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FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE:
THE MODERN DISTORTION OF THE
MEDIEVAL 'LAW MERCHANT'
STEPHEN E. SACHS*
Modern advocates of corporate self-regulation have drawn
unlikely inspiration from the Middle Ages. On the traditional view of
history, medieval merchants who wandered from fair to fair were not
governed by domestic laws, but by their own lex mercatoria, or "law
merchant. " This law, which uniformly regulated commerce across
Europe, was supposedly produced by an autonomous merchant class,
interpreted in private courts, and enforced through private sanctions
rather than state coercion. Contemporary writers have treated
global corporations as descendants of these itinerant traders, urging
them to replace conflicting national laws with a transnational law of
their own creation. The standard history has been accepted by legal
scholars across the ideological spectrum, by economists and
political scientists, and by those drafting new regimes to govern
Internet commerce.
This Article argues that the traditional view is deeply flawed.
Returning to the original sources-especially the court rolls of the
fair of St. Ives, the most extensive surviving records of the period-it
demonstrates that merchants in medieval England were substantially
"© 2006 Stephen E. Sachs. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007; University of
Oxford, B.A. (Hons) 2004; Harvard University, A.B. 2002. This Article is a
revised and expanded version of Stephen Edward Sachs, The 'Law Merchant' and
the Fair Court of St. Ives, 1270-1324 (Mar. 21, 2002) (unpublished A.B. thesis,
Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard University Library), available at
http://www.stevesachs.com/thesis.pdf. I am grateful to Thomas N. Bisson, Paul
Brand, Richard Brooks, Josh Chafetz, Charles Donahue, Vasugi Ganeshananthan,
Samantha Kahn Herrick, John H. Langbein, John Maddicott, Amanda Schwoerke,
and Gregory Smith for advice and comments on earlier drafts, and to Merton
College, Oxford, for financial support. All errors, of course, remain my own.
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subject to local control. Commercial customs and substantive laws
varied significantly across towns and fairs, and did not constitute a
coherent legal order. The traditional interpretation has been
retained, not for its accuracy, but for ideological reasons and for its
long and self-reinforcing pedigree. This Article takes no position on
the merits of shielding multinational actors from domestic law; it
merely denies that the Middle Ages provide a model for such
policies.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 1270, the wine merchant Gerard of Cologne appeared
before the fair court of St. Ives to retrieve his property. A small vill
in the county of Huntingdonshire, England, St. Ives was the site of an
annual fair every Easter, and a special court had been established
within the fair to hear disputes. Three containers of Gerard's Rhenish
wine had allegedly been seized as collateral in another controversy,
and he was ready to swear an oath to establish his ownership and get
them back. Unfortunately, the records note, he did not come
"sufficiently equipped"-and then a curious phrase-"according to
law merchant."' Gerard was told to return with five oath-helpers,
who would also swear oaths to guarantee the truth of his claim. 2
No further proceedings in the case are recorded, and Gerard of
Cologne-who probably never did retrieve his wine-might seem to
have had little relevance for the future development of commercial
law. Yet 730 years later, echoes of Gerard's failure were heard in the
report of an American Bar Association panel on "Achieving Legal
and Business Order in Cyberspace." In July 2000, the ABA panel
suggested that courts should turn to "a 'law merchant' for the
Internet" in enforcing mandatory, non-binding arbitration clauses, as
well as in regulating the activities of automated software robots.3
One might well wonder how this unusual term, the "law
merchant," could possibly have retained a consistent meaning across
more than seven centuries. How could any institution that required
oath-helpers of Gerard of Cologne also provide a model for the
transnational regulation of Internet 'bots'?
1. 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT 5 (Charles Gross ed. &
trans., Selden Society 23, 1908) [hereinafter I SCLM]. The translation here offered
by Gross is likely to be in error; the original text reads "secundum legem
mercatorum," rather than the more common phrase "secundum legem
mercatoriam," for which the translation may be more appropriate. See infra text
accompanying note 258.
2. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5; cf infra text accompanying note 88
(describing compurgation).
3. American Bar Association Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project,
Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 Bus. LAW. 1801, 1822, 1933
(2000).
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For hundreds of years, however, historians have sought from the
Middle Ages evidence of an independent, exclusively mercantile
legal system as a solution to contemporary problems of foreign trade.
Since the early seventeenth century, the prevailing view has been
that fair courts like that of St. Ives enforced a body of law known as
"the law merchant." This law differed from the municipal laws of
existing jurisdictions in that it was created autonomously by
merchants and expressed their customs, reflecting unwritten usages
rather than the written command of a sovereign legislator. At the
same time, the law merchant was not the product of a single
merchant guild or even a single country, but was rather universal, the
creature of the transnational merchant community, establishing
substantive principles and convenient procedures to govern
commerce across political borders. The law merchant thus
represented a new legal order, free from the oppressive control of
local laws and local lords. In the words of Levin Goldschmidt, a
nineteenth-century German lawyer and historian, "'out of his own
needs and his own views' the merchant of the Middle Ages created
the Law Merchant."4
This "Romantic" vision of a universal law merchant-produced,
interpreted, and enforced by a legally autonomous merchant class-
is still accepted in various forms by most studies of English
commercial law.' It has been adopted by legal scholars across the
4. WILLIAM MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW
MERCHANT 161 (1904) (quoting Goldschmidt), cited in LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE
LAW MERCHANT 9 (1983). The quotation from Goldschmidt is more fully given in
MITCHELL, supra, at 10 ("The grandeur and significance of the medieval merchant
... is that he creates his own laws out of his own needs and his own views.").
5. See, e.g., BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW (1990) [hereinafter
BENSON, ENTERPRISE OF LAW]; HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION
(1983); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE
209 (2d ed. 2002); TRAKMAN, supra note 4; Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of
Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 4 n.3, 5 (2004); Bruce L. Benson, Justice Without Government: The
Merchant Courts of Medieval Europe and Their Modern Counterparts, in THE
VOLUNTARY CITY 127 (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Benson,
Justice Without Government]; Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New
Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial
Transactions, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 317 (1984); William C. Jones, An Inquiry into the
History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United
States, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 445 (1958); Leonard P. Liggio, The Medieval Law
688 [21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
ideological spectrum, from Richard Posner to Roberto Unger; 6 it has
made its way into standard first-year casebooks;7 and it has
profoundly influenced the development of commercial law in the
modem era.' The rapid expansion of cross-border trade and the rise
of electronic commerce-in which borders are all but invisible-
suggest to some that a "new law merchant" is emerging, and that
existing national legal systems would do well to strengthen its
institutions and defer to its authority.'
Merchant: Economic Growth Challenged by the Public Choice State, 9 J. DES
ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 63 (1999); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise
and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1551, 1593-1601 (2003). (Trakman's views have since moderated on certain
points. See Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant
Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265 (2003) [hereinafter Trakman, E-Merchant Law]; see
also infra note 27.)
The term "Romantic" is not necessarily pejorative. See WYNDHAM ANSTIS
BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT (photo. reprint 1986) (1923).
6. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 73-74 (1985)
(claiming that merchants wished to avoid "government bureaucracies and
government courts" and therefore "struggled to develop their own associations and
their own law alongside the bureaucratic law of the state"); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 257
(1979) ("Throughout the Middle Ages European merchants had their own private
courts and law for the adjudication of commercial disputes."). Posner twice
described the "medieval merchants' courts" as "private courts" in Discussion by
Seminar Participants, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 347 (1979). For references to
medieval commerce in other studies of private legal systems, see ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 137 n.2 (1991); and Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1763 n.161 (2001).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 2
(6th ed. 2003) (asserting that medieval merchants "administered a remarkably
effective system which did not depend upon state enforcement mechanisms"); id.
at 6.
8. For a discussion of the impact of Goldschmidt's work on modem American
law, especially with regard to Karl Llewellyn and the formation of the Uniform
Commercial Code, see James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American
Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code,
97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987); and compare U.C.C. § 1-103(b), 1 U.L.A. 20 (1989)
("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant .... supplement its provisions.").
9. For a (limited) sample of such works, see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The
Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION 1 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990); Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
2006] 689
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The appropriateness of a "new law merchant" to regulate cross-
border commerce is far beyond the scope of this study. What this
Article seeks to show, however, is that the historical experience of
medieval mercantile law has been grossly misconceived. The
Romantic interpretation is deeply inaccurate, at least as applied to the
experience of medieval England, and provides a prime example of
the misuse of historical evidence in support of political ends.
The origins of the "new law merchant" model, Filip De Ly once
worried, "have been discussed by many authors, but have rarely been
subject to thorough analysis." As a result, "the subject has largely
remained obscure," and "there is hardly any evidence to determine
whether the medieval law merchant had autonomous standing" apart
from the local municipal law.10
Yet De Ly's concerns seem overly pessimistic, especially in light
of the evidence from the fair court of St. Ives. St. Ives is particularly
well-suited for a focused study of the Romantic thesis. In the early
thirteenth century, the rural village was the site of one of the largest
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1643 (1996); L. Yves
Fortier, The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or, Back to the Future, 17 ARB. INT'L 121
(2001); Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, FORUM INTERNATIONALE, Nov. 1986,
at 1; Louise Hertwig Hayes, Note, A Modern Lex Mercatoria: Political Rhetoric or
Substantive Progress?, 3 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 210 (1977); Friedrich K. Juenger,
American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1995); Andreas Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's
View, in LEXMERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra, at 37; Clive M. Schmitthoff,
International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in 2 CURRENT LAW AND
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 129 (R. St. J. MacDonald ed., 1961).
On the application of the law merchant to cyberspace, see Matthew R.
Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996); Noel Cox, The Regulation of Cyberspace
and the Loss of National Sovereignty, 11 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 241 (2002);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Delivering Legality on the Internet: Developing Principles for
the Private Provision of Commercial Law, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 154 (2004); I.
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace, " 55 U. PITr. L. REV.
993 (1994); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 553 (1998).
10. FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 8-9,
17-19 (1992).
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fairs in England."l Though it reached its zenith under the reign of
King John, the fair continued to be highly profitable throughout the
1200s as a significant center for the cloth trade, providing an
opportunity for merchants from as far away as Italy to trade their
wares along its central Bridge Street. 12 If the law merchant were
indeed a universal means of regulating medieval commerce, one
should expect it to be in force at St. Ives. 3
More importantly, the activity of the St. Ives court is uniquely well
documented. Far more information is available on the St. Ives
court-both in published works and manuscripts-than on any other
English fair of its day. Fourteen of the fair court's annual plea rolls,
recording the administrative business of the court as well as the cases
argued before it, are preserved in the Public Record Office. The
surviving rolls are variously dated between 1270 and 1324 and
provide the chronological focus for this study. Additionally, the
11. ELLEN WEDEMEYER MOORE, THE FAIRS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1
(Pontifical Inst. of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts 72, 1985); see also Avner
Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual
Responsibility, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 168, 189 (2002)
(describing St. Ives as "one of England's most important fairs"). St. Ives was
located on the River Ouse, and its importance as a center of trade was helped by
the road to Ramsey that ran through it, as well as the well-traveled bridge across
the Ouse that gave the name to "Bridge Street." Lillian J. Redstone, St. Ives, in 2
THE VICTORIA HISTORY OF THE COUNTIES OF ENGLAND: HUNTINGDONSHIRE 210,
211-13 (photo. reprint 1974) (William Page et al. eds., 1932). Henry III bought
immense quantities of textiles there, but its revenues diminished during the reigns
of Edward I and Edward II. Id. at 216.
12. DOROTHY USHER, The Mediaeval Fair of St. Ives, in Two STUDIES OF
MEDIAEVAL LIFE 1, 27 (1953).
13. St. Ives was a river town, and not a port; this study will therefore only be
concerned with trade conducted on land, passing over related issues in the history
of maritime law. Interpretations similar to Goldschmidt's have been proposed for
admiralty law as well, inspired by such documents as the Rhodian Sea Laws, the
Laws of Oleron and Wisby, and the Consolato del Mar. Cf THE RHODIAN SEA-
LAW (photo. reprint 1976) (Walter Ashburner ed. & trans., 1909); MONUMENTA
JURIDICA: THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY (Travers Twiss ed., Rolls Series
55, London, Longman & Co. 1871-1876); CONSULATE OF THE SEA AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS (Stanley S. Jados trans., 1975). However, the sea laws pose
substantially different problems to historians, and modem maritime and
commercial law developed in large measure independently from one another. As a
result, the two fields have often been considered separately, and it is the
commercial history, with its purported rules of general application, rather than the
specialized maritime experience, that has inspired recent suggestions for reform.
2006]
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Selden Society has published a significant number of the records in
two volumes of facing-page translation-one volume edited by the
great legal historian F.W. Maitland, the other by Harvard history
professor Charles Gross.' 4 Though the Gross and Maitland editions
are selective, the extracts were chosen with the design of presenting
as much information as possible about the law as practiced at -St.
Ives.15
Gross had described the St. Ives series as "unrivalled,"' 6 and his
description has remained accurate to the present day. Ellen
Wedemeyer Moore remarked that early documents from English
fairs are "scattered" and present a coherent picture "only when taken
as a whole."' 7 Although the heyday of English fairs was in the
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, most other records from local
fairs are only available for the period after the Black Death. 8 The
only series of documents that Moore regarded as at all comparable to
the St. Ives rolls are the account rolls of the St. Giles fair at
Winchester, which begin in 1287 and continue into the late
14. See 1 SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS 130-
60 (photo. reprint 1974) (Frederic William Maitland ed. & trans., Selden Society 2,
London, B. Quaritch 1889) [hereinafter 1 SELECT PLEAS]; 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at xiii-107. Maitland was only aware of one roll, containing records from .the years
1275 and 1291; in the introduction to his edited selection, he noted that "[i]t would
be an eminently good deed to print the whole roll." 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra, at 130.
15. Maitland was amazed by the rolls' "detailed information about the
commercial law and commercial morals of the thirteenth century," and therefore
emphasized the records of litigation over those describing the court's
administrative tasks. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 130. Gross similarly
sought to identify those records offering the most information "concerning the law
merchant or the procedure of the fair courts." Charles Gross, Introduction to 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at xv.
16. Charles Gross, Introduction to 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at xv.
17. MOORE, supra note 11, at 2-3.
18. For the period before the Black Death, Gross's volume contains only a
handful of cases from the fair and piepowder courts of Carnarvon, dated 1325-
1326, as well as from the fair court of Wye, dated 1332. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
107-11. The records of eleven cases heard in the fair court of Leicester in 1347
have been preserved among other records of the city, but they are in poor
condition, and the legible cases contain little information on the functioning of the
court. See 2 RECORDS OF THE BOROUGH OF LEICESTER 72-74 (Mary Bateson ed.,
1901); cf Albert Thomas Carter, The Early History of the Law Merchant in
England, 17 LAW Q. REv. 232, 232 (1901) ("[T]he local records ... have most
unfortunately been lost or destroyed.").
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fourteenth century. However, the latter are records of account and
contain primarily fiscal information, which will not help us in
examining the justice practiced in the fair courts.' 9 The thesis of an
autonomous, universal law merchant must be tested on the evidence
available, and no source contains as complete a description of an
English fair before the plague as the St. Ives rolls. The fair court
records must therefore be trusted to depict accurately the experience
of commercial law in English fairs of this period. Furthermore,
although a great deal of original work has been done on English
commercial law in the last twenty years, there has been no systematic
examination of the St. Ives documents with an eye towards proving
or disproving the Romantic thesis.20
What the fair court rolls reveal is that the merchants of St. Ives did
not create their own legal order out of their own needs and views.
Rather, the administration of the fair was in large part subject to the
authority of the king of England and of the abbey of Ramsey, a
powerful and wealthy monastic foundation that held both the St. Ives
19. MOORE, supra note 11, at 3.
20. Significant works include JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, The Law Merchant and
the Common Law Before 1700, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW
341 (1986) (studying local customs and the common-law courts); JAMES STEVEN
ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES (1995)
(investigating bills of exchange); and LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM
(Mary Elizabeth Basile et al. eds. & trans., 1998) (presenting a thirteenth-century
commercial treatise). (Because LEX MERCA TORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM contains
two separately paginated sections, references to the original text of the treatise will
hereinafter be cited as LEX MERCATORIA, while references to the editors'
commentary will be cited as LMLP.) Moore examined the St. Ives rolls
extensively, but her discussion centered on the economic and social conditions of
the fair rather than the nature of the law practiced in its court. See generally
MOORE, supra note 11.
Some additional work has been done on Continental sources, including
Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria
Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427 (1999); Emily Kadens, Order Within Law,
Variety Within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 39 (2004); and especially Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early
Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L.
21 (2004). However, the traditional understanding of medieval mercantile law in
the Anglo-American historiography has largely been derived from English sources,
see Kadens, supra, at 40 n.6, and effective criticism of the traditional interpretation
must cover the same ground.
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fair and the manor of Slepe in which the viii was located."1 The king
and abbot had significant authority over the establishment of legal
principles, the resolution of disputes, and the enforcement of the fair
court's judgments. The merchants did participate in each of these
areas of authority, especially in rendering judgments. However, the
same could be said of the unfree suitors of a contemporary manorial
court, and there is little evidence indicating that the merchants who
traded at St. Ives possessed any unique rights to independence or
autonomous self-government. In fact, the best way of understanding
the fair court may not be as a special court for merchants, but rather
as a seignorial court-a lord's court-the business of which was
primarily commercial in nature.22
Moreover, the fair court rolls, in combination with evidence from
the charters and custumals of English towns, indicate that the "lex
mercatoria" occasionally cited at St. Ives could not have functioned
as a universal law for the merchant class. Goldschmidt would have
agreed (indeed, insisted) that the law merchant was a customary law;
it derived its force from mercantile customs, and not from any
official promulgation or enactment. Yet these customs were not
necessarily constitutive of a coherent legal order, nor were they
necessarily shared across any great distance. Within St. Ives, the use
of the phrase "secundum legem mercatoriam" did not invoke a
specific body of substantive principles ("according to the law
merchant"), but rather referred indefinitely to whatever principles
might be appropriate to the case, according to a mixture of local
custom and contemporary notions of fair dealing (i.e., "according to
mercantile law"). Claims that these principles were universal founder
on the clear differences among the various customs of English fairs
and towns. Indeed, the fair court rolls give no impression whatsoever
21. St. Ives came into the possession of the abbey of Ramsey in Anglo-Saxon
times, and it is estimated that in 1300, approximately 800 individuals lived in the
vill as unfree tenants of the abbot. Redstone, supra note 11, at 216; MOORE, supra
note 11, at 231. ("Viii" is the term used by Gross in his translation of the court
rolls; Redstone occasionally described St. Ives as a "town," but it was certainly not
a "town" or "city" in the sense of a legally independent corporation. Redstone,
supra note 11, at 216.) The abbey of Ramsey has itself been the focus of a great
deal of study, and there exists a large amount of excellent documentary evidence
on its holdings. See, e.g., J. AMBROSE RAFTIS, THE ESTATES OF RAMSEY ABBEY
(Pontifical Inst. of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts 3, 1957).
22. Cf ROGERS, supra note 20, at 25.
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that the suitors considered themselves to participate in a tradition of
commercial law extending beyond the borders of St. Ives. The point
is not, as it has sometimes been put, that "the Law Merchant acquired
a distinctly local flavour" as it was haltingly and imperfectly realized
by various jurisdictions;23 rather, there only existed a diversity of
local practices, a diversity which has since been reified by scholars
into a single-and fictional-"Law Merchant."
Given this evidence, why has a flawed interpretation of medieval
commercial law succeeded so brilliantly? The thesis that the Middle
Ages happened upon a universal means of commercial self-
regulation is of more than mere historical interest; it has repeatedly
been used to support various political programs, from the
jurisdictional claims of the civil lawyers in seventeenth-century
England to the demands for self-government of the merchant Volk in
Goldschmidt's day. In the era of globalization, the Romantic thesis
has taken on new life, as scholars attempt to craft a new means of
regulating international commerce-or even regulating the
Internet-based on the model of the medieval law merchant.
Such models, however, are clearly divorced from historical reality.
Broad principles of mercantile law may perhaps have been widely
shared in medieval Europe; merchants would presumably have
preferred justice that was swift and fair, that took notice of
mercantile customs, and that did not place contradictory demands on
those trading across jurisdictional lines. But there is no suggestion in
the fair court rolls of an autonomous legal order that spanned the
continent; there might have been mercantile laws and customs, but
no Romantic law merchant. What similarities existed in the
regulation of commerce may be better explained as the convergent
evolution of local practices, rather than the conscious expansion
across Europe of a distinct body of law. The memory of medieval
commerce has been distorted considerably in the seven centuries
since Gerard lost his wine; the evidence from St. Ives fails to support
the view that the merchants of the Middle Ages "were subject to no
legal order but their own."24
23. Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 276.
24. LMLP, supra note 20, at 188 (describing a view contrary to that of the
editors).
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I. MERCHANT AUTONOMY AND MERCANTILE
COURTS
"If you read the law reports of the seventeenth century," Thomas
Scrutton wrote in 1909, "you will be struck with one very remarkable
fact; either Englishmen of that day did not engage in commerce, or
they appear not to have been litigious people in commercial matters,
each of which alternatives appears improbable." 5
What Scrutton wrote of the seventeenth century might be said with
more justice of earlier periods: that if you read the records of the
English Crown, you might well assume that medieval merchants
almost never appeared before the courts. Indeed, many modem
writers have adopted this position, and claimed that medieval
merchants turned to a private legal system instead. Bermardo
Cremades and Steven Plehn described an idyllic past in which
sovereigns "adopted a laissez-faire approach toward the merchant
class," granting merchants full autonomy "provided they did not
infringe on local concerns. '"26 According to Leon Trakman, the courts
recognized the capacity of merchants "to regulate their own
affairs,"27 and Harold Berman claimed that the merchant community
"organized international fairs and markets" and "formed mercantile
25. Thomas Edward Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the Law
Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7, 7 (John
H. Wigmore ed., 1909) [hereinafter 3 SELECT ESSAYS].
26. Cremades & Plehn, supra note 5, at 318.
27. TRAKMAN, supra note 4, at 9. In his recent work, he took a more nuanced
view of the influence of existing local authorities over merchant courts:
"[H]owever autonomous medieval merchants may have been depicted as being,
they were clearly subject to the influence of local forces," an influence "quite
apparent . . . in the influence exerted by local rulers over courts of the fair
generally and in local influence at the fair of St. Ives." Trakman, E-Merchant Law,
supra note 5, at 266 & n.3; see also Erratum, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. Table of
Contents (Spring 2004) (citing Stephen Edward Sachs, The 'Law Merchant' and
the Fair Court of St. Ives, 1270-1324 (Mar. 21, 2002) (unpublished A.B. thesis,
Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard University Library), available at
http://www.stevesachs.com/thesis.pdf); Donahue, supra note 20, at 23. n.8.
However, Trakman continued to maintain that "many local princes and rulers"
adopted "[a] hands-off approach towards the Law Merchant," which required "a
sacrifice of physical control over merchant trade." Trakman, E-Merchant Law,
supra note 5, at 274. (He also noted that "[o]ver the decades [his] views ... have
changed" concerning the nature and extent of the "resurgence" of a "'modem' Law
Merchant." Id. at 278 n.66. But see infra text accompanying note 239.)
696 [21:685
FROM ST. IvEs TO CYBERSPACE
courts" to administer them. 8 Similarly, Bruce Benson presented a
vision of merchants who "wanted to expand international trade" but
found "highly localized legal systems [standing] in their way"; to
avoid these legal systems, they created their own, building an
autonomous law merchant that was "voluntarily produced,
voluntarily adjudicated, and voluntarily enforced. 29
Yet to what extent was the fair court a court of the merchants, a
court that belonged to the merchant community and that consistently
enforced its will? The fair court of St. Ives-of the type widely
referred to as "merchant courts," or "courts of piepowder"-was
established to hear cases arising out of the fair, many of which would
naturally be commercial in nature. But the mercantile orientation of
much of its business does not imply that the fair court was an
institution under mercantile control. The vision of medieval
mercantile law as an entirely private legal system-with legal
principles developed, interpreted, and enforced by merchants-
would be frustrated if external authorities were found to wield
substantial influence over mercantile courts.
To answer this question, this section will consider the sources of
authority in the fair court's executive, judicial, and legislative
functions.30 Analyzing the evidence through these three categories
shows that the merchants did not exercise anything approaching a
monopoly of power over the fair court's day-to-day operations. Both
in theory and practice, the fair court of St. Ives was a creature of the
king of England and of its lord, the abbot of Ramsey. While the
merchants may have exercised some influence in the court's
decision-making, the evidence from St. Ives does not indicate the
presence of a radically independent and self-governing merchant
community. The power that the merchant community exercised
28. BERMAN, supra note 5, at 340. Even Kadens, whose analysis differs
radically from Berman's (and who recognized that fair courts "were not... purely
merchant institutions"), held that such courts should be categorized with "guild
courts, specialized commercial courts, and commercial arbitration" as "private
mercantile legal systems," to be contrasted with the civil courts---"of the town, the
prince, or the Church"-where the "governing local law" was the default source of
legal principles. Kadens, supra note 20, at 53, 64.
29. Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 128.
30. The division of authority along these lines is somewhat anachronistic, as
the court itself did not acknowledge such divisions.
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within the fair court was not unique to St. Ives or to merchant courts
generally, but rather was common to local courts across England.
The same could be said for many of the substantive legal rules
applied at St. Ives, which were subject to the control of Crown and
abbot and which strongly resembled those of other local courts. Most
importantly, the very notion of a legal system reserved for merchants
may well have been incoherent during this period, as merchants did
not enjoy the status of a separate and distinct personal class.
Indeed, if you were to follow Scrutton's approach in reading the
records of the central royal courts, you would be looking in the
wrong place. A great deal of litigation in medieval England occurred
in local and seignorial courts, which ought to be our natural basis for
comparison. The misconception of the fair courts as "private" results
from an anachronistic identification of the central royal courts with
what would later be termed "the state." The court of St. Ives is most
comprehensible in the terms of its contemporaries, as a seignorial
court subject to the power of the abbot; the fair court was part of a
pre-existing political framework rather than an autonomous
merchant-led legal order.
A. "VOLUNTARILY ENFORCED"
1. Enforcement by the Abbot
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of Benson's formulation is its
description of mercantile law as "voluntarily enforced." On this
view, merchant courts were private courts with limited ability to
enforce their judgments, lacking "the coercive authority of a state."
Instead, these courts relied on voluntary private enforcement, such as
the boycott of traders who refused to respect the court's decisions.3'
Cremades and Plehn described medieval mercantile law as "largely
self-enforcing," as a trader "who refused to comply" with a decision
"risked his reputation and could be excluded from trading at the all-
important fairs .... Parties to a dispute rarely needed the aid of the
local sovereign to enforce a merchant court's decision."32 Paul
Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast portrayed mercantile
courts as operating "without the benefit of state enforcement of
31. BENSON, ENTERPRISE OF LAW, supra note 5.
32. Cremades & Plehn, supra note 5, at 319.
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contracts"; only in later ages could the state "seize the property of
individuals who resisted paying judgments, or put them into jail. 33
Their analysis was later seconded by Edward Schwartz, who
suggested that "the law merchant has no power to coerce any party
into paying a judgment. 3 4
In contrast, however, the St. Ives documents show that such
coercive power-to enforce decisions, to collect damages, and to
assess fines-was exercised routinely. Indeed, in the context of
thirteenth-century legal theory, there could have been little dispute
about such questions; these powers lay very clearly in the hand of the
abbot of Ramsey. The court was part of the abbey's patrimony,
which included the manor of Slepe in which the village was located.
The residents of St. Ives were largely of villein status and owed
tenurial obligations to the abbey.35 The abbot therefore had direct,
personal jurisdiction over the many residents of St. Ives who appear
in the court rolls, and who came before the fair court as before the
court of their lord. Until St. Ives received a town charter in 1874,
some six centuries after the court rolls were written, there was no
officially recognized municipal jurisdiction within the town, and any
33. Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade, 2
ECON. & POL. 1, 2, 20-21 (1990); see also Douglass C. North, Institutions,
Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF MERCHANT EMPIRES 22, 30 (James D. Tracy ed., Ctr. for Early
Modern History, Studies in Comparative Early Modem History 2, 1991)
(describing "the voluntaristic structure of enforcement of contracts via internal
merchant organizations").
34. EDWARD P. SCHWARTZ, ESSAYS IN THE POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF
JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 82 (1993). Unfortunately, Schwartz followed Milgrom,
North, and Weingast in a particularly egregious error by treating the "law
merchant" as a person, an individual merchant whose task it was to arbitrate
disputes. See Milgrom et al., supra note 33, at 16 (initially treating the "Law
Merchant" as an individual for the purposes of an economic model, but then stating
that "[i]t might be that the Law Merchant is a more sedentary merchant than the
long-distance traders whom he serves"); see also SCHWARTZ, supra, at 103 (the
goal of finding knowledgeable judges "was achieved by choosing law merchants
from among the population of traders at a fair").
35. MooRE, supra note 11, at 231; see also Redstone, supra note 11, at 216
("The tenure of the houses within the immediate region of the fair was almost
entirely copyhold .... [Tenants] paid a yearly rent, and did customary works,
being particularly bound to mow the abbot's Great Holme or meadow, and to be
obedient to his bailiff.").
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mercantile courts held there operated solely under the authority of its
feudal lord.36
Moreover, the abbot's rights in the fair had been confirmed by
royal grant. When the abbey received a charter from Henry I granting
the right to hold an annual fair at St. Ives in 1110, the terms of the
charter included the customary rights to take tolls in the fair and to
hold a court to govern it.37 A dispute over the extent of this grant in
the mid-thirteenth century illustrates well the official view of the St.
Ives fair and its court. In 1252, the abbot of Ramsey sued several
royal bailiffs for extending the term of the royal peace for three
weeks after the end of the fair-in other words, adding a three-week-
long royal fair at St. Ives, leading many merchants to delay their
arrival until after the abbot's fair had ended. The abbot and monks
claimed that these actions were "contrary to their charter and
contrary to the will of the king who had that charter made for their
benefit"; the fair had been given "as an appurtenance to Ramsey
abbey in free and perpetual alms," so that the abbots had possession
of it "as of their own soil, with which they could do as they
pleased."38 The plaintiffs repeatedly invoked the argument that the
36. Redstone, supra note 11, at 216 ("[P]iepowder courts [in St. Ives], as well
as courts baron for the manors of Slepe and the priory, retained a purely seignorial
character.").
37. The charter of Henry I granted the abbot a fair
to be held from Tuesday in Easter week until the octave, well and truly, with
sac and soc, toll and theam, and infangentheof and with all customs such as
any fair in all England has. And I wish and command that all coming there,
staying there, or going away from there, may enjoy my firm peace.
Charter to the Abbot of Ramsey (1110), in A SOURCE BOOK FOR MEDIEVAL
ECONOMIC HISTORY 119, 119-20 (Roy C. Cave & Herbert H. Coulson eds., 1936)
(quoting 2 CARTULARIUM MONASTERII DE RAMESEIA 101 (W. H. Hart & P. A.
Lyons eds., Rolls Series 79, London, Longman 1886) [hereinafter 2 CARTUL.
MONAST. DE RAMES.]). The phrase "sac and soc" represented the grant of
jurisdiction along with the profits of justice, and the power to compel attendance at
the court. JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 44
(1996); see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 578-80 (photo.
reprint 1952) (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1898).
38. Ramsey v. Taylor, Curia Regis Roll 146, 36 Hen. 3, m. 10, 10d (K.B.
1252), in SELECT CASES IN PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY III, at 25,
26 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds. & trans., Selden Society 60, 1941)
[hereinafter PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT] (emphasis added); see also 2 SELECT
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St. Ives fair was held on "their own soil," and they protested that the
king's bailiffs had collected tolls and rent even from "the abbot's
houses, stalls, and booths and from the boats and ships which were
moored to the abbot's own soil." The plaintiffs also represented St.
Ives as a private hundred,39 saying that "Hurstingstone hundred
belongs to the abbot, and he has and always ought to have the
attachments which arise from plaints within the fair and outside it,
and [the right] to hear those plaints at his pleasure where he may
wish."4 The resolution of the case is not preserved, but three years
later, Henry III sold to the abbot all the revenues and jurisdiction of
the fair however long it might last--establishing abbatial control
over the fair for the entire period of the extant court rolls. 1
The executive authority of the abbot over the fair, so well
established in theory, was also confirmed in practice. The officers of
the fair court-the steward, the bailiffs, and the clerks-were
appointed by the abbot or by his representatives. The court was held
CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT lxxxvii-lxxxix (Hubert Hall ed., Selden
Society 46, 1930) [hereinafter 2 SCLM].
39. A royally established subdivision under the sole control of a lord. Cf James
C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 165 (1983)
("The term 'hundred' escapes uniform definition, but historically it refers to a
subdivision of a county, measured either by a number of villages or by
population.").
40. Ramsey, in PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT, supra note 38, at 27-29. The royal
bailiffs replied by asserting the king's power over the fair: once the term of the
abbot's fair ended, the fair "came into the king's hand," and "the abbot can in fact
claim no rights in either fair or market after the time of this fair is past." However,
the bailiffs did not contest the abbot's lordship over the fair during the period of
the king's one-week grant. Id. at 28-29.
41. Charter to the Abbot and Convent of Ramsey, 42 Hen. 3, m. 2 (May 7,
1258), in 2 CALENDAR OF THE CHARTER ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC
RECORD OFFICE 10 (1906) [hereinafter 2 CHARTER ROLLS]. The record of the case
ends with the commissioning of a jury, consisting of twelve knights and twelve
merchants, to investigate the customary rights of the abbot over the St. Ives fair.
Ramsey, in PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT, supra note 38, at 30. Gross gleaned from
"vague statements of Matthew Paris" that "judgment was pronounced against the
abbot." Gross, supra note 15, at xxviii. Many years later, Edward I transferred the
annual rent the abbot paid for the fair to his Queen Eleanor by charter, and in 1293,
Edward granted the abbot a weekly market on Mondays in addition to the fair.
Charter to Queen Eleanor, 3 Edw., m. 3 (Oct. 22, 1275), in 2 CHARTER ROLLS,
supra, at 192, 193; Charter to the Abbot and Convent of Ramsey, 21 Edw., m. 4
(May 14, 1293), in 2 CHARTER ROLLS, supra, at 427.
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in the abbot's own administrative buildings,42 and the fines and
amercements paid in the fair court went to the abbot's treasury. 43 The
42. An entry from 1295 describes an oath sworn "at St. Ives, in the hall of the
abbot of Ramsey where pleas are held during the fair." 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
67. Additionally, the bailiffs of the town of Huntingdon, which held the rights to
certain taxes in the fair, swore their oaths on May 7, 1300, "at St. Ives, in the hall
of the lord abbot where the pleas of the fair are held." 1 id. at 73; see also
Redstone, supra note 11, at 216. The building housed other courts of the abbot as
well, implying that the fair court was hardly a private institution of the merchants.
Id. at 219.
43. See MOORE, supra. note 11, at 200-01 (observing that though the revenues
from the fair court were relatively small--only £8 9s. in 1287, compared to £126
from stall and shop rentals the year before-the fines and amercements still
represented a valuable source of income).
The manner in which these payments were recorded provides additional
evidence of the abbot's financial interest. The notes in the margins of the St. Ives
court rolls contain information that the scribe or a later reader found significant and
chose to emphasize; as a result, the contents of the marginalia should give us some
insight into the court's purpose in maintaining records. Of the first year of records
that Gross translated, for example, two-thirds of all marginalia record the amount
of money paid in fines or otherwise rendered to the abbot. See 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 1-10. (Other notes include such information as "Prec' est [it is ordered],"
generally to mark a distraint, or "Memorandum," simply to draw attention to a
proceeding.)
The fact that so many of the marginalia record payments-and that almost
all payments to the court are recorded in the margins-indicates that the court rolls
were used not only by the court to keep track of its proceedings, but also by the
abbot's officials to calculate how much their lord was owed. This may have been
viewed as a more central purpose of the rolls than their use as authorities in future
cases, which seems from the records to have been rather infrequent: out of the
hundreds of proceedings recorded in the Gross and Maitland collections, only five
refer to the record of a previous case on the rolls. See Glemsford v. Longmark (St.
Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 72; Titchwell v. Burdon (St. Ives
Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 81; Lolworth v. Soaper (St. Ives Fair
Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 82; Gavelock v. Trot (St. Ives Fair Ct.
1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 82; Cause v. Ward (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 88.
If the records were indeed primarily fiscal in nature, the St. Ives fair would
have been in keeping with the best administrative practices of its day. An
anonymous treatise on husbandry, written circa 1300 and believed to reflect the
procedures on the Ramsey abbey estates, mentions court rolls only in the context
of assessing the profits of justice: "The steward ought to hand in his court rolls
soon after Michaelmas so that one can charge with these rolls reeves and bailiffs
who ought to render account for the perquisites of courts for the whole year."
Husbandry, in WALTER OF HENLEY AND OTHER TREATISES ON ESTATE
MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING 437 (Dorothea Oschinsky ed. & trans., 1971)
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watchmen and constables as well as the jurors of presentment were
unfree men who owed services to the abbot as their lord. 4 The
abbot's men were responsible for collecting payments to the court,45
requiring the parties' appearance,46 continuing private prosecutions
on their own authority,47 distraining absent defendants by seizing
their goods,48 and conducting lawbreakers to jail.49
These practices, most notably the authority to imprison
defendants, are difficult to reconcile with the interpretation that
merchant courts lacked coercive power. Avner Greif, for example,
wrote that "during this period English law precluded ... punishing a
borrower who defaulted with imprisonment."5 This statement may
(ca. 1300) [hereinafter WALTER OF HENLEY]. Oschinsky argued that the original
version of this treatise was included in the remembrance produced for John of
Sawtrey, who was abbot of Ramsey from 1286 to 1316. Dorothea Oschinsky,
Introduction to Husbandry, in WALTER OF HENLEY, supra, at 200-01.
44. See generally MOORE, supra note 11, at 160-73.
45. See Knaresborough v. Leyland (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 1 (charging the bailiff William of Graveley with collecting the
amercement).
46. See Bolton v. Goldsmith (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 158 ("[The defendant] withdrew from the court in contempt of the
Abbot and his bailiffs.").
47. See Tanner v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
48 (in which the steward ordered an inquest "'ex officio,' as if at the suit of the lord
king"); Benefield v. Fittleton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
74. In most cases, however, the proceedings were ended if the plaintiff failed to
appear. See, e.g., Howell v. Mules (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 28; Broughton v. Canwick (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 46; Glemsford v. Longmark (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in I SCLM, supra note 1, at
72.
48. See, e.g., Waite v. Curtrey (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 30 ("[The defendant] broke the seal of William Unwin of Sawtry, a bailiff of
the fair, which had been placed on his booth because he would not be justiced to
answer Adam Waite plaintiff.").
49. See, e.g., 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 16 (ordering Ralph of Armston and his
fellow bailiffs to "cause the bodies of all the said harlots and the bodies of all other
harlots, wherever they may be found within the bounds and lists of the fair, to be
arrested and brought to the court and held in safe custody until etc.").
50. Greif, supra note 11, at 195; see also Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange
Without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L.
109, 134 n.69 (2004) [hereinafter Greif, Impersonal Exchange]. For a wider
discussion of medieval punishments for debt,- see W.J. Jones, The Foundations of
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have been true of the law enforced in central royal courts, but not
necessarily in local courts, and certainly not in St. Ives.5' In Ribaud
v. Russell, a pair of feather-merchants were accused of failing to pay
their agent his commissions; they were unable to prove their case or
pay the damages, and therefore pledged "their bodies"-in Gross's
explanation, a euphemism for imprisonment. 2 A number of other
cases involved imprisonment for debt,53 including minor debts,54 and
defendants who "refused to be justiced . . . and to stand trial" could
be forced to pledge their bodies as well.55 Even when the court did
not resort to extreme measures such as imprisonment (or exile),56 the
English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early Modern Period,
TRANSACTIONS OF AM. PHIL. SOC'Y, July 1979, at 5, 11-14.
51. Indeed, Greif s statement would not even be true of royal courts during this
period if the debt had been secured by a bond under the 1285 Statute of Merchants.
Statute of Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in I STATUTES OF THE
REALM 98-100 (photo. reprint 1993) (London, George Eyre & Andrew Strahan
1810).
52. Ribaud v. Russell (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in I SCLM, supra note 1, at 15-
16, 16 n.1. They were later released on their own recognizance. Id. at 16.
53. In 1291, Robert Almain defaulted on a debt that William of Sheepshed had
guaranteed; he was later ordered to pay Sheepshed 12d. as well as 2s. damages,
and pledged his body as a guarantee of payment. Sheepshed v. Almain (St. Ives
Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 48. Another such case is Hereford v.
Lyons (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 62-63, in which the
defendant "in the presence of the lord's steward ... binds himself so that if he does
not so pay, his body together with all his chattels may be detained until satisfaction
shall have been made." This latter case may have attempted to rely on a royal
statute justifying the detention, but there is good reason to characterize the
invocation of the statute as mere pretext. See infra text accompanying notes 169-
173.
54. In 1275, Alice Crese claimed that she had been given a respite from
payment for 2s. worth of bread purchased from Richard of Ely two weeks earlier.
When she was unable to prove her case or pay for the bread, she was forced to
pledge her body. Ely v. Crese (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 158-59.
55. Benefield v. Fittleton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
74.
56. When Roger of Pontefract and his wife Beatrice were convicted of stealing
shoes worth 2.5d. in 1291, it was judged that "because the said shoes are of little
value, wherefore no one may lose life or limb," they should instead "leave the vill
of St. Ives and never more hereafter return thereto." Shepherd v. Pontefract (St.
Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 38. A similar penalty was
prescribed that same year for the ten-year-old John, son of William, son of Agnes
of Lynn, who was found stealing a purse near the bridge in St. Ives, "because he is
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far more common practice of seizing and withholding goods still
required a coercive power far beyond an organized boycott.
Moreover, the abbot claimed-and the fair court enforced-a
monopoly on the use of such physical coercion within the fair. A
plaintiff in 1293 sued a servant of Amice Hendeman who had
attempted to seize his goods, arguing that "the said Amice has no
authority to arrest the goods of [the plaintiff] or of any other
merchant which are hosted in the frontages during the fair, [nor has
anyone] save only the lord abbot and his bailiffs."57 In 1287, a man
named Totte Simon attempted to collect a tax on wool; because he
"executed this office without warrant and without the leave of the
bailiffs of the fair," he was summoned to the fair court and his goods
were distrained.5 8 Similarly, in 1291, Hamon of Bury St. Edmunds
claimed the right to exercise the office of alnager (measurer of cloth)
without appointment from the abbot. He based his claim on a letter
patent from Sir Roger de Lisle, clerk of the Great Wardrobe-a
powerful royal official-ordering that he be admitted to measure
wool, linen, and canvas. Hamon was arrested on a Saturday for
measuring canvas without appointment to the office. On Monday, the
court cited the "charter of the lord king touching the fair" and
declared that "no bailiff or officer of the lord king should in any way
interfere with the said fair or its appurtenances," since that might
prevent the abbot and convent of Ramsey from "having for ever the
administration of all things pertaining to that fair both inside and
outside the vill": an unabashed statement of abbatial power. Hamon
was finally admitted to his office-after all, he had served as the
abbot's alnager several times in the past-but he was forced to give
up the letter and renounce his claim to office.5 9 The fair court was
thus both willing and able to assert the abbot's power when
challenged, even against higher authorities.
not old enough to sustain the judgment which is ordained and provided for such
evil-doers." In re Lynn (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 42.
57. Bury v. Quy (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 66. The
plaintiff eventually lost the case, but on different grounds. Id.
58. In re Simon (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 16.
59. In re Hamon of Bury St. Edmunds (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in I SCLM,
supra note 1, at 42.
2006]
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
2. Enforcement by the Merchants
As the holder of a royal grant and as the lord of St. Ives, the abbot
of Ramsey enjoyed an immense amount of control over the conduct
of the fair.6° No similar claim to executive authority could plausibly
be made on behalf of the merchant community. 61 Benson wrote of
"the threat of ostracism by the merchant community at large" as a
means of enforcing the decisions of a merchant court, and certainly
traders would have thought twice before extending credit to a man
who had just been convicted of theft.62 But the fair court rolls contain
no evidence that such ostracism was ever institutionalized; indeed,
given that some defendants appear repeatedly in the rolls, one infers
that they lived to trade again.
Some authors, however, have sought to locate such private
enforcement power in the collective actions of mercantile
60. A lord who held a royal charter could exercise significant authority over a
fair even if it were not held on his "own soil." Often the king would grant a fair to
an outside lord to be held in an independent town; in such cases, the lord's
authority would supersede that of the town burgesses. The bishop of Winchester,
for example, held "little jurisdiction" over the town itself, which was a royal
borough, "or over the port of Southampton, the crucial link between St. Giles fair
and its international merchants." MOORE, supra note 11, at 18. However, during
the term of the fair, the power of the civic authorities in Winchester was entirely
transferred to the officers of the bishop, who held the keys of the city gates so long
as the fair lasted. Similar powers were claimed by the lords of fairs in Hereford,
York, Westminster, and many other towns. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at xxi-xxii; see
also K.L. MCCUTCHEON, YORKSHIRE FAIRS AND MARKETS TO THE END OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 124-25 (Publications of the Thoresby Society 39, 1940);
Charles Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 Q. J. ECON. 231, 238 (1906); Sachs,
supra note 27, at 16 n.21.
61. The sole exception to this rule seems to be the practice of individuals
"raising the hue" following an assault, which alerted the fairgoers to the danger.
See, e.g., Hautaine v. Burdon (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
72. However, "raising the hue" appears to have been a common practice in English
villages and was not in any way unique to merchants or fairs. Moreover, as
Maitland notes, although "[e]very good and lawful man is bound to follow the hue
and cry when it is raised," this "improvised and unprofessional police force" was
""utterly inefficient" in locating the culprit. Frederic William Maitland, Outlines of
English Legal History, 560-1600 [hereinafter Maitland, Outlines], in 2 COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 417, 460 (H. A. L. Fisher ed., 1911)
[hereinafter MAITLAND PAPERS].
62. Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 129.
[21:685706
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
organizations.63 A merchant guild, for example, could use boycotts
both to influence the decisions of external actors and to coerce its
own members to abide by guild policy. Greif, Milgrom, and
Weingast found numerous records of guilds taking reprisals against
foreign merchants and "conditioning future trade on adequate past
protection," citing boycott threats in medieval Flanders, Genoa, and
Germany.64 Moreover, boycotts could be maintained by punishing
guild members who violated the rules of the cartel. In 1281, Jakemin
of Liege was ostracized from the guild of Leicester because he "went
through the country in the county of Leicester and took with him
strange merchants and bought wool with the money of those
merchants," thereby threatening the guild's wool monopoly.65
Merchant guilds are, however, only rarely mentioned in the St.
Ives rolls, which provide no evidence of organized boycotts at St.
Ives. 66 Two additional factors would caution against viewing
boycotts as a significant mechanism of private enforcement. First, it
is not clear how effective or credible such threats were. For example,
in a purported exchange of letters in 1299-1300, the fair court of
Champagne (engaged in a dispute with a merchant court in London)
threatened "to inhibit the land and fairs of Champagne and Brie to
all your subjects and their goods. 67 Yet the threat does not appear to
63. See, e.g., Milgrom et al., supra note 33, at 19 (describing mercantile courts
as part of "a system that relies on boycotts as sanctions").
64. Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case
of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745, 755-58 (1994). In 1261, a group of
guilds in five Flemish towns agreed "[f]or the good of the trade" that "if it should
happen that any cleric or any other merchant anywhere in England ... deals falsely
with any merchant in this alliance . . . no present or future member of this alliance
will be so bold as to trade with them." MOORE, supra note 11, at 301, cited in Greif
et al., supra, at 756; see also Greif et al., supra, at 755-56 (discussing the Genoese
boycott of Tabriz in the 1340s); id. at 757 (discussing embargoes by German
merchants of Norway in 1284 and Bruges in 1358).
65. 2 RECORDS OF THE BOROUGH OF LEICESTER, supra note 18, at 205.
66. In fact, there may be no mention of guilds at all; the only possible reference
of which I am aware is found in Almaine v. Flanders (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 8 (describing the presumably German plaintiff as a
"burgher of Lynn").
67. CORNELIUS WALFORD, FAIRS, PAST AND PRESENT 257 (London, Elliot
Stock 1883). These should be compared to the more certainly apocryphal letters
included as a formulary in the treatise Lex Mercatoria. See LEXMERCATORIA, supra
note 20, at 38-40; see also LMLP, supra note 20, at 103-06 (analyzing factual
2006]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
have been carried out, even after the Champagne court's judgment
was disregarded. Large-scale boycotts were a blunt instrument-they
could be far more costly to their organizers than to those whom they
targeted-and should not be viewed as a dominant method of
enforcement for individual cases. (Nor were they always evidence of
mercantile self-enforcement; the keepers of the fairs of Champagne
were knights or royal officials, and represented the interests of the
French Crown.)
Second, and more importantly, the guilds that might organize such
boycotts were not fully private organizations, but were often
coextensive with local municipal jurisdictions. The sentence against
Jakemin of Liege, for example, was pronounced by the mayor of
Leicester.68 This practice was far from unusual, as town governments
were often created out of merchant guilds. As Greif noted elsewhere,
"in many towns the mercantile and municipal organizations were
identical, since the merchant guild was the governing body of the
borough.'69 To the extent that the merchant guild had been officially
endowed with municipal jurisdiction, its enforcement actions cannot
be considered "private" or "voluntary" in the modem sense.
A more sophisticated means of collective self-regulation would be
the "community responsibility system" (CRS) proposed by Greif.70
Under Greif's model, every member of a community could be held
liable for any other member's unpaid debts or breaches of contract.71
In a world of many local jurisdictions with geographically limited
enforcement power, foreign traders could easily escape liability by
fleeing to another town; by holding the defendant's "peers [and]
parceners" equally liable, the CRS could satisfy the plaintiffs
claims, while ensuring that the defendant's irate countrymen would
deficiencies of letters contained in Lex Mercatoria). It is entirely possible that
Walford's letters are apocryphal as well; those from London are attributed to the
Mayor "and the Citizens of London," while Basile et al. noted that "[n]o London
court of which we are aware ... had 'citizens of London' in its title." LMLP, supra
note 20, at 104 n.87; see also infra text accompanying note 314.
68. 2 RECORDS OF THE BOROUGH OF LEICESTER, supra note 18, at 205.
69. Greif, supra note 11, at 183 n.20.
70. See generally Greif, supra note 11; Greif, Impersonal Exchange, supra
note 50.
71. Greif, supra note 11, at 169.
[21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
seek compensation at home.72 The CRS would therefore give the
community a strong interest in the honorable conduct of each of its
members, and could make use of strong intra-community ties to
encourage honest dealing abroad. It could allow for "impersonal
exchange despite the lack of impartial legal enforcement provided by
a third party," and would be "self-enforcing" in the sense that "all
relevant incentives-to individual traders and their communities-
were provided endogenously."73
Yet to the extent that the CRS model applies to St. Ives, it can
hardly be described as a successful example of "voluntary
enforce[ment]" of mercantile law, since it was neither voluntary nor
well-enforced.74 The applications of collective responsibility at St.
Ives were accompanied by a torrent of litigation, with repeated
disagreements as to which merchants were members of which
communities, as well as hasty (and potentially arbitrary) seizures of
goods.75 Even when the system worked as designed, law-abiding
merchants could find their goods confiscated without regard to their
own actions; as Lars Boerner and Albert Ritschl noted, collective
liability had been described from the earliest sources onward as "a
nuisance, an obstacle to merchant activity, and a bad practice that
72. The phrase can be found in S. Michel v. Troner (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1
SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 152.
73. Greif, supra note 11, at 168, 200. For more on the medieval use of
coalitions and collective business entities to prevent cheating, see Greif,
Impersonal Exchange, supra note 50; Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in
Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989);
Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 525 (1993); and Avner
Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL.
ECON. 912 (1994).
74. Nor was it specific to issues of mercantile law; in one case cited by Greif,
the plaintiff complains of the forcible seizure of his property, rather than of an
unpaid debt or breach of contract. Almaine v. Flanders (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 9; Greif, supra note 11, at 188.
75. See, e.g., Blacythemout v. Hamerton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM,
supra note 1, at 3; Currier v. Holdcorn (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 2, 4; Fleetbridge v. Coventry (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS,
supra note 14, at 145-47.
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had to be abolished or at least regulated. 7 6 Indeed, the practice was
prohibited in England by the first Statute of Westminster in 1275,
which forbade the application of collective liability to residents of
England."
76. Lars Boemer & Albert Ritschl, Comment, Individual Enforcement of
Collective Liability in Premodern Europe, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 205, 206 (2002) (citations omitted); cf 2 FLETA ch. 63 (H.G. Richardson &
G.O. Sayles eds., Selden Society 72, 1955) (ca. 1290) (complaining of the practice
"in fairs, markets, [and] cities" of "obstructing, distraining and harassing anyone
who passes through... for a debt due from another.., alleging against him that
he was an associate of the debtor in question," and noting that "this is done with
impunity"); Volckart & Mangels, supra note 20, at 445.
Boerner and Ritschl further argued that the practice was rarely conceived as
a means of individualized contract enforcement. Rather, the creditor was required
first to pursue the debtor in the courts of the latter's own community, and
collective liability would be imposed only as a punishment on communities that
had failed in doing justice. Boemer & Ritschl, supra, at 208. This seems to have
often been the practice at St. Ives; William and Amice of Fleetbridge sued the
entire community of Leicester only after they had "sued for the payment of the said
money in the court of Leicester . . . [and] the commonalty of Leicester made
default of justice... wherefore [the plaintiffs] style them and the others of the said
commonalty detainors, deforceors and principal debtors of the said debt."
Fleetbridge v. Coventry (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14,
at 145-46; see also 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 94-95 (concerning a theft of jewels
by Flemish pirates, which the count of Flanders did not correct); Almaine v.
Flanders (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 9-10; S. Michel v.
Troner (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 152 ("[T]o
obtain which money the said Brun and his representatives have often laboured at
Boston and at Norwich and as yet have not been able to get any part thereof .... ).
Similar requirements can be found in royal charters to Leicester,
Cambridge, and Lubeck. Third Charter of Henry III to the Burgesses of Leicester,
53 Hen. 3, m. 18 (Apr. 20, 1269), in 2 RECORDS OF THE BOROUGH OF LEICESTER,
supra note 18, at 56; Greif, supra note 11, at 194 (quoting THE CHARTERS OF THE
BOROUGH OF CAMBRIDGE 14 (Frederic William Maitland & Mary Bateson eds.,
1901)); id. at 183-84 (quoting Charter to the Merchants of Lubeck, 51 Hen. 3, m.
31 (Dec. 23, 1266), in 6 CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE: HENRY III, at 20 (1913)).
77. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw., cl. 23 (Eng.), reprinted in 1
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 33. Greif described the new remedies
provided in the Statutes of Acton Burnell and of Merchants as a response to this
loss of collective responsibility: "Edward seems to have abolished the system,
recognizing its cost, only to later realize its benefits and gradually introduce an
alternative based on individual legal liability." Greif, Impersonal Exchange, supra
note 50, at 136; see also id. at 135 n.74, 136 n.76; Statute of Acton Burnell, 1283,
11 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 53;
Statute of Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
More fundamentally, in order to be effective, the CRS required the
forcible seizure of goods from the defendant's community, thus
relying on the coercive power of local courts---or, in Greif's terms,
"intra-community contract enforcement institutions."78 Although
these institutions functioned in the "absence of centralized legal
contract enforcement provided by a state," a comparison to state
enforcement is somewhat anachronistic; at most, the CRS served to
assist local authorities in projecting power beyond their own
boundaries, shifting the cost of enforcement to innocent members of
the defendant's community. When no one of that community could
be found in their limited local domain, these authorities were
helpless.7 9 Collective liability provided only a means for the
magnification and projection of local power, rather than a new
merchant-led mechanism of enforcement. 0 Even if the merchants
REALM, supra note 51, at 98. The evidence of Edward's regret is uncertain,
however, because the option of individual suit had always existed. The innovation
of the statutes was the creation of a sealed bond that provided for immediate
execution without litigation, and avoidance of litigation had been no virtue of the
CRS. See supra text accompanying note 75. Moreover, the process of Acton
Burnell was one of extreme formality, requiring an appearance by both creditor
and debtor before the mayor of one of three specified cities, and could not have
been envisioned as a replacement for a widely available process of recovery.
78. Greif, supra note 11, at 200-01.
79. See Grief, Impersonal Exchange, supra note 50, at 132. In 1315, when
Edward II sought to seize the goods of Flemish merchants to compensate for
injuries done by Flemish pirates, the bailiffs of St. Ives responded that no
merchants from Flanders could be found within the fair, and "[t]herefore up to the
present time nothing has been done therein etc." 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 94.
80. Another case of mercantile self-regulation being ultimately dependent on
coercive authority can be found in Grele v. Lucas (Ch. 1292), PRO C258/1 no. 5
(Paul Brand trans., 2003) (on file with author). In 1291, Thomas Lucas bought £31
worth of fish from the German merchant Arnald de Grele at the fair of Lynn, and
was later accused of having left town at night without having paid. According to
the accusation, Lucas then fled "to Boston, from Boston to Lincoln, from Lincoln
to Hull, from Hull to London, always promising [to pay Grele], who followed him
from town to town." Id. m. 3. The "men of his trade" complained to the London
officials that "they had received great harm in the fair at Lynn," because
no foreign merchant would make any sale before full payment was made in
their ships and houses, calling them false debtors and maliciously carrying off
their goods, where previously they could buy £500 or £400 of goods by God's
penny [a nominal down payment used to confirm a sale] without any further
payment.
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had regulated their own affairs, they still depended on the existing
local authorities to make those regulations enforceable.
B. "VOLUNTARILY ADJUDICATED"
Merchant courts have traditionally been conceived as highly
informal affairs. Perhaps the most extreme example was offered by
Bernard Brodhurst, who claimed that "[w]herever a market or fair
was held," disputes would be resolved "by four or five of the
merchants present on the spot," applying "the principles and customs
recognized as obtaining generally among the trading classes."8 The
Id. m. 2. The Londoners also worried that "unless a speedy remedy was provided
on this matter their goods in overseas parts could be arrested until full satisfaction
was given to the said merchant on the said debt." Id.
Although the case does suggest a form of collective action by the foreign
merchants, it does not seem to fit Benson's description of "voluntary
enforcement." Although they had lost their good credit, the Londoners were still
able to trade with others-this was no punitive boycott, but rather a sensible
insistence that those who associate with thieves should pay in advance. Moreover,
although the London traders collectively sought assistance outside of existing legal
structures-they wanted Lucas arrested and held in jail before his trial-they did
so by seeking the intervention of royal officials, complaining that "the good name
of the merchants of London attending fairs ... has been much damaged by his
actions and can be damaged still more unless he can be brought to justice by his
body (since he has nothing) as a warning to others." Id. In January 1292, Lucas
was brought before the royal warden of London (the city was under the king's
direct control at the time), tried, and consigned to the Tower. It was therefore still
necessary to apprehend Lucas as a "warning to others"-the threatened sanction of
loss of credit was insufficient to prevent violations of the rules.
This case therefore casts any theory of independent merchant justice in a
rather poor light; Lucas fled from town to town without the universal law merchant
ever catching up with him. The situation required the intervention of the Crown,
because Lucas "had nothing by which he could be attached [i.e., he was judgment-
proof], nor could he find sureties for a quarter of a year and more"-the medieval
equivalent of posting bail. Id. The possibility of flight was not something that the
transnational community of merchants (or even tighter communities such as the
"men of his trade" or the merchants of London) could address on their own, and
the use of physical force by local authorities, rather than merely boycotts by
aggrieved merchants, was at some basic level necessary to make the system work.
(I am indebted to Paul Brand for bringing this case to my attention.)
81. Bernard Edward Spencer Brodhurst, The Merchants of the Staple, in 3
SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 25, at 16, 25 (citing GEORGE NORTON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION & CHARTERED FRANCHISES OF
THE CITY OF LONDON 324 (E. Tyrrell ed., London, Longman 3d ed. 1869)). Little
good evidence exists to support Brodhurst's position; the charter of Henry III cited
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process of the St. Ives court was certainly more formal than that, but
a number of authors have attributed independent judicial authority to
the merchant community. On this interpretation, the decisions in
mercantile matters were rendered by merchants themselves, either as
a collective body or in individual proceedings resembling modem
arbitration.
82
The evidence from St. Ives, however, fails to show that the
merchant community exercised a unique degree of influence in the
adjudication of mercantile cases. Although the merchants did
participate in rendering decisions, this "participatory" structure was
common to local courts throughout England. Furthermore, the
merchants were hardly an autonomous legal class; mercantile cases
and appeals could be heard in the royal courts, and the abbot of
Ramsey had significant power to alter the course of litigation in St.
Ives. Rather than modem tribunals for arbitration, England's
mercantile courts far more closely resembled the local and seignorial
courts that were their contemporaries.
by Norton says nothing at all about "four or five" citizens. Charter of 52 Hen. 3,
98 (Mar. 26, 1268), in 1 LIBER ALBUS, LIBER CUSTUMARUM, ET LIBER HORN 137
(Henry Thomas Riley ed., Rolls Series 12, London, Longman 1859) (1419), cited
in Norton, supra, at 324 ("exceptis placitis de mercandisis quae secundum legem
mercatoriam terminari solent in burgis etferiis"). (I am grateful to Rhett P. Martin
for assistance with the Latin text.) One mention of "four or five" merchants can be
found in the Charter to the Burgesses of Melecumbe, 8 Edw., m. 9 (May 27, 1280),
in 2 CHARTER ROLLS, supra note 41, at 223, 223 ("Grant to the burgesses of
Melecumbe all of the liberties granted to the citizens of London, that is that none
of them shall be compelled to plead without the bounds of the said borough ...
excepting [among others] pleas of merchandise which by the law merchant are
determined in boroughs and fairs, so that such plaints (querele) shall be determined
by four or five of the said burgesses [i.e., the burgesses of Melecumbe] present in
the said boroughs or fairs; saving always to the king the amercements thence
arising.") (emphasis added). Yet this provision seems to grant the community of
Melecumbe that four or five of its members are to be included among the suitors
hearing cases in other towns in which they trade, rather than indicating a general
tradition of relying on four or five randomly assembled traders on the spot. (The
insistence that fines be paid to the king also diminishes any impression of private
'frontier justice.')
82. See, e.g., A. Claire Cutler, Globalization, the Rule of Law, and the Modern
Law Merchant: Medieval or Late Capitalist Associations?, 8 CONSTELLATIONS
480, 485 (2001) ("These courts operated privately, more like contemporary
arbitration tribunals than like courts of law.").
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1. The Influence of the Merchants
According to the thirteenth-century treatise Lex Mercatoria,
written during the period of the extant St. Ives rolls, the merchant
community did exercise some independent judicial authority in
mercantile courts. In market courts, the treatise states, "every
judgment ought to be rendered by merchants of the same court and
not by the mayor or by the seneschal of the market."83 There is a
good deal of evidence that this practice was followed in St. Ives. In
the case of Fulham v. Francis, upon encountering a particularly
knotty legal problem (namely, whether servants may swear an oath
to establish ownership of goods by their master), the court called
upon the merchants to render the decision. The court rolls record that
"thereupon all the merchants of the said fair, both natives and
foreigners, to whom judgments belong according to the law merchant
[secundum legem mercatoriam], having been called for this purpose
and consulted, say that [the servants] may properly be admitted in
this and similar cases according to the law merchant."84
Merchants were relied upon to render the decisions of the fair
court quite frequently, not only in cases of exceptional difficulty. We
know that there were merchants present at the court on a regular
basis. In Hereford v. Lyons, the defendant swore "in the presence of
the lord's steward, James Pilat, Bernard Pilat, and many other
citizens, burghers, and merchants" to abide by a settlement.85 The
merchants had a significant role even in cases concerning royal law:
when Simon Blake of Bury was arrested for violating the royal assize
83. LEX MERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 20; see also Gross, supra note 60, at
242 ("In the Middle Ages the merchants were the suitors or doomsmen; they found
the judgment or declared the law.").
84. Fulham v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1311), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 90.
85. Hereford v. Lyons (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 62,
63. Similarly, in Swavesey v. Pope, the question arose whether Hugh Pope, the
defendant, had received a new trial date before his essoiner (a representative sent
to excuse his absence) left a previous court hearing. According to the rolls, Pope
craves that the record of the merchants and of the whole court be allowed
him. The merchants and all others of the court testify and say that [Hugh's
essoiner] withdrew from the court before a day was given to him; wherefore
they say that Hugh made default at that court.
Swavesey v. Pope (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1288), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 35.
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in selling canvas, the court assembled all the merchants of the fair to
try his case.16
The merchants' decision-making role is emphasized by the parties
themselves in Grafjham v. Pope, in which Alan of Berkhamstead
intervened to claim as his own a horse that had been attached for a
debt. He said that he had bought the horse from Thomas of Ramsden,
"[a]nd that this is so he craves may be inquired [by an inquest],
unless he may be admitted to [make] his law [i.e., prove his case by
oath] by the award of the merchants." The inquest later revealed that
Alan had bought the horse through collusion with the defendant, but
the fact that Alan had sought relief "by the award of the merchants"
indicates that the merchants attendant at court were seen as among
the decision-makers. 7 Later in the same session, a dispute arose in
Fleming v. Tanner over whether the appropriate means to prove a
breach of contract were an inquest or a wager of law, a formal oath
of innocence sworn by the defendant and a specified number of
compurgators (oath-helpers). On this question "the parties put
themselves on the judgment of the merchants, and it is awarded by
the merchants that the truth of the matter be inquired [by an
inquest]." 88 These are only a few of the many cases at St. Ives in
which a party appealed to "the merchants" for a favorable decision.
These cases would seem to establish that the St. Ives court did
give decision-making power to the merchant community. The ability
of the merchants to render decisions in this way would certainly have
been unusual in the courts of King's Bench or Common Pleas, and
some historians have emphasized this fact in describing the
mercantile community's judicial independence. 9
86. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 154-55.
87. Graffham v. Pope (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 50-
51. They were not the only decision-makers, however. See Fleetbridge v. Coventry
(St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 147 (referring to a
judgment "of the court and of the merchants," thus implying that the two were not
coextensive).
88. Fleming v. Tanner (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 52.
89. See, e.g., Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 130
("[Given that royal judges] often adjudicated disputes about which they knew
nothing ... [p]articipatory or communal adjudication was, therefore, a necessary
characteristic of the law merchant."); see also 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 539 (7th ed. rev. 1956) (remarking that the practice
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Where these interpretations err, however, is in choosing the central
royal courts as an appropriate basis for comparison. In local courts, it
had long been customary for the population judged by the court to
provide suitors who would attend the court and participate in
rendering its decisions. In fact, the permanent residents of St. Ives
joined the merchants in rendering decisions-these were the "others
of the court" mentioned in Swavesey v. Pope.90 If the process
followed in fair courts were compared to that of manorial and other
seignorial courts, one would find that it was actually quite
standard-and that "participatory" procedure was not in any way an
innovation of the merchants.
An examination of the records of nearby manorial courts shows a
structure very similar to that of St. Ives. In 1295, in the court of the
manor of King's Ripton (which, like St. Ives, was part of the
patrimony of the abbot of Ramsey), a legal question was "inquired
by the township," which says that the plaintiff "has produced
sufficient suit." 91 Clearly, this procedure appears to involve the same
population that is judged by the court in the process of making
judgments. In 1249, in the court of the manors of the abbey of Bec,
Richard Blund asked for a jury "of the whole court" to determine
whether he has the greater right in a certain piece of land; after
investigation, "the whole court say upon their oath that the said
Richard has greater right in the said land than anyone else. 92 The
"whole court" seems very clearly to have been an assembly of suitors
rather than a single judge, especially given that they pronounce their
judgments by oath. Cases were delayed in the abbot's honour of
Broughton in 1294 because "the present court is thinly attended by
suitors," and in King's Ripton in 1288, "the whole court" requested a
delay in giving judgment until the next court session-an event that
of merchant judges gave "the merchants who attended... power to shape directly
the law there administered").
90. Swavesey v. Pope (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1288), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 35.
91. Sweyn v. Nicholas (King's Ripton Manor Ct. 1295), in 1 SELECT PLEAS,
supra note 14, at 118. "Suit" here refers to the secta, the witnesses and others who
accompanied the plaintiff and would swear to the truth of his accusations. Cf 2
FLETA, supra note 76, ch. 63 (defining "suit" in a contract case as "the witness of
law-abiding men who were present at the contract made between them").
92. Blund v. Frith (Abbey of Bec Manor Ct. 1249), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 20-21.
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is only comprehensible if the "whole court" includes the suitors and
not the steward alone.93
Additional examples can be found in the scant records of other fair
courts. In 1347, when John of Knaptoft sued William Parchment-
Maker for debt in the fair court of Leicester, the defendant "[came]
and by leave of the community [put] himself in mercy."94 The
"community" was no mere abstraction. In a later case, it performed
the function of a special jury; the defendant David Blanket-Maker
protested his innocence, "wherefore the bailiff was ordered to
summon the community also etc. which says that he is guilty."95
These examples support the assessment of F.W. Maitland that
although the steward may have presided over a court, often he "was
not the judge; the suitors were the judges. '96 Maitland cited a case of
1226 from Bracton's Note Book in which the sheriff of Lincolnshire
was forced to adjourn the court "because he had quarreled with the
freeholders whose business it was 'facere judicia.'" ' 9 To make
judgments-even in a royal county court-was the responsibility of
the suitors, although the steward or sheriff was "the presiding
magistrate, . . . control[led] the whole procedure, issue[d] all the
mandates, [and] pronounce[d] the sentence." 9 In fact, Maitland
argued, the separation between the presiding officer and the suitors
93. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 83; Alconbury v. Stalker (King's Ripton
Manor Ct. 1288), in id. at 111. One can also find examples further afield. In 1326
in Hatfield Chase, Yorkshire, it was "attested by the community of the court" that
deathbed transfers of land were not accepted, and in 1344 an inquest in Great
Waltham, Essex, was "taken by the entire vill" to determine a point of law. SELECT
CASES IN MANORIAL COURTS, 1250-1550, at 14, 102 (L.R. Poos & Lloyd Bonfield
eds., Selden Society 114, 1997).
94. Knaptoft v. Parchment-Maker (Leicester Fair Ct. 1347), in 2 RECORDS OF
THE BOROUGH OF LEICESTER, supra note 18, at 72.
95. Cochet v. Blanket-Maker (Leicester Fair Ct. 1347), in 2 RECORDS OF THE
BOROUGH OF LEICESTER, supra note 18, at 72-73.
96. Frederic William Maitland, Introduction to 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14,
at xi, lxv.
97. Id.; see also Lincoln v. Auteyn, Hilary, pl. 1730 (K.B. 1226), in 3
BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK 565 (photo. reprint 1999) (Frederic William Maitland ed.,
London, C. J. Clay & Sons 1887).
98. Maitland, supra note 96, at lxv.
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or 'doomsmen' was even in the thirteenth century "very ancient, and
look where we will in Western Europe we may find it." 99
As in the fair of St. Ives, moreover, most local courts in England
displayed no fine distinctions in personal jurisdiction, "no
distinctions of procedure between cases which concern freeholders
and cases which concern customary tenants." Villeins could even be
suitors and "do justice upon their lord," even as they owed him
services "of a very 'villanous' kind."'00 In the end, the injunction of
Lex Mercatoria that judgments are to be rendered by the suitors of
the court and not the seneschal does not seem very far removed from
the principle cited by Maitland that "Curia domini debet facere
judicium et non dominus."''°
Such a system of justice may seem quite alien to those familiar
with modern courts, where an appointed judge decides questions of
law and a jury tries questions of fact. But at the time, the actual work
of the court was strictly limited. In most cases the suitors of local
courts only decided how the proof was to be rendered, such as by
compurgation or by a jury inquest, and not whether the evidence
offered was in fact sufficient. In determining who had the greater
right to the piece of land, the jury of Bec was making judgments of
both fact and law, determining the proper custom to apply as well as
how the parties stood with regard to that custom. The fact that juries
in commercial cases in St. Ives might be composed of "merchants
99. Maitland, Outlines, supra note 61, at 446; see also Carter, supra note 18, at
236 ("'Popularity' is however not peculiar to mercantile Courts, but was common
to all early local Courts, as in this country, to the Manorial Court and the Sheriff's
Court.").
100. Maitland, supra note 96, at lxix-lxxi. Maitland added that in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, "it is common enough to find a demandant claiming a
villein tenement by inheritance 'according to the custom of the manor,' ... with all
the same strict accuracy that would have been required of him had he been a
freeholder pleading before the Common Bench." Frederic William Maitland, A
NeiW Point on Villein Tenure (1891), in 2 MAITLAND PAPERS, supra note 61, at
202, 204. One distinction, however, between cases concerning freeholders and
customary tenants was that the former might insist on having freemen among the
court's suitors. One free plaintiff made this claim in 1284, arguing that Magna
Carta had guaranteed a right to judgment by his peers. Simon Subburg' of
Burnham v. Prior of Walsingham, CP 40/55, m. 97d (C.P. 1284), cited in PAUL
BRAND, THE MAKING OF THE COMMON LAW 296 (1992). However, this distinction
does not seem to have arisen at St. Ives.
101. Maitland, supra note 96, at lxviii-lxix.
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and neighbors" therefore did not mean that merchants represented an
autonomous legal class.10 2 Unlike today's juries, medieval juries
were expected to include those most knowledgeable about the case
and its participants, and courts often impaneled juries of experts on
specific questions. The dispute between King Henry III and the abbot
over the extension of the St. Ives fair was referred to a jury of twelve
knights and twelve merchants; this was certainly not done because
the merchants had any legal right to be consulted in a dispute over
revenues, but rather because the merchants would have been likely to
remember past practice. 103 James Oldham has even presented
examples of juries of matrons (to determine if a woman were
pregnant) and of fishmongers (to assess food quality), and no one has
suggested that matrons or fishmongers were legally autonomous in
medieval England." 4
In relying on specialist juries for specialist questions, therefore, or
in including members of the community as suitors, the fair court was
entirely unexceptional. Indeed, Maitland noted that for much of the
102. See, e.g., Lawford v. Northampton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM,
supra note' 1, at 25. Participation in the judicial process may have been viewed
more as a burden than a privilege. Maitland described a number of examples in
which tenants sought to avoid serving as a suitor for their lord's court, and noted
that "[i]t would have been very dangerous for any one to attend the county court
unless he was bound to go there, for he would have been creating evidence of a
duty to attend." Frederic William Maitland, The Suitors of the County Court
(1888), in 1 MAITLAND PAPERS, supra note 61, at 458, 465. In St. Ives, litigation
occasionally had to be delayed "owing to the small attendance at the court."
Papworth v. Kent (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 39; see also
Cause v. Ward (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 88. Individuals
would also willingly pay fines in order to avoid jury service. William of Hamerton
paid 6d. to avoid serving on a jury in 1302; Robert Bank of the Green was fined
6d. the same day for refusing to serve, and Ralph Clerk was fined 12d. because,
"having been elected by the jurors to be one of them, [he] would not make oath but
withdrew from the court in contempt of the lord and his bailiffs." 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 83.
103. Ramsey v. Taylor, Curia Regis Roll 146, 36 Hen. 3, m. 10, 10d (K.B.
1252), in PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT, supra note 38, at 30; see also supra text
accompanying notes 38-41.
104. See James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
137, 139 (1983) (reporting the early existence of juries composed of "experts" in a
particular field). Where a foreigner was a party, there was established a tradition of
juries "of the half tongue," with half of their members of the foreigner's own
country; the same could hold for Welshmen, Jews, and university students. Id. at
168-69.
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history of St. Ives, "the great bulk of all the justice that was done" in
England was done by local and seignorial courts. 105 The true
innovation of the period may well have been the more formal
procedure of central courts, and not the conventional local approach
adopted by the fairs.0 6
2. The Influence of the Abbot
The evidence presented thus far has shown that the merchants
possessed no unique claim on the judicial power of the fair court, no
authority that would not also have been extended to the populations
judged by other local, seignorial, and manorial courts. However, the
merchants' claim was also far from exclusive: the power to hear
mercantile cases was not limited to merchants alone. The
proceedings of the St. Ives court did not in the least resemble private
arbitration hearings. The abbot's steward presided over them, 07 and
the abbot and his officers could and did intervene in the court's
deliberations-even to the point of moving litigation from one court
controlled by the abbot to another. The abbot's authority was
recognized not only by the royal courts in hearing cases from St.
Ives, but also by the fairgoers themselves. There is therefore little
reason to conclude that the merchants of St. Ives were the masters of
their own affairs, or that the disputes arising from the fair were
"voluntarily adjudicated."
To begin with, the merchants had little opportunity to escape the
fair court's jurisdiction. Although medieval mercantile courts have
105. Maitland, Outlines, supra note 61, at 433. The king's own courts, on the
other hand, had begun as courts for the "protection of royal rights," the "causes of
the king's barons," and the appeals of "persistent litigant[s]" whom "justice had
failed... everywhere else." It was only over time that the royal courts "flung open
[their] doors to all manner of people" and made their custom "the common law of
England." Id. at 433-34.
106. "Elsewhere the position of the 'curia' is less clear because it seems to
discharge many functions: now it judges, now it presents, now it serves as a jury of
trial. Imitation of the royal courts seems to be transfiguring it .... " Maitland,
supra note 96, at lxviii.
107. The steward's role was typical for such courts. See Gross, supra note 60, at
238 ("The court of piepowder was held.., before the steward if the market or fair
belonged to a lord.").
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often been analogized to modem arbitration tribunals, 10 8 the fair court
was a particularly inhospitable environment for private arbitration. In
1287, Robert of St. Leonards and Ralph Pole sued Richard Elsdon;
instead of litigating, they asked for a day in which to negotiate a
settlement, and would "submit themselves in all things to the
arbitrament of Bartholomew of Acre."' 19 Yet this settlement was
accepted only after the defendant paid 12d. for the amercements of
both parties. 110 There are many other cases where parties sought to
settle their cases out of court, but there is no indication in any of
them that the parties ever submitted themselves to the decision of an
arbitrator, nor was the fair court ever called upon to enforce an
arbitral award. In each case where the parties sought leave to make
concord on their own, they had to do so "saving what should be
saved"-with the leave of the steward, and protecting the lord's
rights, "especially his right to demand a fine.""' In other words, this
tribunal was not merely a voluntary mechanism for resolving private
108. See, e.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 9, at 134 ("[T]hese commercial courts ...
were in the nature of modem conciliation and arbitration tribunals rather than
courts in the strict sense of the word."); Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5,
at 282 ("As in medieval times, commercial arbitration centres have developed at
merchant centres, not unlike courts of the fair, and have applied arbitration laws
and procedures to suit merchant clientele, not unlike the actions of medieval courts
of the fair."); Cutler, supra note 82, at 485 ("These courts operated privately, more
like contemporary arbitration tribunals than like courts of law.").
109. St. Leonards v. Elsdon (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
18.
110. Id. at 21. The arbitrator's decision was that the plaintiffs should give the
defendants 4s. No reason is given for the reversal, although it is possible that there
were counterclaims that do not appear in the record. For comparison, the average
wage for a building craftsman during this period is estimated at between 3-4d. per
day (Is. = 12d.; £ 1 = 20s. = 240d.), while that of an unskilled laborer was 1 2-2d.
per day. Henry Phelps Brown & Sheila V. Hopkins, Seven Centuries of Building
Wages, 22 ECONOMICA 195 (1955), reprinted in A PERSPECTIVE OF WAGES AND
PRICES 1, 11 (Henry Phelps Brown & Sheila V. Hopkins eds., 1981).
111. See, e.g., Serjeant v. Foville (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 2. A manual for holding seignorial courts written circa 1307 offers a
similar message, saying that "none can make compromise without the leave of the
lord or his steward when a plaint has been made and gage and pledge given, except
with a saving for all the lord's rights." The Manner of Holding Courts-John de
Longueville, in THE COURT BARON: BEING PRECEDENTS FOR USE IN SEIGNORIAL
AND OTHER LOCAL COURTS 79, 79 (Frederic William Maitland & William Paley
Baildon eds. & trans., Selden Society 4, London,B. Quaritch 1891) [hereinafter
COURT BARON].
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disputes among individuals, but a coercive public forum that could
and did demand payment even from parties who decided not to
litigate.' 1 2
Once a dispute had come before the fair court, its resolution could
be affected by the intervention of the abbot of Ramsey or his
officials. In Coventry v. Fleetbridge, two plaintiffs who had sued the
community of Leicester were countersued, and claimed to be outside
the fair court's jurisdiction as London citizens.1 3 This case was
"[r]eserved for the abbot's hearing," perhaps because it posed
diplomatic issues among the various communities involved. Yet
there is no evidence that the abbot's intervention occurred with the
consent of the parties, or with that of the merchants and residents
who served as suitors. Diplomatic concerns could also affect the
successful execution of a judgment; the judgment against the
defendant in Lolworth v. Soaper, who was "of the homage of the
bishop of Ely," was suspended "owing to a love-day [i.e., a time to
make concord] between the bishop and the abbot, which has been
granted and at which they are to treat concerning the various matters
in dispute between them."' 1 4
The abbot's officers also exercised significant discretionary
powers in the fair court, similar to those they might have possessed
in manor courts. For instance, through the office of the steward, the
abbot had the authority to pardon offenses and remit fines. Pardons
appear twenty-five times in the cases described by Gross and
Maitland, and some of these pardons may indeed have been intended
112. Douglas Yam provided additional examples of medieval arbitration, and
argued that arbitration "was not unknown to the merchant courts and those who
used them." Douglas Yam, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism
Through Institutionalization, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 929, 975 (2004). However, the
practice hardly seems common, and those arbitrations that did occur seem to have
been conceived as mediated settlements rather than independent tribunals.
113. Coventry v. Fleetbridge (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 155; see also supra note 76 (reviewing Fleetbridge's suit).
114. Lolworth v. Soaper (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
82. Although the court had awarded the plaintiff "his debt together with his
damages," there is no mention in the extant rolls whether either were ever
recovered. However, at the end of the record, the plaintiff "puts Richard of Peche
in his place," meaning that further proceedings in the case were envisioned.
[21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
to correct a miscarriage of justice.115 Unsuccessful plaintiffs were
normally fined for their "false claim," and eight pardons were used to
excuse plaintiffs in such cases-perhaps because the steward chose
not to add a fine on top of the suffering alleged in their plea. In the
case of Tempsford v. Chaplain, the plaintiff's allegations against an
intervening party had been supported by the results of an inquest,
which was later thrown out because it had been undertaken by the
steward ex officio; although the intervening party successfully waged
his law, the steward chose to pardon the plaintiff for his false
claim. 16 Four more cases involved procedural errors; Colletta Donel
lost her case against Robert Woodfool when it was revealed that her
real name was Hawise, but the warden of the fair-an official of the
abbot who had no prescribed role in the fair court-chose to remit
her fine. I"7
Pardons could be granted for less noble purposes as well.
Although poverty was a common ground for pardons, accounting for
another eight of the twenty-five cases, these were hardly instances of
absolute privation. In 1293, a merchant selling dishware 'at the
backs' (i.e., away from the main street of the fair) was pardoned for
his poverty and immediately thereafter paid 12d. to the lord abbot to
sell there lawfully. The payment shows that he was hardly
impoverished, and the prosecution and later pardon may just have
been a means of compelling him to pay for his new privilege.1 '
Those involved with the abbot's administration frequently received
pardons: the court pardoned the bailiffs of the fair in a case involving
improper distraints, and when the abbot was found to have lent
houses to prostitutes through an attorney, the attorney's fine was
115. This number does not include several cases where a party had his fine
pardoned on account of poverty and then pledged his body-a euphemism for
being sent to prison for inability to pay. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54
(citing four cases where debtors pledged their bodies for unsatisfied debt). It does,
however, include one case where the defendants had pledged their bodies and then
were liberated on their faith. Ribaud v. Russell (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 15-16.
116. Tempsford v. Chaplain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 44-45.
117. Donel v. Woodfool (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293) in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 57.
118. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 56.
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quickly forgiven.11 9 The court also pardoned defendants "at the
instance of' various intervenors "and other friends," whose
intervention was no doubt influential. 120 The ability to grant pardons
at the steward's discretion made the favor of the abbot a valuable
commodity, and it reinforces the vision that the fair court was not
fundamentally different from its sister court of the manor.121
Indeed, there is a striking absence of any clear line between the
business of the fair court and the business of other courts belonging
to the abbot of Ramsey. When "a certain carter" in 1287 accidentally
knocked three tiles off a house belonging to the abbot, he was fined
3d. in the fair court. Yet there is no explanation of why the case is
heard in the fair court rather than in that of the manor, which
presumably would have been more appropriate. 122 Additionally, at
least one record survives in which a case is removed from the fair
court to that of the weekly market in St. Ives, which was granted to
the abbot in 1293.123 In 1316, Ralph of Houghton sued John Christian
in a plea of debt, and after the defendant was distrained by "a tapet, a
barrel, two hogsheads, and a tankard" and still failed to appear, the
plaintiff requested that the case be transferred "to the court of the
market together with the said distresses. ' 124 No explanation is given
for the transfer, but as the case was heard on May 29, very close to
the end of the fair court's session, the plaintiff may have chosen to
119. Boys v. West (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 60; 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 74.
120. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 41 (describing one such pardon).
121. This is not to say that all pardons, or even most, were examples of
favoritism. Based on a survey of the pardons granted by the fair court of St. Ives in
the year 1287, Moore concluded that the abbots and his officials were "relatively
equitable and impartial" in granting pardons, with "at least as much concern for the
humble and impecunious as for the wealthy fairgoers." MOORE, supra note 11, at
201-02. However, even if pardons were, on the whole, granted fairly, the fact
remains that officers of the abbot held the arbitrary and unchecked power to grant
them-and that pardons granted in the fair court to further the abbot's interests or
"at the instance of ... other friends" were never contested by the merchants. 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 41.
122. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 31.
123. Id. at 121 n.1 (quoting 2 CARTUL. MONAST. DE RAMES., supra note 37, at
298).
124. Houghton v. Christian (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1316), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
101.
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keep his case alive in a weekly court instead of waiting until the next
fair. The same phenomenon can be found in other manorial courts
held by the abbot. 125 The ability to move from one court to another
implies that the abbot's justice was to a certain extent fungible;
regardless of the tribunal's name or function, it was ultimately the
court, not of the merchants, but of the abbot of Ramsey.
The authority of the abbot was well understood by his
contemporaries, as the records of the central royal courts make clear.
In 1315, Simon Dederic of Guisnes brought suit in the court of
King's Bench against the abbot of Ramsey and one of the abbot's
bailiffs for executing what Guisnes considered an improper
judgment-the abbot, as the lord who held the fair, was being held
personally responsible for the actions of the St. Ives court, even
when a decision had been reached secundum legem mercatoriam.26
125. The abbot held his honor court, where his free tenants would be justiced, in
the manor of Broughton. This manor lay within Hurstingstone hundred, a private
hundred which the abbot held of the king. See supra text accompanying note 38. In
1256, Richard King sued one of the abbot's bailiffs for trespass in the honor court;
"[t]he parties were given a day 'at the hundred"' instead. On August 31, 1235, a
servant named Laurence accused John le Megre in St. Ives of stealing a sheep.
Laurence offered to prove that the sheep was his master's at the honor court the
next day. There was no need for the case to be heard there, rather than the manor
court-Warren Ault, in recounting the dispute, noted that "[tihe matter is scarcely
in its field"-but the manor court was then no longer in session, and Laurence
might have had to wait for justice until the following spring. The case was
eventually disposed by assigning it to yet a third forum, the hundred court, where it
was heard the next Monday. Warren Ortman Ault, Introduction to COURT ROLLS
OF THE ABBEY OF RAMSEY AND OF THE HONOR OF CLARE xvii-xviii (Warren
Ortman Ault ed., Yale Historical Publications, Manuscripts & Edited Texts 9,
1928).
126. Dederic v. Ramsey, Coram Rege Roll 221, 8 Edw. 2, m. 93d (K.B. 1315),
in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 86-88; see also Clive M. Schmitthoff, International
Trade Law and Private International Law, in 2 VOM DEUTSCHEN ZUM
EUROPAISCHEN RECHT 257, 262 (Ernst von Caemmerer et al. eds., 1963) (noting
that a court had strong incentive to recognize a foreign court's ruling). See
generally infra text accompanying note 287.
An additional case from St. Ives is found in Saxby v. Bedford, PRO Curia
Regis Roll 155, Michaelmas, m. Id (K.B. 1255), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 5.
This case arose during the period when the fair was in the king's hands, so perhaps
it is not surprising that it would be heard in the court of King's Bench. However,
we should note the respondent's claim that he need not "answer for this," because
he had recovered his money "in the aforesaid fair [of St. Ives] .... And inasmuch
as he recovered there as a merchant and according to the method of merchants [per
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A similar practice can be found in the court of the Exchequer in
1321, where the abbot of Westminster was sued for the actions of his
bailiff pursuant to an order given by the fair court of Westminster.
The merchant plaintiffs argued that in arresting their goods, .the
bailiff acted as "minister of him, the abbot, of the ... fair aforesaid to
do those things that concerned that liberty and the jurisdiction thereof
in the place and name of [the abbot], which things the abbot ought to
have done if personally, etc." On that basis, the act of the bailiff
"ought to be regarded as the act of the abbot himself, when as bailiff
...exercising the jurisdiction of the abbot[,] he arrested the said
goods. ' 127 The royal courts did not shrink from reviewing the actions
of such courts, and moreover considered the authority of the fair
courts' decisions as proceeding from the lords who held them.
These cases have not been accounted for under the traditional
interpretation, which understands the decisions of merchant courts to
be unreviewable by existing authorities. 12 Yet cases could even be
brought to the royal courts directly. In 1276, Richard Lombe brought
suit in the court of King's Bench for an assault that had taken place
in the fair of St. Ives, when five men "beat and wounded him and cut
off his left ear and so ill-treated him that his life was despaired of."'1 29
modum mercatorum], he seeks judgment." Id. This claim was ignored by the royal
court, which clearly did not regard the decision of a mercantile court as binding.
127. Mays v. Seman, PRO Exchequer Plea Roll 43 (Ex. 1321), in 2 SCLM,
supra note 38, at 93. Judgment was initially given in the abbot's favor, as the
defendant was no longer in his service, and because the abbot had received a
favorable royal writ. 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 93, 151-54.
128. See, e.g., TRAKMAN, supra note 4, at 16 ("Appeals were forbidden where
the tribunal wished to avoid frivolous disputes."); Benson, Justice Without
Government, supra note 5, at 130 ("To steer clear of unnecessary litigation, delays,
and other disruptions of commerce, appeals were forbidden."); see also id. at 131
(erroneously arguing that royal courts gained appellate jurisdiction only after the
1353 Statute of the Staple, which "served to weaken the authority of the merchant
courts and the law merchant itself' by "ma[king] the law merchant appear to be
less decisive law"). The royal courts may not have been analogous to modem
appellate tribunals, but they clearly could review the judgments of the fair court.
129. Lombe v. Clopton, Coram Rege Roll No. 26, Michaelmas, m. 40 (K.B.
1276), in 1 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD I, at
30 (G. 0. Sayles ed. & trans., Selden Society 55, 1936) [hereinafter KING'S
BENCH].
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Similar cases can easily be found in the fair court rolls,13° but Lombe
chose to sue in the royal courts instead; the St. Ives court did not
exercise a monopoly over pleas arising out of the fair.3
The strong impression left by these records is that the St. Ives
court was well integrated into the contemporary legal framework,
and that it did not possess any source of judicial authority apart from
existing patterns of lordship. In rendering its decisions, the fair court
operated exactly as a seigneurial court would have, with its suitors
drawn from the population to be judged. Furthermore, despite the
existence of local courts to hear mercantile pleas, the king retained
some jurisdiction over fairs and markets. The abbot held his fair
court by royal grant, and when its decisions were in error, the royal
courts were competent to hear the appeal and to apply the proper
remedy. Indeed, according to contemporary manuals and
formularies, seigneurial courts heard mercantile cases as a matter of
course.13 2 Perhaps nothing else should be expected from the records
of royal or feudal courts; yet the evidence does not betray even a
trace of the idea that mercantile cases are properly resolved only
through a decision of the merchant community.
As a final note, one can examine what any good merchant would
consider an incontestable source: the fairgoers' pocketbooks. When
John Beeston of Nottingham sued Gilbert Chesterton of Stamford in
1275 for the lordly sum of £10 principal and £10 in damages, he
promised one-third of any money he would receive to the lord abbot
130. See, e.g., Shearman v. Longville (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 29.
131. No reason is provided as to why Lombe entered the royal courts; it is
possible that the defendants left the fair shortly after the assault, or that Lombe
expected better results from the more powerful tribunal. Also, his suit was heard in
the Michaelmas term, when the St. Ives court had been out of session for several
months and would not convene again until Easter.
132. "The Court Baron," an instruction manual for stewards of seignorial courts
at the time of the St. Ives rolls, provides a sample case in which a merchant sues
for defamation and subsequent loss of credit. This manual was designed for
seignorial courts generally, and demonstrates that such courts were accustomed to
hearing mercantile disputes. It was also popular, as at least seven copies of the
manuscript survive. The Court Baron, in COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 20, 40-
41; see also Frederick William Maitland & William Paley Baildon, Precedents in
Court Keeping, in COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 3, 6-7.
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"that he may have aid."'33 A significant number of litigants repeated
this gesture; four merchants accused of selling cloth with a false
measure gave the abbot 40s. "for his grace and favour." 13 4 The
merchants who traded at St. Ives made their living from trade; they
would not have been so willing to make payments if they did not
believe that the abbot could give them something in return. There
would be no reason for the parties to pay such substantial sums to the
abbot in a court organized and operated by merchants alone. Even in
cases that did not concern the abbot directly, the parties at the fair
court knew where their justice was coming from.
C. "VOLUNTARILY PRODUCED"
On what principles of law did the St. Ives court rely?
Unfortunately for our inquiry, the fair court was a forum of
expedience, not one preoccupied with the labored examination of
statute and precedent. When a certain Luke sued Gilbert Tarter for
failure to pay 7s. rent, the fair court concerned itself only with
determining the facts, and would likely have thought it absurd to ask
which specific principle the alleged actions had violated.135
Even if such principles were debated, the debates would rarely be
preserved in the rolls. A contemporary treatise describes the dilemma
of a debtor in a court like St. Ives who acknowledged a debt but
wished to show his innocence under the law-for instance, because
the debt had been paid. In such a case, the defendant should make a
general statement of his defense and then make his proof "by his
law" (an oath) or "by the country" (a jury inquest). 13 6 In either case,
the specific arguments would not be introduced into the record,
which would reveal only successful or unsuccessful oaths and
133. Beeston v. Chesterton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 144. Despite his generous offer, Beeston later lost his case. Id. at 155.
134. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 155; see also Almaine v. Flanders (St.
Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 9 (pledging one seventh of
damages); S. Michel v. Dunwich (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS,
supra note 14, at 149 (pledging 13s. 4d. to the abbot if the plaintiff collected, and
4s. if he did not); Thirning v. Wiggenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT
PLEAS, supra note 14, at 157 (pledging 4s. to the abbot).
135. Luke v. Tarter (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 75.
136. The Manner of Holding Courts-John de Longueville, supra note 111, at
91-92.
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verdicts of "guilty" or "not guilty"-making it impossible for later
readers to determine the facts of the case or the substantive law
applied to them. As in the contemporary common-law courts, the
inscrutable methods of proof obscured the distinction between law
and fact.'37 The proceedings of the St. Ives court are even more
difficult to decipher, as the rolls habitually confuse actions of
detinue, debt, and trespass with a freedom that would be shocking to
the doctrinaire common lawyers of a later era.138
Yet the fair court had established rules of substance and of
procedure, even if it rarely presented them in an explicit manner. To
understand them, we must leave behind the modem assumption that
courts decide cases only on the basis of positive, written, enacted
law; as Fritz Kern has noted, the fair court's contemporaries would
have likely considered true law to be "unenacted and unwritten." 139
The substantive principles on which the court operated seem in large
measure to have been general principles of fair play. Promises ought
to be kept; debts ought to be paid; trespasses ought to be punished.
These may be addressed by custom, but they are also matters of
simple justice, which it was the duty of the court to provide.
For some scholars, these principles constituted an alternative legal
system, a "voluntarily produced" law merchant. 40 Indeed, there are
cases in the St. Ives records in which decisions are reached
"secundum legem mercatoriam." Although a full examination of the
meaning of this phrase must be postponed until Part II, for the
137. Cf J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 95-96 (3d
ed. 1990).
138. The fair court was anything but rigorous in its classification of cases;
Maitland cited an example in which an action for money due on contract "is
conceived as an action to obtain money 'detained and deforced by violence against
the lord's peace.' It looks like an action of tort; it also looks like an action to obtain
coins which already are the plaintiff's." 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 134.
139. FRITz KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 156 (photo. reprint
1985) (S. B. Chrimes ed. & trans., Studies in Mediaeval History 4, 1939) (1914).
140. Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 128. This view was
also endorsed by the sociologist Max Weber, who wrote his doctoral dissertation
on medieval partnership law under the guidance of Levin Goldschmidt. MAX
WEBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 51
(Lutz Kaelber trans., Rowman & Littlefield 2003) (1889) (arguing that the
"formation of commercial law" took place as "entirely new legal constructions...
emerged from the rapidly multiplying demands of the historical times").
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moment it is enough to make three observations. First, the merchants
at St. Ives were subject to many legal regimes other than lex
mercatoria, including the ordinances of the abbot, the statutes of the
king, and the customs and principles of equity which constrained and
modified these two authorities. Second, certain fundamental
principles applied by the St. Ives court strongly resembled those of
other, decidedly non-mercantile local and seignorial courts, rather
than any merchant-created legal order. Third and finally, the laws
applied at St. Ives governed all parties before the court, and were not
reserved for the private use of a merchant class. Taken together,
these observations gravely weaken the argument that the merchant
community exercised the primary legislative authority within the
fair-that the merchants were sole authors of the laws by which they
were privileged to be governed.
1. Alternative Sources of Legal Principles
To return to Scrutton's remark with which we began, a reader of
the St. Ives rolls, well versed in the Romantic interpretation, would
be struck with the "very remarkable fact" of how rarely "lex
mercatoria" is mentioned. Only eleven records of the entire set of
court rolls contain the phrase "secundum legem mercatoriam" or its
variants, and these references establish principles concerning the
following seven subjects: the attachment of goods (including the
number of oath-helpers required to claim them,14 1 whether servants
may do so in their master's place, 142 and the time period after which
they may be sold to satisfy a debt); 143 the conclusion of a sale
through the payment of earnest money; 144 the need for pledges in a
wager of law; 145 the need to specify the regnal year in which an
141. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5.
142. Fulham v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1311), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 90.
143. Fairhead v. Tankus (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
71; Yarmouth v. Fick (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 81.
144. Tempsford v. Chaplain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 45.
145. Saddington v. Laungbaurgh (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 22.
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offense occurred; 4 6 the admissibility of a sealed writing of debt;'47
the king's claim to fraudulently marketed licorice;'48 and the right of
a third-party butcher to intervene in sales of meat and fish.149
No matter how unsophisticated the medieval economy, these
principles would hardly constitute a sufficient body of law to
regulate European commerce. As a result, we cannot read "according
to the law merchant" into the court's deliberations in cases where it
does not appear. Rather, we should take the documents as they are,
and consider whether the merchants who traded at St. Ives were
subject to many alternative sources of legal principles. Lex
mercatoria is far from the only authority cited in the rolls-the
regulations of the abbot, the statutes of the king, and the dictates of
custom and fairness are all used at various times to justify decisions
of the court. Indeed, the records of the fair court give very little
indication of where one type of authority ended and another began.
To adopt T.F.T. Plucknett's phrase, the fair court was wound within
an "elastic web" of legal authority, in which the will of king and
abbot had significant influence, although not necessarily complete
adherence. 5 °
To investigate the substantive legal principles that the fair court
applied, we must look first to the manorial institutions that the court
most closely resembled. As was argued in Part I, the fair court can in
many ways be understood as a manor court of the abbot of Ramsey;
in Lloyd Bonfield's formulation, it "established and enforced village
by-laws, elected local officials, enquired into disturbances of public
order,.. . and [monitored] payment of fines and the performance [of]
services owed to the lord," all in addition to resolving disputes
146. Darlington v. Burser (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
85-86.
147. Hoppman v. Welborne (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
86-87.
148. Bedford v. Reading (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1312), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
91.
149. Legge v. Mildenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
46-47; Bishop v. Godsbirth (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1315), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
97.
150. T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, at 13 (Ford Lectures 1947,
1949).
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among parties subject to its jurisdiction.'51 Tenurial obligations
related to the fair, such as the requirement that the vill of Houghton
supply watchmen, were addressed in the fair court along with
unrelated issues such as fire safety regulations and complaints about
a neighbor's garbage piles. 52
In its capacity as an administrative institution of the abbot, it was
only natural that the fair court would make decisions based upon the
authority of the abbot's will. An entry from 1315 fines a clerk six
times for successively failing to "present the articles of the fair, as is
the custom [prout moris est]."'1 53 Exactly what these articles
contained, we do not know; however, we can assume that they
served to regulate conduct within the fair. In 1287, Richard of
Banbury was accused of selling russet cloth "at the backs," meaning
away from the main street of the fair-an act that was considered
"contrary to the ordinances [of the fair].' 54 Similarly, letting houses
to prostitutes was described in 1300 as "contrary to the ordinance of
the fair [contra statutum ferie]. '
The abbot's "peace," a lord's guarantee of freedom from violence,
was also frequently cited as an authority by the fair court. Most of
the cases of assault are said to occur "contra pacem domini Abbatis
151. Lloyd Bonfield, The Nature of Customary Law in the Manor Courts of
Medieval England, 31 COMP. STUD. IN Soc'Y & HIST. 514, 517-18 (1989).
152. See 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 73, 75, 84.
153. Id. at 98.
154. Id. at 21. The phrase "contrary to an ordinance of the fair" is used in two
other cases of selling at the backs, those of Reginald of Wetwang in 1293 and of
William of Gidding in 1300. Id. at 58, 78.
155. Id. at 74. In a conversation with the author, Paul Brand noted that it is not
certain whether these ordinances were promulgated by the abbot, as opposed to
being formed in community with others. However, the rolls do make it clear that
the abbot was licensed to grant exceptions. See, e.g., id. at 24 (granting an
exception to merchants who unlawfully sold merchandise during the time of the
fair). One possible interpretation is to identify the ordinances with the charter of 42
Hen. III, which Gross read as granting that "during the fair no one is to carry on
trade whereby the profits of the abbot and convent may be diminished." Id. at 36
n.1; see Charter to the Abbot and Convent of Ramsey, 42 Hen. 3 (May 7, 1258), in
2 CARTUL. MONAST. DE RAMES, supra note 37, at 67, 68; see also Charter to the
Abbot and Convent of Ramsey, 42 Hen. 3, supra note 41. But at least one entry of
1288 describes such sales as contrary to both "the charter of the lord king" and "the
ordinances of the fair," indicating that they were considered as distinct. Pollard v.
Nicholas (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1288), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 36.
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[against the peace of the lord abbot]," and the phrase appears
repeatedly in cases of trespass, slander, and breaking and entering. 116
The formula even makes its appearance in a case of debt and
contract, where the defendant is accused of having violated the peace
by taking possession of a horse before he had sufficiently paid for
it. 1
57
This position of authority was not unique to the abbot; the king's
will found its expression in St. Ives in a similar way. When faced
with a direct royal command, such as the 1315 order to seize the
goods of all Flemish merchants present at the fair, the St. Ives court
immediately sought to comply.158 It also obeyed the terms of the
king's charters-of course giving pride of place to those describing
the privileges of the abbot, 5 9 but also accepting as valid royal grants
that exempted individuals from the fair court's jurisdiction. For
instance, in Almaine v. Flanders, the fair court exempted foreign
communities from judgment if they could present royal charters
granting them immunity. 160 Those of the city of London had the right
to be tried in their own courts, and the fair court respected this right
156. Ledman v. Barber (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1288), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 33;
Wells v. Horningsea (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at
138; London v. Woodfool (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note
14, at 143; Raven v. Cobbler (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 145.
157. Lawford v. Northampton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 25; cf Chapman v. Boston (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 141 (accusing the defendant of assault and robbery on the king's
highway "against the peace of the lord abbot and his bailiffs").
158. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 94. The goods were to be seized to help repay a
countess for her robbery at the hands of Flemish pirates; the bailiffs answered that
no goods or chattels of Flemish merchants had been found in the fair since the writ
was delivered, and "therefore up to the present time nothing has been done therein
etc." Id. at 94-95.
159. In 1288, John Poke was convicted of leasing two houses when not all of the
houses of the abbot had yet been leased. This was described as "contrary to the
charter of the lord king." 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 34. Gross noted that Henry III
had granted a charter ensuring that the abbot's houses would be the first to be
leased. Id. (quoting 2 CARTUL. MONAST. DE RAMES., supra note 37, at 68).
160. Almaine v. Flanders (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
9-10.
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when it was invoked. 16' The king reserved the rights to establish
standards of weights and measures, to take prises of goods for the
royal wardrobe, and to regulate the currency, and the court rolls
contain records of these procedures. 162 Furthermore, the king could
still exercise some direct legislative control over the fairs of his
realm, as when he granted privileges in St. Ives to the bishop of Ely,
or exempted foreign merchants from many taxes and tolls in the
Carta Mercatoria of 1303.163
The court of St. Ives was even called upon to enforce royal grants
that had nothing to do with its own jurisdiction. In 1293, Thomas of
Grantham sued the abbot of Thorney for taking a 6d. toll from him in
the abbot's market of Yaxley, even though "he and all citizens of
London are free and quit of such demands in all cities and boroughs
throughout the realm of England."'164 The record leaves no indication
of why the abbot of Thorney was subject in this case to the abbot of
161. See Coventry v. Fleetbridge (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS,
supra note 14, at 155.
162. See 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 40-41 (litigation concerning a false measure);
id. at 76 (concerning prises); May v. Stanground (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 80 (noting that the debased "crockards and pollards" had
been "prohibited by the lord king throughout all England," and enforcing payment
at the prescribed 2:1 rate). Damages were partially paid in "cokedones" in
Yarmouth v. Fick (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 81, but in
that case the debased coins had already been attached before the currency
regulations took effect. See generally Statute Concerning False Money, 1299, 27
Edw. (Eng.), in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 131; C.G. Crump &
A. Hughes, The English Currency Under Edward 1, 5 ECON. J. 50, 63 (1895); N.J.
Mayhew & D.R. Walker, Crockards and Pollards: Imitation and the Problem of
Fineness in a Silver Coinage, in EDWARDIAN MONETARY AFFAIRS 125, 137 (N.J.
Mayhew ed., British Archaeological Reports 36, 1977).
163. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 32; Carta Mercatoria, 31 Edw. 3, m. 11 (Feb. 1,
1303), in ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY: SELECT DOCUMENTS 211 (A.E. Bland et
al. eds., 1914). In 1287, the prior of Ely appeared in St. Ives to request the
privileges he had been guaranteed in prior royal charters; these included the rights
to receive the amercements of his own men in pleas against others, and to have his
officers carry a rod in the fair as a symbol of their power. No answer to the request
is recorded. I SCLM, supra note 1, at 32. (These royal privileges had earlier been
the subject of litigation before the Common Bench. See Ely v. Ramsey (C.P.
1283), in 1 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 138 (Paul A. Brand ed., Selden
Society 111, 1996).)
164. Grantham v. Thorney (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
63-64.
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Ramsey's jurisdiction; however, it does show that the fair court
could and did entertain litigation based on a royal grant. 65
The extant records from St. Ives coincided with the explosion of
legislation under Edward I, and occasionally a royal statute did
effectively change the practice of justice at the fair court. Before
1275, for instance, an entire community could be held collectively
liable for the debt of a single member (as mentioned earlier
concerning the CRS). 166 Indeed, much of the litigation examined by
Gross in the fair court rolls of 1270 and by Maitland in the rolls of
1275 arose out of such disputes. 167 Once the Statute of Westminster I
exempted English communities from this practice, a change is clearly
reflected in the records-at no point after 1275 were the goods of an
English community seized in an individual dispute.168
At other times, however, royal statutes would be more honored in
the breach than in the observance. In 1287, the fair rolls record that
the communities of merchants at the fair of St. Ives "were assembled
to hear the command of the lord king in accordance with the new
form of his statute touching merchants frequenting English fairs."
The "new form of his statute" is believed to be the Statute of
Merchants, issued at Westminster in 1285, which amended the 1283
Statute of Acton Burnell. 169 As a result of this assembly, the
merchants would have presumably been familiar with the procedure
for debt collection that the statute established. However, after the
165. This case cannot be explained-as one might explain a number of others
arising from conduct that did not take place in St. Ives-by assuming that the
plaintiff found the defendant in the fair and turned to the nearest court at hand. The
abbot of Thomey and his co-defendant, his bailiff William Curteis, were both
represented by attorneys, giving the impression that they had expected the
litigation and had sent representatives to take their places. The case is made still
more mysterious by the fact that the defendants chose to settle for the sum of a full
mark, many times the 6d. claimed as damages. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying note 70.
167. Cf 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 1-10; 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 145,
149.
168. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw., cl. 23 (Eng.), reprinted in I
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 33.
169. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 19; cf Statute of Acton Bumell, 1283, 11 Edw.
(Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 53; Statute of
Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra
note 51, at 98.
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statute is mentioned in this record, it virtually disappears from the
rolls. In fact, the St. Ives records appear to contain only one case
where the Statute of Merchants was invoked, namely Hereford v.
Lyons, where a debtor was imprisoned "in accordance with the
statute of the lord king [secundum statutum domini regis]" until he
could find security for the payment of his debts. 170 Even in this sole
example, the fair court was playing fast and loose with the terms of
the statute, which provided for the recovery of certain registered
debts, not any debt whatsoever. Moreover, the debtor in this case was
given an opportunity to sell his goods and to repay the debt before he
was arrested-a practice allowed by Acton Burnell but prohibited by
the Statute of Merchants, which required that the debtor be
imprisoned immediately and that he remain in prison until the debt
were paid in full.171
Even as the court misapplied the statute, however, it still relied on
the statute's authority for justification-its actions were undertaken
secundum statutum domini regis.17 2 To be treated so unevenly, these
statutes cannot have been understood as strict, positive law; instead,
the fair court seemed to follow more closely the interpretation of
Plucknett described earlier, that statutes "in essence were merely
170. Hereford v. Lyons (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 62-
63.
171. Id.; PLUCKNETT, supra note 150, at 140; see also Statute of Acton Burnell,
1283, 11 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at
53; Statute of Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 51, at 98. In a conversation with the author, Paul Brand
suggested that the record may reflect a deliberate misreading of the statute. The
parties in this case eventually settled, after the defendant promised to pay his debts
by the end of the coming June.
172. Not all royal statutes were so lucky; clause 35 of the Statute of Westminster
I forbade the officials of non-royal courts to seize goods in cases involving
"contracts, covenants, and trespasses done out of their power and their jurisdiction
... nor within their franchise where their power is." Statute of Westminster I,
1275, 3 Edw., cl. 35 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note
51, at 33, 35; see also LMLP, supra note 20, at 107 n.3. This statute seems to have
been entirely ignored at St. Ives, even by those who would have an interest in
citing it so as to avoid punishment. See, e.g., Saddington v. Langbaurgh (St. Ives
Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 22 (arising entirely out of a dispute
that took place in the town of Bedford); Titchwell v. Burdon (St. Ives Fair Ct.
1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 59 (concerning a debt incurred in Boston, for
which the plaintiff had pursued the defendant for almost a year before finding him
in the St. Ives fair).
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modifications of the elastic web of the customary common law." '173
The authority of the statutes was not set aside in conflict with a
superior law merchant; rather, the statutes were never so hard and
fast to begin with.
A similar story can be told of the customary constraints on the
abbot's power. Some evidence of the power of custom is provided by
the fact that the fair court appealed to custom, not to the abbot's
command, in fining the clerk who had failed to present the articles of
the fair.174 In 1287, Robert Pole and six others sought permission to
sell woolen cloths and canvas in the same stalls, a practice prohibited
by the abbot's regulations; for the significant sum of 20s., their
request was granted for one year only, and they were required to take
an oath that "never in the future will they make such a sale there, or
demand this as a custom, save by leave of the warden and the
steward of the fair."'175 The fact that the abbot's officials would
require a solemn oath to prevent a claim of custom shows the
influence that such a custom might have wielded had it been allowed
to form, as well as the power of custom to restrict the abbot's
freedom of action. 7 6 Yet it must be noted that there is nothing
uniquely mercantile in such customs, which could emerge between
lords and their tenants concerning any kind of privilege. 177 Even were
the one-time grant to harden into a custom, it would have been owed
173. PLUCKNETT, supra note 150, at 13.
174. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 98.
175. Id. at 24.
176. As Bonfield argued, however, to understand this notion of custom, we must
separate it from the modem concept of "precedent," which contains not only the
principle that similar reasoning must be applied to similar cases, but the
requirement that rules be held either to be unchangeable or to be changed only in a
certain legally recognized manner. Such a description would be entirely
inappropriate for the customary law of the St. Ives court, in which the abbot's
representatives feared a new claim of custom might eventually arise from a single
one-year exemption. Confusing custom with precedent might also "startle
historians of common law, because it would mean that manor courts had adopted
the concept of precedent centuries before ... that of the royal courts." Bonfield,
supra note 151, at 522.
177. The bishop of Chichester, for example, in 1408 granted his tenants an
exemption from building a new hay loft "on condition that it shall not serve as a
precedent in time to come." Id. at 520.
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only to Robert Poole and his fellows, and not to all merchants
generally.
That the fair court might have relied on custom in this way should
not be surprising, given Plucknett's description of the "elastic web"
of "customary common law." The king and abbot exercised
significant influence over the principles applied there, and customary
principles were often combined with these authorities-as in one
case concerning the manipulation of wool prices, described as both
"contrary to the custom of the fair" and "to the great damage and
prejudice of the lord king." '178
As is clear from the above discussion, the authority of the king and
that of the abbot were not entirely distinct in the fair court's records,
and may not have been distinct in the minds of the fair court's suitors
either. Several cases in the court rolls cite royal and abbatial
authority almost interchangeably, and occasionally combine it with
customary provisions. For instance, selling "at the backs" was
usually referred to in the court rolls as an infraction against the
abbot, or (as above) as contrary to an "ordinance of the fair."
However, when the merchants of Louvain and Malines were found
engaging in the practice in 1315, it was called "contrary to the
custom of the realm etc. 179 Stephen of Reedness that same year was
accused of selling at the backs "to the contempt of the lord king and
to the great damage of the said abbot"; he was ordered to appear to
answer "the lord king and the abbot of Ramsey," and an inquest was
begun "on behalf of the king etc."'180 And in pleading against
Nicholas Crowthorpe of Northhampton in 1288, the bailiff Philip
Pollard cited as authorities the "ordinances of the fair," the "charter
granted by the lord king," the "peace of the lord abbot and his
bailiffs," and the "law and custom of the [St. Ives] fair" all at once. 8'
The fair court therefore cannot be seen as participating in a single
legal tradition. The abbot's dictates, the king's statutes, the residents'
178. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 92-93. The "damage" may result from the
increased cost of royal prises and purchases in the fair.
179. Id. at 93.
180. Id.
181. Pollard v. Crowthorpe (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1288), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
35-36.
[21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
customs, the suitors' sense of justice-all these participated in an
organic, 'living' law. The principles of the fair courts were not
merely grounded in the will of the merchant community; instead, the
authority of the lord and of the lord king were keenly felt in the fair's
day-to-day administration. In this way, the fair court was very similar
to the local and seignorial courts that were its contemporaries, and it
is these similarities to which we now turn.
2. The Law of Local Courts
Another "remarkable fact" about the fair court, Scrutton's reader
might conclude, is that the records from St. Ives read like records of
other local courts. The fair court followed the same general
procedures as its local contemporaries. The various judicial manuals
of the period, written to help stewards manage their seigneurial
courts, describe the practices at St. Ives with surprising accuracy. In
matters of substance, moreover, the fair court frequently applied
principles common to its contemporaries, even on questions later
historians have described as central to the law merchant. This
evidence tells against the view of a law merchant "voluntarily
produced" by an independent merchant community; neither in
procedure nor in substance do the court rolls convey the impression
of a radically independent institution operating outside the legal
conceptions of its day.
The type of justice practiced by manorial and seignorial courts is
possibly more ancient than that of the courts of common law, and it
may have been more familiar to the litigants at St. Ives. Maitland's
original study of the St. Ives rolls included them in a volume of
"Manorial and Seignorial Courts," and in many respects-the style
of record-keeping, the manner of presenting complaints and answers,
the means of argument, the evidentiary tools of inquest and wager of
law-the St. Ives court was operating in well-marked territory. After
all, the abbot of Ramsey had many courts, and cases could be moved
among them;' 82 why would his steward conduct each of them so
differently?
We can find further similarities in procedure by looking to the
instruction manuals used by stewards of contemporary seignorial
182. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
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courts. The practices described in "The Court Baron," a popular
instruction manual for the stewards of seignorial courts in the late
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, very closely resemble those
of the fair court. In one sample case included in the text, a merchant
defamed another and caused him to lose credit for a purchase; the
defendant was allowed to wage his law six-handed (i.e., with five
compurgators) at the next court.'83 Exactly the same procedure was
followed in cases at St. Ives, such as Rushbrooke v. Woodfool and
Woodfool v. Pors--even down to the number of compurgators
required.'84 In a second sample, the defendant in a case of debt asked
for a love-day in an attempt to settle the dispute. The steward granted
the love-day, but did so "saving the right of the lord in all things"; an
almost identical procedure occurred at St. Ives in Cousin v. Huy.'85
Two more manuscripts, entitled "The Manner of Holding Courts"-
one composed circa 1307 for John de Longueville, a lawyer who
represented the borough of Northampton in Parliament, 8 6 and
another composed circa 1342 for the Abbey of St. Albans' 87 -
confirm the similarities between the procedure at St. Ives and in
other local courts. These treatises, it must be remembered, were not
written to address mercantile courts specifically; rather, they were
intended to be generally applicable to seignorial courts throughout
England.
Although many authors have emphasized the distinct procedures
of mercantile courts-often extolling their "speed and
informality"' 8S-the court of St. Ives in fact retained many of the
183. The Court Baron, supra note 132, at40-41.
184. Rushbrooke v. Woodfool (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 57; Woodfool v. Pors (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 71. In
the latter, the defendant fails in his law because he "came three-handed when he
ought to have come six-handed." Id.
185. Cousin v. Huy (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5.
186. The Manner of Holding Courts-John de Longueville, supra note 111; see
also Maitland & Baildon, supra note 132, at 14.
187. The Manner of Holding Courts-St. Albans Formulary, in COURT BARON,
supra note 111, at 93; see also Maitland & Baildon, supra note 132, at 15.
188. Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 130; TRAKMAN,
supra note 4, at 13; see also Kadens, supra note 20, at 57 (describing "merchant
procedure" as "equitable procedure," which relied "not on the rigor of the law but
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worst formalities of existing procedure. Parties could lose a judgment
should one of their compurgators accidentally name the plaintiff
instead of the defendant, or by failing to mention the word "ox" in
denying the plaintiffs count word for word.189 As Charles Donahue
noted, the "default rules" of procedure at St. Ives were not provided
by a distinct "body of customary law," or by "an accepted body of
mercantile procedural rules." Instead, they were supplied by "the
common customary law of the realm of England," supplemented by
"the common elements in the procedure of local courts."1 90
The fair court did not merely adopt existing procedural rules, but
much substantive law as well. This Article cannot attempt a complete
comparison of St. Ives' practices with those of other courts, and
some of its practices may have been distinctively mercantile.1 91 Yet
on judging 'ex aequo et bono,' according to that which is fair and best for the
parties and doing so in the simplest possible fashion").
189. Langbaurgh v. Bytham (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 20; Legge v. Mildenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
46-47; see also MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 17-18.
Moreover, although the St. Ives rolls-along with Lex Mercatoria and
every other contemporary English source-are replete with examples of wager of
law, this practice has been overlooked by many commentators. See, e.g., 1
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 570 ("Wager of law was unknown among
them."); TRAKMAN, supra note 4, at 2 ("Commercial adjudicators ... avoided the
delays that would otherwise arise from the administration of oaths . . . ."); Benson,
Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 130 ("[T]hese courts avoided lengthy
testimony under oath .... ").
190. Donahue, supra note 20, at 30.
191. See generally Kadens, supra note 20, at 48-56. For example, one common
custom was that of releasing attached goods to plaintiffs after the defendant failed
to appear for a year and a day. See, e.g., Fairhead v. Tankus (St. Ives Fair Ct.
1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 71. Royal records show the practice was
common to other fair courts. In 1281, the fair court of Stamford held that distraints
should be kept for a year and a day before turning them over to the plaintiff, "as
the custom of merchants is [prout moris est mercatorum]." Chesterton v.
Stanbourne (Assize at Lincoln 1281), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 31. The
assertion was made in the argument of a bailiff of the fair, but it went uncontested.
Id. Similarly, the steward and bailiffs of the Boston fair claimed in 1301 that "there
are divers customs in use among the merchants coming there and pleading
according to the law of merchants [secundum legem mercatoriam]"--one of which
was that defendants who failed to appear would have their goods delivered to the
plaintiff and held until the next fair, at which time they would be appraised and
used to pay the debt. Dispenser v. Cleasby (K.B. 1301), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38,
at 66.
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it is worthwhile to examine two fields, the enforcement of contracts
and the transfer of debts, where the alleged distinctions between the
law merchant and domestic English law have received particular
emphasis-and where the St. Ives court clearly followed the local
approach.
In cases of contract, the English royal courts for centuries required
a writing under seal as "the only admissible proof of an
agreement. '192 The rule therefore denied relief to plaintiffs in cases
concerning everyday agreements-such as carrying a cartload of
hay-for which no formal deed (or "specialty") would be
executed. 193 The mercantile courts, however, had a far looser
requirement, and routinely considered cases of covenant without
requiring a sealed deed. For instance, the St. Ives court in 1291 heard
the case of Carlisle v. Halling, concerning a covenant without
specialty to sell a pair of tongs. 194 A number of authors have
attributed this flexibility to the influence of the law merchant:
Trakman noted that merchants traded "[u]nencumbered by formal
documents under seal";195 Berman wrote that "informal agreements
Even this practice may have had non-mercantile roots, however, in the
tradition that possession pursuant to an exercise of jurisdiction could become
ownership after a year and a day. See 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 31 (noting
that one who claimed ownership of a lost sheep before the manor court of the
abbey of Bec must "bind[] herself to restore it or its price in case it shall be
demanded from her within [a] year and [a] day"); see also F. W. Maitland,
Possession for Year and Day, 5 LAW Q. REv. 253, 260 (1889) (identifying the
year-and-day as the period after which successful common-law plaintiffs could
obtain a writ of execution, and after which intervenors could no longer claim that
property disposed of by a court was actually their own).
192. John William Salmond, The History of Contract, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS,
supra note 25, at 320, 325; cf Thomas Corbet v. "B.," 20 Edw. (Eyre of Salop
1292), in YEAR BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD THE FIRST, YEARS XX
AND XXI 222 (Alfred J. Horwood ed. & trans., Rolls Series 31, London, Longmans
1866) (concerning a covenant case supported only by good suit, against which the
defendant requested "[]udgment if we ought to answer his suit, in the absence of a
writing &c").
193. See Anon v. A., 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), in 2 THE EYRE OF
LONDON, 14 EDWARD II, A.D. 1321, at 286, 286 (Helen M. Cam ed., Year Books
of Edward II 26 (Part 2), Selden Society 86, 1969) (requiring specialty to prove a
covenant, noting that "we shall not undo the law for a cartload of hay").
194. Carlisle v. Halling (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 47.
195. Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 274. Note, however, that the
"writing obligatory" which Trakman saw as a replacement for such "formal
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could be legally binding"; 19 6 and Cremades and Plehn praised the law
merchant's "abandonment of contractual formalities. '197
As we saw in the context of adjudication, however, this view is
based primarily on the practices of royal courts. Before the period of
the St. Ives rolls, much of commercial law had traditionally been a
matter for local courts. The manor court of the Bishop of Ely at
Littleport, for instance, heard a number of minor cases of covenant
without requiring specialty. A jury inquest, not a sealed deed,
revealed that William Peche "did not make the sedge of Oliver
Beucosin in Hakonfen before Midsummer in [the] last year as he
covenanted," and Peche was ordered to pay damages and a 6d.
fine. 198 Other examples abound 19 9 -as one should expect, for "[i]t is
hard to believe that these Littleport villans, ...when they made
agreements about their petty affairs, ... procured parchment and ink
and wax and a clerk. 200
Historians are divided as to how the royal courts came to insist on
specialty in actions of covenant.01 Yet it is widely agreed that the
requirement altered what had been the traditional modes of proof,
which did not require specialty, and thus rendered the procedures of
the central royal courts "different and distinct from what went on in
local courts. 20 2 The king's jurisdiction was in certain respects a
documents," id., could itself bear a seal. See Hoppman v. Welbome (St. Ives Fair
Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 86-87 ("In witness whereof I have put my
seal to the present writing.").
196. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions
(Lex Mercatoria), in 3 A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS fol.3, at 5, 5 (2d ed. 1983).
197. Cremades & Plehn, supra note 5, at 319.
198. Beucosin v. Peche (Littleport Manor Ct. 1318), in COURT BARON, supra
note 111, at 124-25.
199. See, e.g., Brewster v. Ilger (Littleport Manor Ct. 1325), in COURT BARON,
supra note 111, at 144; COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 115.
200. COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 115-16.
201. See D. J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 24 (1999).
202. Joseph Biancalana, Actions of Covenant, 1200-1330, 20 LAW & HIST. REV.
1, 31 (2002). Robert Palmer argued that the specialty requirement emerged with
the introduction of the justicies writ. See ROBERT C. PALMER, THE COUNTY
COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1150-1350, at 208-15 (1982); Robert C. Palmer,
Covenant, Justicies Writs, and Reasonable Showings, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97
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recent innovation, 203 and the local courts it supplanted frequently did
not require a formal deed in cases of covenant. The royal courts did
not represent the entirety of English law. Rather than abandoning the
law of the 'state' for that of the merchants, then, the court of St. Ives
merely retained the pre-existing local practice.
The fair court also followed contemporary practice with regard to
transferring debts. Medieval merchants are often said to have treated
debts as transferable, a practice that culminated in the development
of fully negotiable instruments. 20 4 Benson wrote that merchant
(1987). Biancalana, however, contended that the requirement was not linked to the
writ, but was rather intended to increase the popularity of royal courts among
plaintiffs by limiting the options of the defendant. Biancalana, supra, at 31-32.
Both would have agreed, however, that the requirement kept "central and local
courts separate and distinct from each other." Id. at 31.
203. See generally ROBERT L. HENRY, CONTRACTS IN THE LOCAL COURTS OF
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 15-16 (1926); COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 116 ("[T]he
king's court never.., took upon itself to enforce the whole law of the land. Only
by degrees and owing to the decay of the local courts did its catalogue of the forms
of action become the one standard of English law."). Royal courts recognized the
variety of local practices; damages could be assessed in county courts "according
to the custom of the county," and writs to Ireland might direct a sheriff to do
justice "according to the law and custom of those parts." PALMER, supra note 202,
at 210.
204. According to the seventeenth-century trader Gerard Malynes, the practice
of endorsing bills to others may have been "used amongst Merchants beyond the
seas," but the "Common Law of England" stood "directly against this course; for
they say there can be no alienation from one man to another of debts; because they
are held Choses in Action." GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL LEX
MERCATORIA 97 (photo. reprint 1997) (London, Adam Islip 1622); see also Carter,
supra note 18, at 241. Among merchants, however, Berman claimed that
commercial instruments became fully negotiable in the "late eleventh and twelfth
centuries." BERMAN, supra note 5, at 350, cited in Kadens, supra note 20, at 41
n. 12. Others have argued that bills of exchange were commonly transferred in mid-
fifteenth-century England, and that the law merchant had established their
negotiability by this time. See, e.g., J.H. Munro, English "Backwardness" and
Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th to 16th
Centuries, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE Low COUNTRIES 105 (Peter Stabel et
al. eds., Studies in Urban Social, Economic and Political History of the Medieval
and Early Modem Low Countries 10, 2000).
The emergence of negotiable instruments has long been treated as the
paradigmatic innovation of the law merchant. See Carter, supra note 18, at 241
(reasoning that negotiability was one of the "peculiar features which the common
law regarded with aversion"); Cremades & Plehn, supra note 5, at 319 (explaining
that the law merchant is typified by "the legal recognition given to bearer bills of
exchange"); North, supra note 33, at 32 ("The law merchant established certain
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courts, unlike their contemporaries, "recognized debts as freely
transferable through informal 'written obligatory,' a process
developed by merchants themselves to simplify the transfer of
debt. ' 2°5 Trakman similarly claimed that "the medieval Law
Merchant, realistically, originated the 'writing obligatory,' by which
creditors could transfer freely the debts owed to them. ' 20 6
Trakman found authority for his position in the St. Ives case of S.
Michel v. Troner-in which a group of Norwich merchants bought
wine for £8 10s., "which they were bound to pay to the said Brun or
any on his behalf bearing a certain obligatory writing made between
them on Midsummer Day A.D. 1274. "2o7 However, this case fails to
provide an example of unlimited transferability. The debt was to be
paid to Brun or another acting "on his behalf," which likely indicates
a collection agent designated by Brun, rather than an independent
third party to whom the obligation had been endorsed.0 s
'choses in action' called negotiable instruments."); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) ("The law respecting negotiable instruments may be
truly declared . . . not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial
world."); cf 15 AM. JUR. 2D COMMON LAW § 7 (defining the law merchant as "the
law regarding the negotiability of commercial paper as such law developed before
the enactment of any statute on the subject"). But see ROGERS, supra note 20
(providing a wealth of evidence opposing the claim that the common law
'incorporated' negotiability from the law merchant); Stephen E. Sachs, Burying
Burton: Burton v. Davy and the Law of Negotiable Instruments (May 21, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.stevesachs.
com/papers/burton.pdf.
205. Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 130.
206. Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 274.
207. Id. at 274 n.39; S. Michel v. Troner (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT
PLEAS, supra note 14, at 152.
208. Cf ROGERS, supra note 20, at 47 (making a similar argument with regard to
the later case of Burton v. Davy). The record goes on to mention that "Brun and his
representatives have often laboured at Boston and at Norwich" to retrieve the
money, indicating that Brun did in fact designate such agents. 1 SELECT PLEAS,
supra note 14, at 152. Even J. Milnes Holden, whom Trakman cited, noted that the
action in this case "was no more than an ordinary plea of debt." J. MILNES
HOLDEN, HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 1N ENGLISH LAW 6 (1955)
(internal citation omitted); Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 275 nn.41
& 43.
This practice was not uncommon; plaintiffs who could not travel to St. Ives
would frequently send attorneys in their stead. See, e.g., Bolton v. Rydon (St. Ives
Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 159; Graftham v. Pope
(1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 54; Grantham v. Thorney (St. Ives Fair Ct.
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Moreover, even if a creditor had sought to transfer an obligation to
an unrelated third party, the St. Ives court would have refused to
enforce such transfers. In Abingdon v. Martin, the plaintiff claimed
standing as a messenger of the London cloth merchant John of
Abingdon, whom the defendant owed £11.209 After initially
challenging the plaintiffs standing, the defendant appeared in court
two days later and presented what he claimed to be a written
confirmation that the debt had been paid in full. The plaintiff
immediately protested that the document was invalid, and asked for a
jury to investigate. At this point, however, Martin argued that the
plaintiff could not contest the document's validity, "since it is not
lawful for him or for any other person to deny or abate the deed of
another." The court agreed, Martin went free, and the unhappy
plaintiff was fined for making a false claim.21
The record does not show whether Martin's written confirmation
was valid or not. The document's validity, however, was clearly
irrelevant to the court's procedure: even an obvious forgery could not
be challenged by one who claimed to hold a transferred debt. As a
result, it is hard to believe that many creditors transferred their debts
at St. Ives, or that the court's approach to written instruments
exemplified a more liberal merchant custom.
In general, the legal principles that can be gleaned from the St.
Ives rolls do not leave a great deal of room for separate mercantile
customs. Robert Henry compared the practices of mercantile,
borough, communal, manorial, and seignorial courts, and found
''comparatively little divergence" in the law they applied.
Occasionally "a line can be drawn between the practice of borough
and merchant courts on the one hand and manorial on the other,
sometimes between borough and communal as against the manorial
and merchant"; but in general there existed a "substantial
1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 63-64; Vicker v. Foliot (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295),
in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 70; see also Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in
Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 21 n.84
(1998) (describing the increasing number of"pleaders" at St. Ives).
209. Abingdon v. Martin (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
65.
210. Id. at 65-67.
[21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
uniformity" in the substantive law of the various courts, with "much
more of similarity than of dissimilarity. 211
The merchants of St. Ives did not "voluntarily produce[]" a law so
similar to that of local courts by sheer coincidence. Rather, the
widespread similarities between the local courts and the court of St.
Ives, on both procedural and substantive matters, argue that the two
shared a common legal tradition, and that the latter was not an
independent creature of the international merchant community.
3. The Status of Merchants
Even if separate mercantile customs could be identified, medieval
mercantile law need not be viewed as a private law of merchants.
William Mitchell portrayed the law merchant as a guild privilege, "in
its origin a personal law, the law of a special class." By virtue of
their profession, merchants could be judged by the law merchant as
opposed to the common law; this class-based choice of law was a
"characteristic feature" of the law merchant "throughout the Middle
Ages." 2  More recent scholarship similarly describes the word
"merchant" as a "term of art" indicating a "personal status"
analogous to that of the clergy or nobility, a term not applied more
widely until the seventeenth century.213
At St. Ives, however, appeals to mercantile law were by no means
limited to a particular class of persons. Non-merchants could invoke
the protection of the customs of the fair or even of decisions reached
secundum legem mercatoriam. Additionally, the rolls contain
211. HENRY, supra note 203, at 9-10.
212. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 81. Mitchell argued largely on the basis of
Continental examples, although he did have some evidence from England. See also
BEWES, supra note 5, at vi ("The merchants carried their law, as it were, in the
same consignment as their goods .... ."); BERMAN, supra note 5, at 345-46
(analogizing merchants' privileges to those of churchmen in ecclesiastical courts);
HERBERT ALAN JOHNSON, THE LAW MERCHANT AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, 1664 TO 1730, at 16 (1963) (explaining how the law
merchant "became a personal law that accompanied the merchant on his travels").
213. Kadens, supra note 20, at 44-45 (arguing that merchants "existed in a world
apart from that shared by the retailers and artisans who bought and sold locally," as
the latter were uncontroversially subject to "local laws and customs" without
raising issues of jurisdiction or choice of law). Note, however, that Kadens rejected
much of the Romantic tradition.
2006] 747
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
theoretical arguments that men of all social classes can be considered
"merchants" for the purpose of the law merchant's protection. In
other words, the records depict mercantile law as a general body of
customs applying to commerce, rather than as a set of privileges
granted to a specific class.214
The fair court records do not contain a single example of a
challenge to a party's social standing to have a case heard by the
court or to be judged secundum legem mercatoriam. After all,
questions of a theoretical nature were rarely raised in this very
practical forum. Yet the records do establish that the jurisdiction of
the fair court of St. Ives was in no way restricted to merchants. Some
of those who came before the fair court were indeed members of
merchant guilds or mercantile communities; Gottschalk of Almaine,
who by his name was likely a German merchant, was also a "burgher
of Lynn."2 5 However, individuals of all classes and occupations
appear in the court rolls of St. Ives: in addition to merchants, local
and foreign, we see a parade of monks,216 knights,217 townsmen,218
bakers,21 9 carters, 20 servants, 21 and those even lower on the social
214. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 467 (stating that mercantile
law "seems to have been rather a special law for mercantile transactions than a
special law for merchants"); FREDERIC ROCKWELL SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE
EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW 345-46 (1930) (denying that
the law merchant was the private law of a class).
215. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 9.
216. Ape v. Kirkstead (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note
14, at 147.
217. Hereford v. Lyons (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 62
(in which the plaintiff is a knight). But see Appleby v. Bailiff of the Count of
Brittany (C.P. 1278-89), in 2 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 359, 360 (Paul A.
Brand ed., Selden Society 112, 1996) (recounting a pleader's allegation-though
without confirmation by the court-that a "knight of the county" is "not
distrainable under the law merchant").
218. See Cousin v. Huy (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 3.
219. Cricklade v. Wellingborough (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 57-58.
220. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 31.
221. Waite v. Hamon (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 13.
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scale.22 St. Ives was in a rural area; before its incorporation in the
late nineteenth century, it was not a city with independent legal status
or a free town where merchants made the law. Some residents
farmed, others provided services, and many did both; some residents
were even quite well off. But they were almost all unfree and had
various obligations to their lord, notably the pannage of pigs, hay-
making, tallage, and payments on the marriage of daughters and for
grazing pigs in the forest.223 These individuals of servile status, who
would be classified as villeins by the common law of the time, were
judged in the fair of St. Ives under the same rules as great merchants.
Consider Nicholas Legge, a butcher of St. Ives found in the rolls
as an ale taster and juror. In his case against Nicholas of Mildenhall
in 1291, Legge sought to intervene in a contract between Mildenhall
and another butcher, as he was allowed to do by "the usage of
merchants." Mildenhall admitted that "lex mercatorum," the law of
merchants, "does indeed allow every merchant to participate in a
bargain made with a butcher"; clearly, both parties included Legge in
the category of "merchant," and the court raised no objection to the
argument.224 Yet Legge was a resident of the vill-he was elected
constable among residents of Bridge Street in 1302-and there is no
indication that he was of unusual status. In any event, he was
certainly no international traveler, or even a member of a corporate
merchant guild.225
One can also find in the fair rolls a rare theoretical discussion of
the range of the term "merchant." In the 1311 case of Fulham v.
Francis, two servants of the abbot of Burton-on-Trent appeared in
court to prove, "secundum legem mercatoriam," that a horse being
seized to pay a debt actually belonged to their master. When forced
222. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 107 ("Richard Brewhouse receives the merry-
andrews in the midst of the fair to the disturbance and peril of the merchants;
therefore he [is fined] 6d.").
223. MOORE, supra note 11, at 237. Redstone noted that the town did not receive
its charter until 1874, and the inhabitants at the time of the fair paid a yearly rent,
did customary works, owed obedience to the lord's bailiff, and needed licenses
from the lord for the marriage of widows or daughters. Redstone, supra note 11, at
216.
224. Legge v. Mildenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
46-47.
225. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 162, 257.
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to defend their right to testify, they cited a point of law and claimed
that it applies to "any merchant ... whosoever he may be, whether
earl or baron, bishop or abbot, or any such person of rank." More
importantly, the plaintiff never contested this expansive definition of
"merchant"--he only claimed that the servants should not be allowed
to act as their abbot's attorneys.226
This all-inclusive definition was accepted without objection by the
court, which seems to settle the question of whether St. Ives court
was part of a private legal system. If the classification of "merchant"
has any meaning as an occupational description or as a name for a
social class, it cannot include earls, barons, bishops, or abbots; these
groups, especially the churchmen governed by ecclesiastical law,
possessed a legal status profoundly distinct from that of merchants
and townsmen. Indeed, the trader Gerard Malynes would later
specifically exclude "clergymen, noblemen, gentlemen, soldiers,
[lawyers], publick officers and magistrates" from the ranks of the
"merchants" whom the law merchant could protect.227
As Frederick Pollock and F.W. Maitland noted, the term
"merchant" was not used to indicate a personal status until well after
the period of the court rolls.228 The understanding at St. Ives seems to
have been that a "merchant" is anyone who engages in trade-which
would mean that the law applied at St. Ives was a commercial law of
a general nature, not a personal one. If the law merchant were indeed
the legal privilege of a mercantile class, that class must have been so
inclusive as to be historically and legally meaningless.
226. Fulham v. Francis (St, Ives Fair Ct. 1311), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 89-
90.
227. MALYNES, supra note 204, at 6.
228. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 466-67 ("[lI]n private law
'merchantship' . . . seems too indefinite and also seems to have few legal
consequences to permit our calling it a status .... Until lately no one but 'a trader'
could be made bankrupt; still we should hardly say that in 1860 'tradership' was a
status."). In the eighteenth century, Wyndham Beawes complained of the
"[c]onfusion of the terms Merchant and Trader" which had "prevailed for a long
Time" in the past: "in the early Annals of England and Scotland we find Traders,
who resorted to the Publick Fairs, indiscriminately stiled Mercatores; they are thus
denominated in the publick Records in the Reign of Edward I." WYNDHAM
BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA 31 (Thomas Mortimer ed., London, R.
Baldwin 5th ed. 1792) (1758).
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D. CONCLUSIONS
A later historian, comparing the procedure of the St. Ives courts to
that, say, of the court of King's Bench, would doubtless find
significant differences between them. In comparison to the royal
courts, the merchants exercised more power over their own fate; as a
community, they were allowed to share in making judgments, and
the court was willing to take notice of their customs. But the central
royal courts hardly represented the only legal tradition in England. A
manual on "How to Hold Pleas and Courts," written circa 1274 by
John of Oxford, a monk in the priory of Luffield, reminds the reader
that there was one manner of pleading in the court of Common Pleas,
another before the justices in eyre, another in county and hundred
courts, and still another in the courts of knights, freeholders, or lay or
religious lords.229 These individual courts did not always enforce the
common law of the royal courts, but might possess their own
customs; a good steward "should know the customs of that county,
hundred, court or manor, and the franchises pertaining to the
premises,for laws and customs differ in divers places. 230
When viewed in this context, the experience of merchants at the
fair of St. Ives was hardly exceptional. The appropriate conclusion
from the evidence of the fair of St. Ives is not that the merchants
were given a unique license by existing authorities and allowed to
determine their own affairs. Instead, the fair court followed existing
models of seignorial courts-a perfectly sensible conclusion given
that it was a seignorial court, a court that "has a lord. 231 Indeed, it is
only because so much of the jurisdiction of local courts was later
229. How to Hold Pleas and Courts, in COURT BARON, supra note 11l, at 68.
The identification of author and date is found in Maitland & Baildon, supra note
132, at 11-13.
230. How to Hold Pleas and Courts, in COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 68
(emphasis added). For a later recognition that laws might differ even among
unquestionably English courts, see Y.B. 4 Edw. 4, fol. 8, pl. 9 (C.P. 1464),
reprinted in A.K.R. KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 259, 260-61
(1957) ("[T]he common law of the land in this case differs from the law of the
Chancery on the point.").
231. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 130.
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absorbed by centralized royal institutions that modem scholars could
be surprised by the local practice of mercantile law.232
One should not see the involvement of merchants in rendering
decisions as legal independence, any more than one should interpret
the participation of the unfree King's Ripton suitors as self-
government. The mercantile courts of thirteenth-century England
were not courts ruled by the merchants, nor were they specially
reserved for them. Instead, in James Steven Rogers' phrase, they far
232. In the traditional portrait, medieval merchants enjoyed a golden age of
independence before succumbing to state control. Trakman described mercantile
autonomy as serving the interests of "revenue and profit" as well as "growing trade
relations"; the "medieval Law Merchant was notably able to deliver these results,"
he wrote, "until the evolving nation state diluted the result." Trakman, E-Merchant
Law, supra note 5, at 297-98.
Unfortunately, the ability of merchant courts to "deliver these results" may
be overstated. The case of S. Michel v. Troner-which Trakman cited for its
mention of a "writing obligatory," arguing that "[1]ess procedural formality also
meant the speedier dispensation ofjustice"--regarded an £8 debt arising out of an
exchange almost two years earlier, "to obtain which money the [plaintiff] and his
representatives have often laboured at Boston and at Norwich and as yet have not
been able to get any part thereof." S. Michel v. Troner (1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS,
supra note 14, at 152; Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at -274. The
defendant could not be found at St. Ives either, and such serial (and unsuccessful)
prosecutions were far from uncommon in the St. Ives rolls.
Concern for the "dilut[ion]" caused by "the evolving nation state" is
similarly out of place. As examples, Trakman described such royal actions as the
Statute of Acton Burnell and the Statute of Merchants and argued that the system
of formally enrolled bonds these statutes created was "largely rejected by the Law
Merchant." Id. at 274 n.40. Although it is true that these statutes were rarely
invoked at St. Ives, see supra text accompanying notes 169-171, they were
designed to improve a plaintiffs ability to collect on debts, automatically
establishing the validity of a claim-indeed, under the later statute, allowing for
the defendant's immediate incarceration-whenever a formally enrolled bond was
presented. The statutes did not in any way prevent plaintiffs from continuing to
rely on more informal evidence in local courts, and were far more likely to have
been welcomed as an alternative to the existing inefficient means of debt
collection. (As is made clear in the preamble to the Statute of Merchants, the
process of Acton Burnell, which allowed only for the seizure of goods rather than
incarceration, was viewed by merchants as insufficiently harsh. Statute of Acton
Burnell, 1283, 11 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, suprt note
51, at 53, 53; Statute of Merchants, 1285, 13 Edw. (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES
OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 98, 98.) Concern for "dilut[ion]" by the state
appears only centuries later and in a dramatically different context.
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more resembled "local courts of general jurisdiction held at places
where a great deal of trade took place. 233
II. "LAW UNIVERSAL THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD"
In 1473, a foreign merchant sought an exemption in the court of
Star Chamber from certain English shipping regulations. Although
English law required that he register the number of sailors and the
name of the vessel in exchange for safe-conduct, the merchant
protested that he should not be "bound by [English] Statutes, which
Statutes are introductive of new law." As a foreigner who was
unfamiliar with the peculiarities of English law, the merchant argued,
he should be held to obey only those rules "declarative of ancient
right, that is to say, Nature, etc.," and his case should be "determined
according to the law of Nature, in the Chancery." Without deciding
the merits of the case, the Chancellor agreed that the merchant
should not be forced "to abide a trial by 12 men and other
solemnities of the law of the land"; rather, his case should be heard
in the Chancery according to "the law of Nature, which is called by
some 'Law Merchant,' which is law universal throughout the
world. 23
4
For hundreds of years after 1473, influential writers on English
commercial law echoed the language of this case. In 1622, the
merchant Gerard Malynes spoke of the law merchant as "a
customary law, approved by the authority of all kingdoms and
commonwealths, and not a law established by the sovereignty of any
prince"; for Malynes, the "customary law of merchants" held a
"peculiar prerogative" above all other customs and laws in that it "is
observed in all places. 235 Similarly, in his Question Concerning
233. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 25.
234. Anon. v. Sheriff of London, Y.B. 13 Edw. 2, fol. 9, Pasch, pl. 5 (Ch. 1473),
excerpted in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at lxxxiv, lxxxv-lxxxvi. For a more complete
account, see 2 SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER 30 (M. Hemmant ed.,
Selden Society 64, 1948) [hereinafter EXCHEQUER CHAMBER]; see also infra note
399.
235. MALYNES, supra note 204, at vi-vii, 3; see also BEAWES, supra note 228, at
38 (arguing that since the laws "of any one Realm" are insufficient for organizing
commerce, "the Law-Merchant was established" to include those rules "to which
all nations pay a just Regard").
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Impositions, seventeenth-century lawyer Sir John Davies stated that
the "commonwealth of merchants hath always had a peculiar and
proper law to rule and govern it. This law is called the Law
Merchant, whereof the laws of all nations do take special
knowledge."236
Indeed, the vision of the law merchant as a single entity common
to all nations has persisted in the work of modern historians. In his
classic history of English law, William Searle Holdsworth argued
that while "usages differed from place to place," the courts of
markets, fairs, and boroughs applied "a special law merchant,
differing from the ordinary law"-a "species ofjus gentium," the law
of nations, rather than "the law of a particular state. 237 William
Mitchell noted the "strongly marked international character" of the
law merchant, asserting that "the main lines of [its] development
were everywhere the same.2 38 More recent writers such as Benson
have described a law merchant "regulat[ing] virtually every aspect of
commercial transactions in all of Europe (and frequently outside
Europe)," and Trakman found the "twenty-first-century Law
Merchant" analogous to its medieval ancestor, in that it "is
cosmopolitan in nature and transcends the parochial interests of
nation states. '239
The rhetoric employed by Malynes, Holdsworth, Benson, or
Trakman soars far above the unassuming arguments found in the fair
court rolls. Some 200 years before the Chancellor's decision, Gerard
of Cologne was told that he was not sufficiently equipped to wage
236. JOHN DAVIES, THE QUESTION CONCERNING IMPOSITIONS (1656), reprinted
in 3 THE WORKS IN VERSE AND PROSE OF SIR JOHN DAVIES 12 (Alexander B.
Grossart ed., Fuller Worthies' Library, Blackburn, C. Tiplady 1876). Although the
edition of Davies' work here reprinted was not published until 1656, it was likely
written while Davies occupied the office of attorney general, and his term of office
ended in 1619. LMLP, supra note 20, at 133 n.37.
237. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 66 (emphasizing the "cosmopolitan
character of the Law Merchant"); 1 id. at 528-29.
238. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 20; see also M.M. POSTAN, MEDIEVAL TRADE
AND FINANCE 295 (1973) ("[I]n Northern Europe conventions of merchant law...
differed comparatively little from country to country.").
239. Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 128; Trakman, E-
Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 281; see also BENSON, ENTERPRISE OF LAW, supra
note 5, at 32 (noting the evolution of the law merchant "into a universal legal
system").
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his law "according to law merchant" and was sent back to find more
compurgators; was this an invocation of a universal principle, a tenet
of the Law of Nature? 240
We cannot assume that the suitors at St. Ives were drawing on the
same concepts as the writers of the early modem period or even the
foreign merchants of the late fifteenth century. In fact, the best
evidence from the original sources seems to be that they were not-
that the law governing markets and fairs was not a "law universal
throughout the world," nor did the suitors of St. Ives act on the
presumption that it was. Both within the St. Ives court and without,
one can find evidence for significant variations in the principles of
mercantile law-variations which may justify abandoning the notion
of a universal law merchant.
A. "THE LAW MERCHANT" AT ST. IVES
What did the St. Ives court believe itself to be doing when it
decided an issue secundum legem mercatoriam? Although the
evidence is unclear, two general observations can be made. First, the
court rolls do not portray an institution that saw itself as governed by
and in turn implementing a specific code, whether customary or not.
Second, in its relations with other fora, the St. Ives court displayed
little awareness of any participation in a process extending beyond
St. Ives, let alone one that spanned all of Europe. The very use of the
phrase "the law merchant" may thus be inappropriate, as the rolls
demonstrate substantial variety in the court's conceptualizations of
mercantile law and the principles established thereby.
1. Within the St. Ives Court
As we have seen above, the eleven cases which cite lex mercatoria
(or its variants) defy easy characterization. They may involve matters
of procedure, such as how to dispose of the attached goods of a
defendant in default,241 but they may also include important
240. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5.
241. Fairhead v. Tankus (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 71.
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substantive questions such as when a sale is complete,242 or specific
usages concerning the right of outside butchers to participate in any
sale of meat or fish.243 Sometimes a special assembly of merchant
communities invoked the law merchant's authority; at other times,
the court included the phrase almost as an aside.244
Most importantly, an appeal to mercantile law might provide
authority for a well-established point of law-but it also might
provide a convenient label for a simple appeal to justice. Whatever
lex mercatoria might-provide, the court had substantial freedom to
define its boundaries. Additionally, the terms the court adopted in
making such appeals are highly variable, suggesting the absence of
the sort of conceptual clarity that a universal, substantive law would
provide.
The parties before the court occasionally invoked the authority of
lex mercatoria in making a simple claim of justice. In 1302,
Christine of Darlington claimed that "on Wednesday last in this
present year [die Mercurii ultimo preterita hoc anno]," Adam Burser
of Bury St. Edmunds accused her of theft and "assaulted her with
vile words, calling her harlot, knave, and other enormities," causing
her to lose credit for six quarters of wheat. Burser denied
wrongdoing and asked for judgment against Christine, for she had
specified the day of the assault as being in "this present year," when
she ought to have specified "the twenty-ninth or thirtieth year of the
reign of King Edward, as is the custom in every court. ' 2 45 Darlington
responded that her plea was sufficiently precise secundum legem
mercatoriam, because "the day and year are sufficiently known to
any one when the heading of the court [roll] specifies the thirtieth
242. See Tempsford v. Chaplain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 44 (considering a sale complete as soon as the earnest money-a token down
payment also called a "God's penny"--had been paid).
243. Bishop vs. Godsbirth (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1315), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
97; Legge v. Mildenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 46-
47.
244. See, e.g., Fulham v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1311), in 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 89; 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5.
245. Darlington v. Burser (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
85.
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year of the reign of King Edward. ' 246 She did not contest Burser's
claim of custom, or appeal to a widely-held understanding that
mercantile law differs in this respect. Instead, she seems to have
contended that reciting the year was unnecessary, and for that reason
could not have been required secundum legem mercatoriam. The St.
Ives court does not seem to have applied any consistent rule on the
subject; many complaints mention the regnal year, but some do
not.247 Here, although both parties asked for a judgment of "the
merchants and others," the court appears to have been reluctant to
issue a general ruling, and instead granted permission to settle. The
case thus gives the impression that lex mercatoria could be used as a
placeholder for commonsense principles of fair play-principles
hardly unique to a mercantile setting.248
Certain cases in the St. Ives court rolls even seem to incorporate
new principles as part of mercantile law. In 1311, two servants of the
abbot of Burton-on-Trent intervened in the case of Fulham v.
Francis to claim for their master a horse that had been wrongly
attached. 249 The plaintiff argued that they should not be allowed to
prove their case through oaths, citing a general principle that "when
anyone should make proof of the ownership of any merchandise...
246. Id. at 86.
247. See, e.g., Langbaugh v. Bytham (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 20 (concerning an assault "on Tuesday last"); Long v. Cam (St. Ives Fair
Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 39-40 (concerning a sale "on Friday after
the feast of St. John"); Hanker v. Lindsey (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM,
supra note 1, at 78-79 (concerning a covenant made "on Friday after Ascension
day in this year [die Veneris prox 'post Ascensionem Domini hoc anno]"). None of
the parties in these cases drew attention to the date.
248. In this practice, as in others, the fair court followed its local equivalents.
The records of local courts, as well as contemporaneous formularies, do not
consistently require the regnal year. See, e.g., Elm v. Fox (Littleport Manor Ct.
1317), in COURT BARON, supra note 111, at 123 (indicating no date); The Court
Baron, supra note 132, at 43 (providing a form to hear an offense committed "on
such a day and hour in this year that was"); id. at 48 (providing a form for
defamation that does not mention the date); cf The Manner of Holding Courts-
John de Longueville, supra note 111, at 84 ("[I]t is not necessary in any plea to
specify the hour at which a deed was done, except in the pleas of the crown or
where there is breach of the king's peace," where one must "set down the place
and the year and the hour").
249. Fulham v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1311), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 89-
90.
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it is necessary that he whose ownership is alleged should appear in
his own person to make [proof]. '250 The servants replied that
whenever a merchant delivers his goods to a servant to have them put
on sale, it would be "hard and inconsonant with right if such servants
... should not be admitted to make such proof in the name of their
lord."25' The emphasis is placed on issues of justice rather than of
substantive law-to deny the servants their opportunity to make
proof would be "hard and inconsonant with right," rather than
contrary to a specific and widely-acknowledged tenet of the "law
merchant." No consensus existed on the issue, for the court refused
to decide the case without convening "all the merchants of the said
fair, both natives and foreigners," who eventually declared that the
servants "may properly be admitted in this and similar cases"
secundum legem mercatoriam-language that indicates a rule to be
used in the future, rather than one of long standing in the past.25 2
Indeed, after the servants succeeded in making their oath, they
retrieved the horse "according to the law merchant hitherto
approved"-a phrase giving the strong impression that something
new had been introduced.253
Whatever authority lex mercatoria might have possessed, it did
not deprive the court of significant discretion. For example, in
Tempsford v. Chaplain and in Fulham v. Francis, only two oath-
helpers were considered necessary secundum legem mercatoriam to
establish ownership of goods that had been attached. 4 Yet when
Gerard of Cologne was held "[in]sufficiently equipped" to claim his
wine, he was given another chance, this time with five oath-
250. Id. at 90.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Tempsford v. Chaplain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 44-45; Fulham v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1311), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
89. Meanwhile, the anonymous treatise De Legibus Mercatorum, which Basile et
al. believed to be an educational text composed in London in the late thirteenth
century, states unambiguously that five compurgators are necessary. LEX
MERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 42.
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helpers-a favor not extended to Richard Matthew of Broughton or
Perot de Douai, other parties who failed in their law.255
Given the flexibility with which principles could be attributed to
mercantile law-the three cases above are more than a quarter of the
total-is it still reasonable to use the phrase "the law merchant" to
describe a coherent legal order?256 In the case of Gerard of Cologne,
the court did not demand more compurgators secundum legem
mercatoriam, but "secundum legem mercatorum.' ' 257 Gross translates
this phrase as "according to law merchant," but the text provides no
justification for this reading-a better translation would be
"according to the law of merchants. 258 Indeed, some authors have
called into question the translation of lex mercatoria as "the law
merchant," implying the presence of a single entity. The phrase
secundum legem mercatoriam might be rendered "according to law
merchant," "according to merchant law," or the more
comprehensible "according to mercantile law," a phrase which
carries no connotations of legal uniqueness or universal applicability.
Basile et al. adopt the latter translation, and maintain that "the law
merchant" has encouraged a distorted interpretation in the secondary
literature.259 Indeed, Rogers goes so far as to argue that the "sense of
mystery and jurisprudential complexity" evoked by "the Law
Merchant" results from "nothing more than [its] odd grammatical
construction."2 60
255. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5; Scot v. Matthew (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 61; Nottingham v. Douai (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 64.
256. As Bonfield noted, in order to infer the existence of substantive principles
from court records, we must assume that the courts extended the parties
substantive due process as well as equal protection; i.e., that "the decisions reflect
a proper application of customary law regardless of the status of the parties
involved and the equities of the dispute." Bonfield, supra note 151, at 523. In the
case of St. Ives, this assumption may not be justified.
257. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5; see supra text accompanying note 1.
258. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5. I am grateful to Thomas N. Bisson for
assistance with the Latin text.
259. LMLP, supra note 20, at 7.
260. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 250 ("In English, when a noun is made into an
adjective, a suffix is usually added, and adjectives in English generally precede
rather than follow nouns. Moreover, in the twentieth century, we no longer employ
such stylistic flourishes as capitalizing nouns, or rendering them into Latin.").
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If any number of terms could be used to render secundum legem
mercatoriam into modem English, even more were used at St. Ives to
express equivalent ideas in Latin. In 1312, the question arose of
whether a shipment of licorice should be forfeited to the king
"according to merchant law and custom etc. [secundum legem et
consuetudinem mercatoriam etc.]"; the formulation is very similar to
that of secundum legem mercatoriam, and the two seem to be used
interchangeably in this case.261 Similarly, in Legge v. Mildenhall, the
plaintiff made a claim according to mercantile usage ("secundum
usum mercatoriam"), and the defendant admitted that the usage is
allowed by lex mercatorum, the "law of merchants"--with no
distinction made between "law," "custom," and "usage. 262 The
"custom of the fair" '263 as well as the "law and custom of the said fair
[secundum legem et consuetudinem ferie predicte]' '264 each describe
principles applicable at St. Ives, and the phrases are used as if they
were entirely synonymous. Their use implies that the practice of
mercantile law at St. Ives was more flexible than the translation of
"the law merchant," with its reifying definite article, would imply.
The other phrases support an interpretation of secundum legem
mercatoriam as appealing to a loose concept of custom and fairness
rather than a specific, well-defined body of law.
Records from contemporary courts outside St. Ives support this
interpretation. For instance, the fair court of West Malling in Dyer v.
Stonehill ordered a defendant attached by twenty-nine pieces of wool
"according to the law of the fair [secundum legem ferie].'' 265 A 1306
settlement between the city of Norwich and the prior and convent of
Holy Trinity, recorded in a royal charter, specifies that the townsmen
would be under the jurisdiction of the prior and convent during the
fair "when any matter belonging to the law of fairs [jus feriarum]
261. Bedford v. Reading (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1312), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
91.
262. Legge v. Mildenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in I SCLM, supra note 1, at
46-47. Gross translated "secundum usum mercatoriam" as "according to the usage
of merchants." Id.
263. 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 92-93.
264. Pollard v. Crowthorpe (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1288), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
35-36.
265. Dyer v. Stonehill (W. Mailing Fair Ct. 1364), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
112.
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requires. 266 The county court of Southampton described a delivery
of goods as having been conducted according to the customs of
merchants (secundum consuetudinem mercatorum).267 The central
royal courts could do the same: one case in King's Bench endorses a
practice as being used "in lege mercatoria" as well as being justified
"according to maritime law [secundum legem marinam].'26 s Another
describes decisions being made both secundum legem mercatoriam
and secundum legem et consuetudinem mercatoriam, as well as a
party having recovered "according to the method of merchants [per
modum mereatorum]" for good measure.269
The variability in the principles established "according to the law
merchant," as well as the terms used to express the concept,
demonstrate the somewhat haphazard nature of the justice
administered at St. Ives. The court sought above all to provide its
community with "justice and equity," 270 taking judicial notice of
existing merchant customs (and occasionally creating new ones) to
ensure the correct result. According to the evidence that can be
gathered from the rolls, the St. Ives court did not rely on mercantile
law as a well-defined set of principles, but rather invoked a complex,
vague, and ever-changing body of "merchant law and custom. '"271
266. Charter to Norwich, 35 Edw., m. 22 (Dec. 4, 1306), in 3 CALENDAR OF THE
CHARTER ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 73, 74 (1908)
[hereinafter 3 CHARTER ROLLS].
267. Dunstable v. Le Bal (Assize at Romsey 1278), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38,
at 29. Curiously, Hall translated this phrase as "according to the custom of the
country." Id.
268. Fulham v. Fleming, Coram Rege Roll No. 107, Michaelmas, m. 46 (K.B.
1287), in KING'S BENCH, supra note 129, at 169, 170. For comparison, if
secundum legem marinam were translated in the same fashion as secundum legem
mercatoriam, it would be rendered as the unusual phrase "according to the law
maritime."
269. Saxby v. Bedford, PRO Curia Regis Roll 155, Michaelmas, m. ld (K.B.
1255), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 5.
270. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 153.
271. Reading v. Bedford (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1312), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
91.
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2. St. Ives and Other Courts
It is difficult to make any conclusions about national or
international similarities based primarily on court records from only
one limited area (the fair of St. Ives) and period of time (1270-1324).
As was noted earlier, very few questions of substantive law were
argued in a way that is accessible to us from the records-too few to
support any systematic investigation of whether foreign or local
merchants had a more accurate understanding of the law applied at
St. Ives.272 Yet one can examine the supposed universality of the law
272. See supra text accompanying note 137. Of the 332 cases that Gross and
Maitland examined, thirty-two involved some kind of default-an error of
procedure or substantive law that resulted in the' loss of a case. However, of these
cases, many involved "miskennings," mistakes in a defendant's pleading, or other
technical errors. These errors would have resulted in defaults in other English
courts as well, and so do not point to any deficiency in the defendants' knowledge
of mercantile law. In other cases, the defendants were unable to find a sufficient
number of compurgators. See, e.g., Risborough v. Russell (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275),
in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 150-51. This may indicate that they did not
know how many to bring, but it may also indicate that the defendants were widely
known to have been guilty, or that few others could swear to their innocence.
In all, only four examples can be clearly identified in which a case was lost
due to an error of law or a substantively incorrect legal theory. (Given that Gross
and Maitland selected cases to illustrate the law applied at St. Ives, it is unlikely
that many more examples remain in the unpublished documents.) William of
Abingdon lost his case for the reasons explained above. See supra text
accompanying note 209. John Woodfool sued Peter of Tooting in 1287 on the
assumption that the latter would be bound by agreements made in his name by the
servant of a third party; the court rejected his plea, stating that there was no need to
sue the defendant if the servant "survives in flesh and bone, and the said John can
bring an action against him if he desires." Woodfool v. Tooting (St. Ives Fair Ct.
1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 23. But cf Benson, Justice Without
Government, supra note 5, at 127, 130 ("[T]hese courts ... considered actions by
agents in transactions valid without formal authority."). A similar question appears
in Fulham v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1312), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 89, in
which the plaintiff unsuccessfully contested an agent's ability to make a claim of
ownership on his master's behalf. Finally, Sarah Poke claimed that she could not
be held liable for damages caused by her live-in handmaid, but the court denied her
claim and the inquest jury found in the plaintiff's favor. Redknave v. Poke (St. Ives
Fair Ct. 1316), in I SCLM, supra note 1, at 101. (In one additional case, Fleming
v. Tanner (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 52, the plaintiff
made an error of law that did not cause him to lose the case. William Fleming
sought to wage his law after the defendant disputed the terms of the contract
between them; he was not allowed to do so, and a jury inquest was held. However,
the inquest eventually decided in the plaintiff's favor.)
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merchant in reverse; rather than ask whether other courts resembled
St. Ives, one can inquire to what extent St. Ives sought to follow
other courts.
The fairs of medieval England could never be seen as entirely
independent from one another; they were each part of a standard
cycle of fairs, and the regular return of foreign merchants was crucial
to their success and income. However, despite these
interconnections, the fairs were quite distinct from one another as
legal entities. The merchant courts functioned on an almost entirely
independent basis; each court considered itself competent to decide
cases arising from anywhere in the world, and showed no hesitation
in doing so.
The court of St. Ives frequently heard cases that had first arisen in
faraway places, involving disputes to which St. Ives had no
connection other than being the temporary location of both plaintiff
and defendant. Because merchants traveled regularly from fair to
fair, contracts would often be written in one place to be performed in
another.2 73 The 1293 dispute between William of Abingdon and
William Martin was based on a debt incurred in London, with the
payment to take place in the next fair of Stamford; St. Ives was
neither the place of the contract's formation nor the place of
performance, yet the fair court could serve as the forum for the
dispute.27 4 Nor was the 'transmunicipal' element of such contracts
Unfortunately, this selection is far too small for any rigorous analysis of
whether foreign or local merchants were more likely to make errors of this kind.
Presumably there are more examples of such errors hidden within the jury process;
but if the jurors considered any substantive legal arguments, these arguments were
not recorded on the rolls and are therefore lost to us.
273. Volckart and Mangels, who argued that "the importance of universally
accepted commercial institutions in the Middle Ages has hitherto been vastly
overrated," did so on the claim that all but a fraction of European trade prior to the
fourteenth century was "simultaneous" and therefore unlikely to give rise to
complex legal disputes. Volckart & Mangels, supra note 20, at 427, 436, 446.
However, non-simultaneous exchange (with payment separated from delivery in
time and space) was routine in medieval England, and was even institutionalized
by the royal prise system, in which payment for each prise would be due in the
next major fair. See MOORE, supra note 11, at 9.
274. Abingdon v. Martin (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
65. Other cases can be found involving the towns of Boston and Westminster,
Hereford v. Lyons (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 62, Boston
and Northampton, Curteis v. St. Romain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM,
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necessary for St. Ives to claim jurisdiction; in 1292, a wine merchant
sued a deadbeat buyer in the St. Ives court, although the contract was
formed in the town of Boston and was to have been performed there
as well.275
In an age of slow communications and expensive transportation,
the incentives for defendants to slip out of town rather than face a
lawsuit must have been rather strong. The general principle applied
by the St. Ives court appears to be that the plaintiff could sue
wherever the defendant was found; faced with a defendant who was
without assets (and thus judgment-proof), the plaintiff in Gavelock v.
Trot received a tally "whereby he can prosecute against the said
Richard for the recovery of his said debt, wherever it seems to him
most expedient. '276 This wide-ranging jurisdiction was not limited to
cases of contract and debt. In 1315, Edmund of Winchester sued
Alexander of Nailsworth in the St. Ives court for a simple assault that
took place in the town of Northampton the previous year.277 These
cases seem to support the description advanced by Rogers, that the
fair courts were "local courts of general jurisdiction" and not
specialized institutions limited to commercial pleas arising out of the
fair. 278
supra note 1, at 26, and Stourbridge and Haddenham, Treasurer v. Haddenham (St.
Ives Fair Ct. 1317), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 103, among others.
275. Titchwell v. Burdon (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
59. Similarly 'internal' cases can be found arising out of actions in Stamford,
Risborough v. Russell (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14,
at 150, Bedford, Saddington v. Langbaurgh (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM,
supra note 1, at 22, Bury St. Edmunds, Ribaud v. Russell (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287),
in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 15, and many other English cities.
276. Gavelock v. Trot (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1300), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 83.
277. Winchester v. Nailsworth (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1315), in 1 SCLM, supra note
1, at 96.
278. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 25. As was noted in Part I, this general
jurisdiction was exercised contrary to royal statute; the first Statute of Westminster
in 1275 had prohibited the officers of anyone but the king from attaching
individuals' goods for "Contracts, Covenants, and Trespasses done out of their
Power and their Jurisdiction ... nor within their Franchise where their Power is ...
" Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw., cl. 35 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES
OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 33, 35; see also supra note 172. Gross noted that
"the trial of actions concerning contracts or other matters that did not arise in the
fair" was widely seen as among the fair courts' "abuses of jurisdiction," and future
statutes were issued to remedy it. Gross, supra note 15, at xviii; see also Statutes
Made at Westminster, 1477, 17 Edw. 4, cl. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF
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Yet if the mercantile courts were partners in the administration of
a universal law merchant, one might expect some sort of organized
division of labor among them. This is especially true given that cases
in the St. Ives court might be simultaneously litigated elsewhere: the
plaintiff in Tooting v. Woodfool brought a lawsuit after an insult
made in the vill of St. Ives, but Gross noted that he also began
litigation for the same cause that day at Huntingdon, and the Monday
before he had done so at Boston.27 9 What principles mediated the
contacts between St. Ives and its sister courts, and how were
conflicts between them resolved?
Some occasional mentions of external courts appear in the St. Ives
rolls. However, such examples are exceedingly rare, and generally
represent other aspects of court process rather than true
collaboration. For instance, in Beeston v. Chesterton, the plaintiffs
case turned in part on a letter patent from the bailiffs of Graffham,
describing past proceedings in that manorial court. Yet the letter was
never presented as evidence in the St. Ives court, which eventually
came to the opposite conclusion from the court of Graffham.280
Similarly, the parties in Waite v. Hamon had earlier litigated in the
Boston fair court, but its judgment had been followed by an
agreement, and the enforcement of this agreement, rather than the
foreign judgment, occupied the court of St. Ives.28 '
Although the St. Ives court was willing to pass judgment on
controversies arising out of foreign cities and fairs, it did not appear
to recognize the courts of those areas as participating in a special and
shared transnational jurisdiction. Decisions reached in the courts of
other cities or communities could be challenged and even reversed in
the fair court. Some of these reversals seem to be unintentional,282
THE REALM, supra note 51, at 452, 461; An Act for Tryall of Matters in Courts of
Pypowder Held in Fayres, 1483, 1 Rich. 3, ci. 6 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES
OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 477, 480-82.
279. Tooting v. Woodfool (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
84-85.
280. Beeston v. Chesterton (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 153-54. The letter presumably would have been relevant to an inquest,
but the defendant was allowed to wage his law instead.
281. Waite v. Hamon (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 13.
282. In Saxby v. Bedford, a burgess of Beverley won a judgment in the
Archbishop of York's court in Beverley for £7. The defendant later found the
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but many more examples show a clear intent on the part of the St.
Ives court to reject the authority of another forum. In Hamerton v.
Cambridge, the plaintiff claimed that the court of Cambridge failed
to "do right to him," and he brought suit in the court of St. Ives to
correct the error. 83 In '1275, Brun de S. Michel of Bordeaux brought
suit in St. Ives only after failing to collect his debts in the courts of
Boston and Norwich. 84 William of Fleetbridge and his wife Amice
successfully sued the entire community of Leicester in 1275 by
claiming that the court of Leicester had "made default of justice"
when they tried to collect a debt.2 5 The court of St. Ives even
claimed power to oversee how another abbot ran his market, as when
Thomas of Grantham sued to protest an uncustomary toll that was
taken from him in the market of Yaxley. s6
Nor was the St. Ives court necessarily respectful of claims of
custom from other areas. The case of Dederic v. Ramsey illustrates
how different communities may have lacked a consensus on the
substance of mercantile law.28 7 In 1315, Simon Dederic of Guisnes, a
cloth merchant, sued the abbot of Ramsey and one of his bailiffs in
the court of King's Bench, arguing that the fair court had wrongfully
seized goods under the care of his servant Eustace. The goods had
been attached in execution of Eustace's debts; they were held in
custody until the end of the fair, when they were transferred to
Eustace's creditors. Simon argued that the goods of an alien
merchant, "brought from a strange land," ought to be kept "in the
original plaintiff in St. Ives, falsely claimed that the £7 had been stolen, and
promptly won the money back. See Saxby v. Bedford, PRO Curia Regis Roll 155,
Michaelmas, m. ld (K.B. 1255), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 5; see also supra
note 126.
283. Hamerton v. Cambridge (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 3.
284. S. Michel v. Troner (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note
14, at 152. I am not aware of any examples of contact between the St. Ives court
and a court outside of England. The evidence of letters sent regularly between
courts in London and Paris is contested. See supra note 67.
285. Fleetbridge v. Leicester (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 14; see also supra note 76 (discussing collective liability).
286. Grantham v. Thorney (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
63-64.
287. See Dederic v. Ramsey, Coram Rege Roll 221, 8 Edw. 2, m. 93d (K.B.
1315), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 86; see also supra note 126.
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custody of the lord of that fair until the fair of the same place in the
following year," when the owner could appear to retrieve them; he
further claimed that lex mercatoria "is this in all and every fair
throughout the whole realm, etc. '288 The St. Ives bailiff, however,
asserted that lex mercatoria "is this" for both "alien and native
born": that if judgment is entered against a party, and he alleges that
the goods belong to someone else, unless the owner appears "during
that fair to claim those goods and merchandises, etc.," the goods "so
attached at the close of that fair ought to be immediately appraised..
. and execution made thereof, etc., without further delay." Both
parties asked for an inquest, and a jury of forty-eight merchants was
eventually summoned to declare the custom. 28 9
No final result is recorded in this case, so we do not know what
verdict the jury returned. It is quite possible that there was no single
custom on this subject. The St. Ives court generally did not impose a
default judgment until a year had passed; yet there is no case in the
rolls where such delay was required after a final judgment, or where
the true owners of contested goods failed to appear within the same
fair.290 More importantly, however, Dederic never claimed that the
bailiff acted contrary to the order of the court-meaning that the
merchants of St. Ives who had been suitors at the fair court had
agreed with the bailiff's description of the custom, and had discarded
that of Simon and Eustace. The current practices at St. Ives and of
Guisnes in northern France could well have diverged on this point,
and the jury of merchants may not have had any more authoritative a
291
view.
288. Dederic v. Ramsey, Coram Rege Roll 221, 8 Edw. 2, m. 93d (K.B. 1315),
in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 87.
289. Id. at 88. Some might interpret the ruling as an attempt to enforce
uniformity, in that a party disadvantaged by local practice could bring suit in royal
court and have the custom declared by a more widely representative jury, drawn
from various trading cities. However, the question went to the jury in general terms
partly because the bailiff agreed that there is a uniform tradition, and requested a
jury of merchants to declare it.
290. See generally supra note 191 (discussing the year-and-day rule); Graffham
v. Pope (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 54; Stanwick v.
Wylye (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1295), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 67-68 (on contested
ownership of distrained goods).
291. The possibility of such variance in procedure would not have been
considered out of place in the royal courts; a request for information from the city
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The resolution of cases in other courts, or the assertion of different
customs, was clearly not regarded as final--or even as persuasive.
Correspondingly, the suitors of St. Ives could not have reasonably
expected their decisions to be recognized in other communities in
England, let alone across Europe, as binding precedent. In light of
the radical independence of mercantile courts, the vision of these
courts as participating in a single, shared legal tradition-and the
vision of the law merchant as a single "law universal"-seems very
difficult to maintain.
B. MERCANTILE LAW BEYOND ST. IVES
It is far beyond the scope of this study to compare systematically
the commercial regulations of jurisdictions across Europe---or even
across England-during this period. However, it is possible to find
some direct evidence of variations in the theory and practice of
mercantile law within England; such evidence is available in both
contemporary treatises and the records of cities and towns. Although
some similarities may have existed in the regulation of commerce,
these similarities fail to support the notion of a "law universal"
governing commerce; rather, they are soon lost amid the clutter of
municipal customs and local idiosyncracies.
1. Lex Mercatoria
If there were a single, universal law merchant, what did it say?
The enticingly entitled treatise Lex Mercatoria, believed to have
been composed by a London lawyer in the late thirteenth century
(perhaps the 1280s), purports to describe the contemporary state of
commercial law in England.292 Ellen Wedemeyer Moore, whose
treatise on medieval English fairs otherwise shows a profound
familiarity with the St. Ives court, used Lex Mercatoria to fill in the
gaps the court rolls leave regarding its procedure, concluding that
"all of the principles [Lex Mercatoria] describes accord perfectly
with the practice of merchant law as revealed in the St. Ives fair court
of Bordeaux in 1276 was answered by an inquisition "made according to the
manner of that country [ad modum patrie illius factam]," and the court accepted
the results of the inquisition willingly. Nova Villa v. Bernard, Coram Rege Roll
17, 4 Edw., m. 17d (K.B. 1276), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 15.
292. LMLP, supra note 20, at 110, 116.
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records of 1270-1324. '' 293 Holdsworth went even further in
discussing Lex Mercatoria and the St. Ives records, saying that "it is
clear from these authorities that these piepowder courts were of the
same general type as the fair courts of the Continent. 294
However, the treatise does not give the supporter of the universal
law merchant as much ammunition as Holdsworth might hope. The
second chapter of Lex Mercatoria describes the "law of the market,"
saying that it "differs from the common law of the kingdom in three
general ways": it delivers a judgment more quickly, it holds the
defendant's pledges responsible for all damages and court costs in
the event of an adverse judgment, and it does not allow the defendant
to wage his law.295 In all other matters, including "prosecutions,
defenses, essoins, defaults, delays, judgments, and executions of
judgments," the treatise suggests that "the same process should be
used in both laws. 296
This is an oversimplification, of course-if it were literally true,
there would be no need for the subsequent nineteen chapters of the
treatise. But the fact remains that Lex Mercatoria does not present
mercantile law as an entirely independent legal system, with its
origins in the laws of Nature and of nations; instead, it was highly
dependent on the English common law, "which is the mother of
mercantile law and which endowed her daughter with certain
privileges in certain places."2 97 If the parties would rather litigate at
common law than at mercantile law, "they certainly can, and they do
so more often than not throughout the whole kingdom." '298 These
plaintiffs chose to litigate at common law despite its elaborate
procedures, which allowed defendants to delay judgment for months
or years at a time. Such a description is hardly commensurate with
the portrait of mercantile law as entitled to exclusive jurisdiction
293. MOORE, supra note 11, at 168 n.96.
294. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 106. In an earlier volume, he claimed
that "it is clear from the records of the courts of [fairs such as St. Ives] that they
were of the same type as the courts of similar fairs which existed all over Europe."
1 id. at 536.
295. LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 2-3.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Id. at 18.
298. Id. at 2.
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over commercial cases, or as an escape from an oppressive, archaic
common law.299
Examining Lex Mercatoria does reveal some general principles
followed by the St. Ives court-for instance, the speedy process of
justice. However, contrary to Moore's account, the differences
between the procedures described in the treatise and those
implemented in the fair court are striking and fundamental. A first
example of such discrepancies regards the disposition of attached
goods when their owner is absent. Merchant courts moved quickly;
most pleas were addressed in a single day or perhaps over two days.
According to Lex Mercatoria, those defendants who did not appear
in three consecutive courts were to be declared in default, in which
case the plaintiffs would be able to offer proof in their absence and
subsequently seize those goods that had been attached to secure the
defendants' appearance. The author of Lex Mercatoria notes this
procedure and recognizes the difficulties that might attend it,
especially for defendants who are far away from the fair grounds
when the case is brought. After briefly considering whether such a
procedure is just, the author then notes that "it is ordained" that if
those attached are in distant parts, they are to receive a grace period
of several days depending on the distance, so that they will be able to
reach the court in time to defend their goods.300
Yet this discussion of attached goods weakens, in three distinct
ways, the view of mercantile law as universal. First, although the
language used in the passage of Lex Mercatoria is similar to that
used when the author refers to a royal statute or other formal
ordinance, no such statute has been found.3 1 The "ordained"
procedure seems to represent wishful thinking on the part of the
299. Indeed, Holdsworth interpreted the limited differences asserted in Lex
Mercatoria as evidence of the creeping incorporation of the law merchant into the
common law. The author of the treatise, he wrote, "regards the Law Merchant as a
mere off-shoot of the common law," and "can only point to three specific
differences." 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 539. But if Lex Mercatoria
accurately describes the system in use across Europe, as Holdsworth also
maintained, see 5 id. at 106; see also supra note 294, then of what differences from
the common law does the law merchant consist?
300. See LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 7-10; LMLP, supra note 20, at 69-
71.
301. See LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 9; LMLP, supra note 20, at 69-71.
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author rather than actual practice of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries.30 2 Second, the passage notes significant discrepancies in
the procedures of various courts. In criticizing the current procedures
for addressing attachment, it notes that the distraints were handled
"in such different ways in different parts [of the kingdom] that no
one at all was able to know or learn the process of mercantile law in
this respect," a description that contrasts sharply with a view of
mercantile law as substantially uniform.3 °3  Third, the rapid
disposition the author described as widespread does not seem to have
been the practice at the court of St. Ives, which regularly delayed
disposition of attached goods-sometimes only until the close of the
fair, but often for a year or more. At the fair of 1299, for example,
Adam of Yarmouth sued John Fick of Hawley, who failed to appear;
a white horse of Fick's was attached, but Adam did not receive the
value of the horse until the close of the fair of 1300, after more than a
year of repeated defaults.3 4
302. This is not the only instance in which the author of Lex Mercatoria failed to
distinguish between his preferences and existing practice. We have already
encountered the treatise's declaration that "every judgment ought to be rendered by
merchants of the same court and not by the mayor or by the seneschal of the
market." LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 20; see supra text accompanying note
83. However, although the author identified a specific writ in royal court as the
proper corrective for a steward who has overstepped his bounds, there is no extant
writ of the form he described, nor is there any record of a trespass action brought
against a steward or mayor on these grounds-leading Basile et al. to conclude that
this 'ordinance' is a recommendation instead of an existing statute. LMLP, supra
note 20, at 74-76.
303. LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 9. Scrutton made a similar admission
with regard to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:
And as the Law Merchant was considered as custom, it was the habit to leave
the custom and the facts to the jury without any directions in point of law,
with a result that cases were rarely reported as laying down any particular
rule, because it was almost impossible to separate the custom from the facts;
as a result little was done towards building up any system of Mercantile Law
in England.
Scrutton, supra note 25, at 13.
304. Yarmouth v. Fick (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1299), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 81.
This appears to have been the standard practice, whereby there were no defaults
from fair to fair. See Ulting v. Hardwick (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1315), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 97 (delaying the final execution by a year); 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 101
(punishing one of the sureties for goods attached in Ulting for failing to answer for
their value); see also supra note 191 (surveying customary attachment of goods).
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More damningly, the strictures of Lex Mercatoria also contradict
St. Ives practice regarding such fundamental procedures as the nature
of proof, a subject central to the functioning of any court. The
treatise states unambiguously that mercantile law differs from the
common law in that "it does not admit anyone to [wager of] law on
the negative side, but in this law it always belongs to the plaintiff to
prove, for example, by suit or by deed or both, and not to the
defendant."3 °5 As noted above, it lists this distinction as one of the
three general differences between mercantile and common law.30 6 In
medieval English courts, proof was an advantage rather than a
burden; a defendant who could wage his law-take a solemn oath,
together with a specified number of oath-helpers, that the allegations
against him were false-could establish his innocence at once. 7 The
treatise later repeats this provision, noting that although common law
might allow the defendant to wage his law when no tally, writing, or
other record of the sale has been preserved, mercantile law says
otherwise-"in no way ought [the defendant] be admitted to this."
The author went on to explain that merchants often sell their goods
on credit without tallies or writings, and it would be "hard and very
tedious and a kind of burden and continuous obstacle to them" if
plaintiffs were forced to record in full detail even the most minor of
transactions.3 08
Despite the strength of the author's convictions on this point, the
St. Ives fair rolls show precisely the opposite procedure. In 1275,
Ralph Raven sued Alan Cobbler of St. Ives for a debt of 8s. in silver
in payment for tanned hides. Cobbler waged his law, and the next
day he swore successfully and was released. The court then fined
Raven 6d. for making a false claim.309 This is only one among scores
305. LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 3.
306. Id.; see also 2 FLETA, supra note 76, ch. 63 ("The position is different,
however, in cities and fairs and among merchants, in whose favour, by the grace of
the prince, it is granted that proof shall be the privilege of the party asserting the
claim, in accordance with the law merchant [secundum legem mercatoriam] ....").
307. The fact that the word "law" is used as a synonym for "oath" shows the
respect accorded to solemn oaths in this period. See LMLP, supra note 20, at 63.
308. LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 11. A tally was a notched stick that was
used as a record of debts.
309. Raven v. Cobbler (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note
14, at 144-45.
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of cases settled by a defendant's wager of law, which appears to have
been the accepted practice in St. Ives. In fact, the translated records
appear to contain only two instances of a plaintiffs wager of law.31 0
Clearly, the oaths of defendants in pleas of debt were given full
weight in the St. Ives court, just as they were in other seignorial and
fair courts.3 ' It is hard to overstate the importance of this
fundamental discrepancy, given that the features said to be unique to
mercantile courts are almost entirely procedural in nature.3 12
A final argument against Lex Mercatoria providing the substance
of a universal law merchant is that it does not address a number of
questions that were resolved secundum legem mercatoriam at St.
Ives. Whether the victim of an assault must specify the day of the
year the assault occurred, or whether a butcher can intervene in a sale
of meat or fish by crying "Halves," are never considered in this
310. In the case of Holywell v. Beverley (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1270), in 1 SCLM,
supra note 1, at 7, Michael of Holywell is recorded to have made his law
sufficiently against Stephen of Beverley and his fellow Nigel, whom he had
accused of detaining 5 marks and 5s. payment on eleven treys of barley. However,
the earlier proceedings in the case are not preserved; depending on what occurred
before the records begin, it is possible that this case is consistent with the rest of
the case law in denying plaintiffs the opportunity to wage their law. A similar
explanation can be provided for Lattener v. Goodrich (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1293), in 1
SCLM, supra note 1, at 59, in which the defense rests on a counterclaim; Henry
noted that "the defendant has become plaintiff and the plaintiff defendant," so that
"it is not strange to see the plaintiff allowed to prove payment by his law." HENRY,
supra note 203, at 31. A plaintiff was also permitted to wage his law in the
archbishop's court of Beverley, after his tally had been denied by the defendant;
the parties eventually came before the fair court of St. Ives, which rendered a
contrary decision. See Saxby v. Bedford, PRO Curia Regis Roll 155, Michaelmas,
m. Id (K.B. 1255), in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at 5; see also supra note 126.
311. The defendant's wager of law, even in cases of debt, is presented as
standard practice for seignorial courts in The Manner of Holding Courts-John de
Longueville, supra note 111, at 84. The same practice was adopted by the fair court
of Leicester; in 1347, Nicholas of Austrey sued Richard of Mansfield and his wife
Agnes for a debt of 15s., and Richard was allowed to make his law. Austrey v.
Mansfield (Leicester Fair Ct. 1347), in 2 RECORDS OF THE BOROUGH OF
LEICESTER, supra note 18, at 73.
312. To Maitland, for example, the law merchant "would ... have been found
chiefly to consist of what would now be called rules of evidence, rules about the
proof to be given of sales and other contracts." 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 37, at 467.
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treatise;" 3 indeed, they would seem quite out of place. Yet if the
author considered himself to be presenting a complete description of
a complete legal system-as the enumeration of differences from the
common law would imply-these omissions seem to indicate either
that the author was unaware of the customs practiced at St. Ives, or
that he did not consider those customs to be part of mercantile law'
Thus, Lex Mercatoria does not accurately describe the practice of
commercial law at St. Ives. But if the text contains deliberate or
accidental falsehoods as to the widely-recognized content of
mercantile law, one would expect those falsehoods to have been
caught, refuted, or corrected by readers familiar with its terms.3 14
Alternatively, mercantile law may have been sufficiently malleable
and variable across distances that fundamentally different procedures
could be used in St. Ives without a concerned and learned author
sixty miles away in London becoming aware of it.3"5 In that case,
Malynes' claim that the law merchant was uniformly "observed in all
places" seems entirely without foundation.3 16
313. Darlington v. Burser (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1302), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
85; Legge v. Mildenhall (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 46-
47.
314. Indeed, at least one portion of the text seems to have been added by a later
writer, namely the purported exchange of letters between the merchant courts of
London and Paris noted in Part I. See supra note 67. The exchange is probably
fictional; some letters are dated both to the calendar year and to the regnal year of
Phillip the Fair, but the two dates do not correspond. A sample letter dated 1296
mentions King Phillip "of glorious memory," but he did not die until 1314.
Furthermore, the proposed letter from Paris refers to the city's "guildhall," an
institution that was well known in London but which had no known equivalent in
Paris at this time. Basile et al. speculated that the choice of Paris as the
correspondent city may have been intended to show solidarity between merchant
communities even in a time of war between England and France. See LEX
MERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 38-40; LMLP, supra note 20, at 103-05.
Holdsworth, however, cited these letters to demonstrate "the communications
maintained between the courts of different fairs, whether in England or abroad." 5
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 107.
315. In at least one mercantile court of thirteenth-century London, however, the
decisions were rendered by the warden together with the aldermen-not merely
merchants at large, but holders of a recognized municipal office. See H.G.
Richardson, Law Merchant in London in 1292, 37 ENG. HIST. REv. 245 (1922).
316. MALYNES, supra note 204, at vi-vii, 3. In fact, the mercantile law described
in Lex Mercatoria may be nothing like the commercial law with which Malynes
was familiar. Cf Paul R. Teetor, England's Earliest Treatise on the Law Merchant,
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2. Cities and Towns
Mercantile law, Lex Mercatoria states in its first chapter, "is
thought to come from the market," emerging from the practice of
trade.317 Given that markets are said to have been found in five
places-"cities, fairs, seaports, market-towns, and boroughs"-we
might do well to look at the practice of mercantile law in English
cities, market-towns, and boroughs.318 Holdsworth added that
whether or not a borough held a separate piepowder court, the fact
that it was a center of trade "often caused the customary law
administered in its court to be better suited to the needs of commerce
than the common law"; the emphasis on equity "clearly made for the
reception and recognition of reasonable mercantile customs, and
enabled such courts, when necessary, to administer the law
merchant."319
Was Holdsworth correct in his assessment, and did cities and
towns govern their commercial activity through a shared law
merchant? It would be a significant undertaking to consider the
records of cities, towns, and boroughs across England in the same
level of detail that has been applied to St. Ives. However, from a
limited examination of custumals and other documents stating the
local laws on mercantile matters, two observations arise.
First, the records present the customs as part of a body of law
specific to the town, with no external justification in a universal law
merchant or general regulatory principles. The Bristol custumal (c.
1240) echoes the language of Lex Mercatoria, but not its
reasoning-burgesses and strangers could plead among themselves
"from day to day, without writ, according to the custom of the
town."320 Similarly, if a merchant in the town of Grimsby refused to
6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 178, 180 (1962) (noting that while the ancestry of the "law
merchant" of Justices Holt and Mansfield can be found in seventeenth-century
authors, Lex Mereatoria depicts "a rudimentary commercial law so different in
many respects as to raise serious questions about the nature of its connection with
the later 'law merchant' despite the identity of names").
317. LEXMERCATORIA, supra note 20, at 1.
318. See id.
319. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 538.
320. 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 184 (Mary Bateson ed. & trans., Selden Society 21,
1906).
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acknowledge a debt, according to the 1259 town charter he would
"enjoy the law and custom of the said town" in proving his case-
recognizing that customs could differ from place to place.3 2' To the
author of Lex Mercatoria, these matters would be properly covered
by mercantile law; the towns regarded them simply as part of local
custom. Occasionally the local records invoked mercantile law
explicitly, as in the case of the 1291 Ipswich custumal, which
guarantees to plaintiffs in certain circumstances a "good inquest
according to merchant law [solom ley marchaunde] in the form
below written. 3 22 These references to mercantile law appear only in
the context of a local rule; the custumals advance no claim that
courts elsewhere in England were obliged to follow the same
procedure.
Second, the differences among the local customs found in the
records are significant. These cannot be dismissed as minor
variations in procedure, peculiarities that should be expected in a
legal environment where communication is slow and record-keeping
expensive; to judge from the references at St. Ives, much of
mercantile law consists of procedure.323 If one were to ignore the
areas of law for which the variations were extensive, very little of a
shared "law merchant" would remain.
Consider the subject of earnest money, frequently invoked by
historians identifying differences between the law merchant and the
common law. In St. Ives, the payment of a "God's penny" or other
earnest money signaled the conclusion of a sale; in Tempsford v.
Chaplain, the assembled merchants declared that a buyer had
"according to the law merchant . . . sufficiently concluded the
purchase of the said horse by giving a God's penny" to the seller.3 24
321. 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 126 (Mary Bateson ed. & trans., Selden Society 18,
1904). According to a 1280 charter, the fairs of St. Edward at Westminster were to
observe "the same customs.., as in the fair of St. Giles of Winchester," and their
wardens were to "show full justice . . .according to the custom of the fair of
Winchester." Confirmation of the Charters of the Abbot and Monks of
Westminster, 9 Edw., m. 15 (Nov. 24, 1280), in 2 CHARTER ROLLS, supra note 41,
at 239, 239.
322. 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 320, at 188.
323. See supra note 312.
324. Tempsford v. Chaplain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1,
at 44-45.
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A similar policy is found in the 1249 Statuta Gilde of Berwick, in
which anyone who had already paid the God's penny or other earnest
money "shall pay the merchant from whom he bought the said goods
according to the bargain made, without breach of contract or breach
of the earnest. 3 25 However, such rules were not unique to merchants,
as is shown by non-mercantile sources such as Bracton and "The
Court Baron. 3 26 Nor was the rule necessarily uniform, for other
jurisdictions did not treat sales as final once earnest money had been
paid--or, at the very least, made them conditional on the seller's
acceptance of the earnest. The twelfth-century Preston custumal
states that a seller may cancel the bargain before delivery by
repaying double the buyer's earnest; in the case that the buyer has
already handled the goods, "he must either have them or 5s. from the
seller. 327 In 1303, Carta Mercatoria attempted to standardize the
law on this point, stating explicitly that "neither of the merchants can
withdraw or retire from that contract after God's penny shall have
been given and received between the principal contracting
persons. 328 Yet exceptions still remained; in Waterford, an early
fourteenth-century custumal allows buyers to "repent" of having
given the "God's silver" for a payment of l0s. 329
One could also compare the local customs on wager of law. We
have already noted the divergence of St. Ives practice from that of
Lex Mercatoria, as well as the significant discretion the fair court
enjoyed in applying its own rules on the subject.3 0 Yet a very brief
325. 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 321, at 217.
326. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 182
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (ca. 1220-1250) [hereinafter 2 BRACTON] ("A
purchase and sale is contracted when the contracting parties agree on the price,
provided the seller has received something in the name of earnest, for what is given
by way of earnest is evidence that a purchase and sale has been concluded."); The
Court Baron, supra note 132, at 40.
327. 2 BRACTON, supra note 326, at 217. For a separate account of the same
practice written circa 1290, see 2 FLETA, supra note 76, ch. 58 ("[T]he custom of
merchants... lays it down, in accordance with the law merchant [secundum legem
mercatoriam], that the seller in this case is either to deliver to the buyer the thing
bought or to pay five shillings for every farthing of earnest-money.").
328. Carta Mercatoria, supra note 163, at 213.
329. 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 321, at 218.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 254-255, 305-312.
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examination of town and borough documents reveals a myriad of
customs on the manner of proof. Some towns followed the practice
set out in Lex Mercatoria, whereby the responsibility of proof fell
entirely on the plaintiff. In the Irish town of Kilkenny, a fourteenth-
century custumal states that "every plaintiff ought to prove his action
by the suit of two lawful men brought with him," and defendants
were given no opportunity to offer proof in their defense.331
Similarly, a 1291 Ipswich custumal notes that in minor transactions
"it is not usual for merchants to make writing or tally for the speedy
payment," and the buyer therefore "shall not be allowed in pleading
to defend by his law," so long as the sale or delivery "can be proved
or averred by good inquest according to merchant law [solom ley
marchaunde].332 However, a number of other towns allowed the
defendant to wage his law three-handed (with two oath-helpers) in
cases of debt, even if the plaintiff brought a suit of witnesses.333 A
1348 custumal in Northampton allows defendants in small cases with
less than 12d. at issue to wage their law without a single
compurgator, and twelfth-century London did the same for
foreigners who could not find six countrymen to join them (although
the defendant was required to repeat his oath at the six nearest
churches).334
A final example can be found in the practice of "market overt." In
St. Ives and elsewhere, buyers were allowed to retain stolen goods if
they were purchased in good faith. 3 5 However, although this
principle has been described as a major element differentiating the
law merchant from the common law,336 the practice was not
331. 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 320, at 187.
332. Id. at 188.
333. Examples include the 1301 Manchester custumal, 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS,
supra note 321, at 180-81, and the twelfth-century Preston custumal, id. at 178.
"Suit" here again refers to the secta. See supra note 91.
334. 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 321, at 177, 181; cf. 2 FLETA, supra note
76, ch. 63 (describing it as a "custom among merchants" that a repudiated tally can
be proven if the defendant goes to nine churches and swears upon nine altars).
335. See Tanner v. Francis (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
48; 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 321, at 59-60 (describing the customs of
Fordwich).
336. See Carter, supra note 18, at 243; Peter M. Smith, Valediction to Market
Overt, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 225, 229 (1997).
[21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
universally shared. In Chester, Exeter, and Waterford, for example,
the custom was the exact opposite; even a good-faith buyer would as
a matter of course lose the goods to their original owner.337
In even a short survey of local practices, one finds a series of
unique customs, each stranger than the next. If a citizen of Waterford
bought from a foreign merchant and could not make the payment
before the merchant made ready to return overseas, then the citizen
had "only three ebbs and three floods as delay," after which the
bailiffs would pay the merchant and recover from the debtor.338
Under the early-fourteenth-century Norwich custumal, whether a
plaintiff could "exclude his adversary from his law" depended on
whether the trespass was committed within the bounds of the market;
if not, a jury would be selected from "that neighbourhood where the
deed was done."339 Finally, under the Ipswich custumal of 1291, a
group of ten compurgators was customarily winnowed to four using
a random selection procedure involving a thrown knife.34
None of these practices were found at St. Ives or in Lex
Mercatoria, and none seem consistent with the narrative of universal
rather than local regulation of trade. Nor is there evidence that local
principles were usually conceptualized as part of a common legal
tradition. Towns occasionally borrowed customs from each other, but
this imitation occurred piecemeal, and would sometimes be opposed
by those towns whose laws were imitated.341
337. The charters and custumals of Chester, Exeter, and Waterford prescribe
strict measures for stolen goods. See 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 321, at 57-
59.
338. 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 320, at 184-85.
339. Id. at 189.
340. 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 321, at 179-80.
341. In 1284, John of Gaunt requested that certain customs of the city of
Hereford "be certified for the use of the men of [Cardiff] then desiring the same,
also for the use of other [villages] whose necessity should require them." 1
CARDIFF RECORDS 13 (John Hobson Matthews ed., Cardiff, Elliot Stock 1898);
RICHARD JOHNSON, THE ANCIENT CUSTOMS OF THE CITY OF HEREFORD 26
(London, J.B. Nichols & Sons 1868). Hereford had no objection to sharing its
customs with other royal towns, but would not do so for towns held by "divers[e]
lords of the kingdom," which were "not of our condition" and would have to pay a
fee. JOHNSON, supra, at 27. Customs were often requested by lords in order to
grant equal privileges to another town, which may explain Hereford's desire to
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In the end, Holdsworth himself concluded that the borough courts
do not fit his model of the law merchant. Although commercial needs
may have influenced their procedures, he noted that "commercial law
does not ... hold a large place in the borough custumals," and one
must look to the courts of the fairs, rather than those of the boroughs,
to "trace the development of commercial law" in medieval
England.342
Given that the evidence from fairs is largely restricted to St. Ives,
these discrepancies call into question the very notion of a shared
body of mercantile law. A more compelling understanding might be
that the merchants who asked that their cases be judged secundum
legem mercatoriam were not necessarily all asking for the same
thing. Perhaps these merchants wanted only to be judged with
fairness and in accordance with commercial practice, and used
general terminology even if those practices were not themselves
universal.
C. THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT: ROYAL RECOGNITION
The above discussion has documented substantial variation in the
governance of trade within and among medieval English courts, and
has suggested that there was no unified body of law deserving the
name "the law merchant." Yet the phrase lex mercatoria appears in
the documents, and it must have had some meaning to the lawyers
and clerks who wrote them. This section will therefore examine two
such documents, the Carta Mercatoria and the Statute of the Staple,
which are traditionally interpreted as strong evidence that their
contemporaries recognized a distinct law merchant transcending
local boundaries.343 These documents clearly describe lex mercatoria
as the proper means of deciding certain mercantile cases. However,
one can invoke the concept of mercantile law without necessarily
recognizing any particular provisions as being part of one "law
protect its elevated status. See id. at 9 (describing the process for the village of
Drussellane).
342. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 105-06.
343. See, e.g., John H. Munro, The International Law Merchant and the
Evolution of Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,
in BANCHI PUBBLICI, BANCHI PRIVA TI E MONTI DI PIETA NELL 'EUROPA PREINDUSTRIALE
49, 53 (Dino Puncuh ed., Atti della Societt Ligure di Storia Patria, n.s., 31, no. 1,
1991); Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at 131.
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merchant." Indeed, the best evidence from the charter and the statute,
as well as from the courts that they governed, indicates that the
practice of mercantile law differed from court to court-and, more
importantly, that contemporaries tolerated and expected this
variation.
For the Carta Mercatoria, issued by Edward I in 1303, the case is
easy to make. Among the many other privileges granted in the
charter to foreign merchants, the king ordered "all bailiffs and
ministers of fairs, cities, boroughs and market-towns" to do "speedy
justice to the merchants ... who complain before them from day to
day without delay according to the Law Merchant touching all and
singular plaints which can be determined by the same law." '344 Yet
the charter states two clauses earlier that if disputes should arise over
contracts sealed with a God's penny-in other words, disputes over
sales, the most common source of business for a merchant court-
then "proof or inquisition shall be made thereof according to the uses
and customs of the fairs and towns where the said contract shall
happen to be made and entered upon." '345 Evidently, as William
Mitchell noted, "the usages and customs of fairs differed. '346 Similar
language can be found in a charter issued to the merchant vintners of
Aquitaine a year earlier; although it requires the localities to do
"speedy justice ... according to the law merchant," it also provides
that in contractual disputes, proof would be made "according to the
uses and customs of the fairs and towns where the said contract was
made. 347 Far from establishing a single legal code throughout the
realm, the Carta Mercatoria guaranteed a more rapid method of
dispute resolution, which followed the various uses and customs of
the commercial towns and fairs.
344. Carta Mercatoria, supra note 163, at 213.
345. Id.
346. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 6.
347. Charter to the Merchants of Aquitaine, 30 Edw., m. 2 (Aug. 13, 1302), in 3
CHARTER ROLLS, supra note 266, at 29, 29-30; see also Charter to the Burgesses of
Melecumbe, in 2 CHARTER ROLLS, supra note 41, at 223.
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The Statute of the Staple, issued by Edward III in 1353, poses a
more complex issue.3 48 This statute established certain staple towns
(among them York, Canterbury, and Westminster) with a joint
monopoly over the trade of wool, leather, and lead. Although this
statute falls outside the period of the St. Ives rolls, it is frequently
cited as evidence that a substantive law merchant was recognized as
separate from the common law or the varying local customs. Clause
8 of the statute gives exclusive jurisdiction over the staple to the
officials who oversee it, and explicitly provides that the merchants
coming to the staple towns "shall be ruled by the Law-Merchant [la
lei marchant], of all Things touching the Staple, and not by the
common Law of the Land, nor by Usage of Cities, Boroughs, or
other Towns[.] ' 349
However, there are five reasons to doubt that the lei marchant of
the statute was a uniform, substantive body of law. First, when
viewed in context, the protection granted in clause 8 appears to be
primarily jurisdictional in nature, concerning the choice of forum
rather than the choice of law. The clause reads more fully,
the Mayors and Constables of the Staple shall have
Jurisdiction and Cognisance within the Towns where the
Staples shall be ...of all Manner of Things touching the
Staple; and that all Merchants coming to the Staple ... shall
be ruled by the Law-Merchant, of all Things touching the
Staple, and not by the common Law of the Land, nor by
Usage of Cities, Boroughs, or other Towns; and that they
shall not implead nor be impleaded before the Justices of the
said Places [i.e., 'Cities, Boroughs, or other Towns'] in Plea
of Debt, Covenant and Trespass, touching the Staple, but
shall implead all Persons of whom they will complain, as
well such as be not of the Staple, as those that be of the
Staple, . . . only before the Mayor and Justices of the
Staple.350
348. Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 1
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 332 (also described as the "Ordinance
of the Staples").
349. Id. cl. 8, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 336.
350. Id. (emphasis added).
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The effect of this passage was not to eliminate all variation in the
laws applied by staple courts, but rather to guarantee that claims
arising out of the staples would be heard there, in the staples, rather
than in other "Cities, Boroughs, or other Towns" under their own
laws."' The danger was that merchant plaintiffs might confront
defendants who claimed, as did William of Fleetbridge at St. Ives,
that they could only be sued in London or in some other
jurisdiction.352 If a plaintiff chose to sue elsewhere, however, he
would have the right to do so. Clause 8 explicitly identifies the
purpose of its own provisions: they were instituted "so always that of
all Manner of Contracts and Covenants ... the Party Plaintiff shall
[choose] whether he will sue his Action or Quarrel before the
Justices of the Staple by the Law of the Staple [la lei de lestaple], or
in other Place [e.g., in royal courts] [at] the common Law." '353
Second, the statute's repeated references to the "Law of the
Staple" blur the distinction between a mercantile law meant to apply
351. The insistence that cases be heard by the justices of the staple is also found
in Clause 5, which provides that the staple courts will not be interrupted by a
general eyre (in which royal justices hear all the cases arising within a county, and
local systems of justice are suspended). Id. cl. 5, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 51, at 335.
352. Fleetbridge v. Coventry (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1275), in 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra
note 14, at 155. After the Statute of the Staple, the Mayor of London began to
invoke his concurrent status as Mayor of the Staple of Westminster in claiming
authority to decide mercantile cases. See Senyger v. Pope (1380), in 2 CALENDAR
OF PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS 277 (A.H. Thomas ed., 1926) [hereinafter PLEA
AND MEMORANDA ROLLS] ("[The Mayor] inform[s] the parties that he was Mayor
of the Staple of Westminster as well as Mayor of the City of London, and that the
law merchant was pleadable before him both in the Staple and the Chamber of the
Guildhall."); Mageri v. Grameny (1380), in PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS, supra,
at 283. Such authority was not required merely to decide cases in which merchants
were a party. In what may be the earliest recorded example of English soccer
violence, a group of London tailors and furriers were imprisoned in 1373 for
having "made an assembly, under colour of playing with a football, in order to
assault others, occasion disputes, and perpetrate other evil deeds against the peace.
... PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS, supra, at 152. See generally ERIC DUNNING
ET AL., THE ROOTS OF FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM: AN HISTORICAL AND
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY (1998).
353. Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 2, cl. 8 (Eng.), reprinted in 1
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 336. Additionally, the staple courts
were intended to be sources of "contracts of record," which would be styled as
judgments. Restricting future litigation to the staple courts would have helped to
ensure the effectiveness of such contracts.
2006]
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
to all trade and the specific laws applied by the various staple courts.
The phrase "Law of the Staple" appears far more frequently in the
statute than the phrase "Law-Merchant," and in certain instances, the
statute uses the terms lei marchant and lei de lestaple
interchangeably. Clause 20 mandates that when foreign merchants
suffer "Outrages" outside the bounds of the staple, the justices of that
place "shall do speedy justice to them after the Law-Merchant from
Day to Day, and from Hour to Hour, without sparing any Man or
[driving] them to sue at the common Law." '354 Almost identical
language is used to describe the procedure for dealing with one who
levies unlawful taxes on foreign merchants; clause 2 states that
"speedy and ready Process shall be against him from Day to Day,
and from Hour to Hour, according to the Law of the Staple, and not
at the Common Law." '355 Similarly, clause 21 specifies that the
mayors of the staples are to have "Knowledge of the Law-Merchant,
to govern the Staple"; yet at the same time, they are to punish
violators "after the Law of the Staple. 356 Clause 23 of the statute
requires that merchants agree to the mayor and constables' exercise
of jurisdiction "according to the Law and Usage of the Staple [la lei
& usage de lestaple]" and that the merchants also preserve the staple
"and the Laws and Usages of the same [les leis & usages dycelle],
without fraud or deceit. ' 357 The conceptual plurality of these laws
and usages does not sit easily with the vison of a single, invariant law
merchant.
Third, the practical application of the lei marchant and the lei de
lestaple portrays the law of the staple courts as more local than
universal. Although few records of staple court proceedings survive,
we find in the records of two very late cases that the concept of the
lei de lestaple allowed for variations from place to place.35s The
354. Id. cl. 20, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 340.
355. Id. cl. 2, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 334.
356. Id. cl. 21, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 340-
41. This clause might read more sensibly if it were translated as requiring
"knowledge of mercantile law to govem the staple."
357. Id. at cl. 23, reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 341.
358. As Gross noted, so few staple court records are extant that some historians
have been led to think that no such records were kept; these records survived only
because they were copied from the original rolls and sent to the Chancery. See
Gross, supra note 15, at xxvii.
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plaintiff in Pope v. Davy sued for debt in the staple court of Exeter
"secundum legem mercatoriam et stapule predicte." The phrase,
which Gross rendered as "according to the law merchant and the law
of the said staple," indicates not two distinct laws but a single
entity.5 9 In this case, the court repeatedly recognized a law that had
as much to do with a particular staple as it did with mercantile
practice. Even more flexibility was shown in Eliot v. Dyne; here the
staple court of Westminster found that a plaintiff in a case of debt
could wage his law singlehandedly, as long as his account-book
recorded the debt and the defendant had no written evidence that it
had been paid. This judgment-which would never have been
accepted at St. Ives a hundred years earlier-was rendered by the
court "solom leur usages et custumes par leye marchant," which
Gross rendered as "according to their usages and customs and
according to the law merchant. 3 60 However, another translation
might be "according to their usages and customs by mercantile
law"-implying that "leye marchant" provides for the application of
the suitors' usages and customs, not of any independent substantive
principles of law. After he was found guilty, the defendant was
committed to prison "according to the usage of the said staple [solom
lusage du dicte estaple].'"361
Fourth, the terms lei marchant and lei de lestaple seem to be used
in the statute as catch-all phrases for the customs of the court-
useful concepts, but not necessarily demonstrative of the existence of
an independent law. In clause 19, merchants are held not to be liable
for the deeds of their servants, unless a servant acts at his master's
command, in the capacity of his office, or "in other Manner, that the
Master be holden to answer for the Deed of his Servant by the Law-
Merchant, as elsewhere is used. 3 62 Because merchants cannot stay
long in any one place, "speedy Right" should always be done "from
359. Pope v. Davy (Exeter Staple Ct. 1428), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 116.
360. Eliot v. Dyne (Westminster Staple Ct. 1401), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
114. Although the institution of account-books developed after the time of St. Ives,
that court would have rejected any suggestion that a plaintiff could win judgment
solely on the evidence of his own paper records.
361. Id.
362. Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 2, cl. 19 (Eng.), reprinted in 1
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 340.
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Day to Day, and from Hour to Hour, according to the Laws used in
such Staples before this Time holden elsewhere. 3 63 The merchant
plaintiffs were to have access to speedy procedure, and thus could
not be required to sue in royal courts and at the common law; beyond
that, however, the statute gives little indication of what the lei
marchant or the lei de lestaple might contain. One is reminded of the
grant of the fair to the abbey of Ramsey "with all customs such as
any fair in all England has"; the clause indicates the presence of
regulations without identifying any individual regulations in
particular.3" In the same way, the use of lei marchant and lei de
lestaple may have been a means of referring to principles of
mercantile law, but without implying that the drafters of the statute-
or even the merchants for whom it was enacted-had any specific
principles in mind.
Fifth, if it were a distinct legal order, the law merchant the statute
describes would fail an essential test of autonomy. Both the statute
and the charter grant privileges to merchants only in their capacity as
plaintiffs, giving them the option to sue in staple courts as well as in
the royal courts at common law. The defendants are given no such
choice; though defendants would have generally preferred the
common law, with its far more elaborate procedures and many
opportunities for delay, it is not hard to imagine reasons why they
might have chosen a different procedure.3 65 The grants of the Carta
Mercatoria and the Statute of the Staple provide no process whereby
common-law claims can be removed to mercantile courts against the
wishes of the plaintiff. If the customs of merchants are to serve as the
principles of a separate legal system, rather than merely one
parasitical on English law, then the principles that favor defendants
must be just as binding as those favoring plaintiffs-but because of
the plaintiffs opportunities for forum-shopping, only the latter are
given effect.
363. Id.
364. See Charter to the Abbot of Ramsey, supra note 37, at 119-20.
365. For instance, eleven compurgators may be required for wager of law in a
royal court, while only two or five might be required at St. Ives. See BAKER, supra
note 20, at 87; Tempsford v. Chaplain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1291), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 45; 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at 5.
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The Carta Mercatoria and the Statute of the Staple therefore do
not establish the law merchant as a body of commercial law-a
distinct set of substantive principles to govern trade. At a time when
the common law itself, as Nathan Isaacs noted, "was little more than
a series of technical rules of evidence and procedure," references to
lex mercatoria "indicated merely a different set of similar rules" for
simpler procedure. "This," Isaacs continued, "rather than the
adoption of an imaginary code, is the purpose of the Carta
Mercatoria . . . in promising certain foreign merchants speedy
justice, secundum legem mercatoriam." 3 66
Nor can the charter and statute be viewed as creating a legal
sphere beyond the reach of local authorities. We have already seen
the influence of Crown and abbot at the fair court of St. Ives, and the
Carta Mercatoria and the Statute of the Staple explicitly preserve the
king's appellate jurisdiction over mercantile courts.3 67 Rather, they
seem to protect the rights of traders to plead their cases in certain
fora, subject to customs that may have been as various as the courts
in which they were declared. In no sense, then, can one say that the
charter and the statute subjected the commerce of medieval England
to a uniform, cosmopolitan law merchant.
D. CONCLUSIONS
It may very well have been that in resolving mercantile disputes,
local authorities-at St. Ives and elsewhere-paid strong attention to
the customs of merchants, as they did to the customs of all those who
came before them. It may have been that similarities existed in
mercantile customs and ways of doing business across wide areas of
England or of Europe, similarities supported and reinforced by trade
among various regions. It may have also been that some of these
366. Nathan Isaacs, The Merchant and His Law, 23 J. POL. ECON. 529, 530-31
(1915).
367. Carta Mercatoria states that bailiffs and ministers who fail to do "speedy
justice" to the merchants "shall be punished in respect of us as the guilt demands."
Carta Mercatoria, supra note 163, at 213. Clause 21 of the Statute of the Staple
provides that "if any Merchant will complain of the Mayor of the Constables, that
they have failed of Right ... it shall be speedily redressed by the Chancellor and
our Council without Delay." Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 2, cl. 21
(Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 51, at 341.
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customs, in a legal environment, were referred to under the general
heading of lex mercatoria.
But none of this demonstrates that the merchants who sought to
have their pleas adjudged secundum legem mercatoriam were all
asking to be judged by the same law. The evidence cited above
strongly implies that "lex mercatoria" was a general phrase for
whatever law was appropriate to mercantile transactions, not
necessarily a term for a specific body of principles actually applied
to them. As in the staple court of Westminster, decisions were
reached according to the courts' usages and customs by mercantile
law.368 Such an interpretation would be consistent with the linguistic
practices of the time; as John Hudson wrote, the Latin term lex was
used in medieval England not only to refer to a specific body of law,
but also to mean "all Law or laws, written or unwritten," or-most
importantly for our inquiry-to "indicate in a general sense what is
lawful or what is considered correct procedure." '369 And if different
populations determined what was correct in each forum, then "the
law applied would be the local mercantile understanding of what the
law of the particular situation was."37
As a result, one cannot conclude that the practice of mercantile
law was experienced by the contemporaries of the St. Ives fair as part
of a single legal system, a "law universal throughout the world." The
fact that the many independent merchant courts were engaged in a
similar enterprise, if true, would not imply that they were engaged in
a common enterprise, or that they saw themselves as enforcing a
single law throughout the realm. Bonfield's analysis of English
manorial customs seems entirely applicable in the commercial
context as well:
368. Eliot v. Dyne (Westminster Staple Ct. 1401), in 1 SCLM, supra note 1, at
114.
369. HUDSON, supra note 37, at 3. This indeterminate language seems to have
been a feature of the medieval approach to law. For example, in 1199, King John
granted various privileges to the city of Leicester, "saving to us and to others the
just and due customs." 1 RECORDS OF THE BOROUGH OF LEICESTER, supra note 18,
at 7. It was a common practice in contemporary documents to refer to "just and due
customs" without specifying precisely what those might be.
370. Jones, supra note 5, at 448.
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There is little direct evidence to suggest that the conceptions
of jurisprudence governing transactions in a court
encompassed the regularity of application of rules either
within a jurisdiction or throughout the kingdom required to
support an argument that any decision reflected the collective
cultural position . . . . Our preliminary sketch of cases
suggests that the outcome of disputes touching fundamental
issues of customary law seem to vary. I am not arguing here
for contrary positions on individual issues of law[,] but rather
that law in its modem sense may be absent, regardless of how
judgments are articulated.3 71
How, then, could historians such as Mitchell have maintained that
mercantile law was "possessed of a certain uniformity in its essential
features?"37 Though he recognized that "each country, it may almost
be said each town, had its own variety of Law Merchant," Mitchell
added that they were all "varieties of the same species. Everywhere
the leading principles and the most important rules were the same, or
tended to become the same. 373 When describing the "broad general
principles" of the law merchant,374 however, he offered only
procedural descriptions-the system provided merchants with a
process of justice that was equitable and swift and that took judicial
notice of their customs. 3 75 These descriptions may not always apply
371. Bonfield, supra note 151, at 530-31.
372. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 10.
373. Id. at 9. However, the categorization here seems quite arbitrary. No matter
how numerous the "minor points" on which mercantile law "differed ... from
place to place," without an understanding of which features are essential, one can
always assert that it possessed "a certain uniformity in its essential features." Id. at
10.
374. Id.
375. See id. at 10-11 ("[The law merchant was] in the main customary law ....
Everywhere, in commercial transactions, custom held sway, and even where the
State legislated it had often merely to confirm or slightly modify the rules that had
long before been established through custom."); id. at 12 ("[Its jurisdiction was]
summary .... Its justice was prompt, its procedure summary, and often the time
within which disputes must be settled was narrowly limited."); id. at 16, 20
(describing the law merchant as "characterized by the spirit of equity," and stating
that its development in England, France, and Italy emphasized "plain justice[,]
good faith disregard of technicalities and regard for 'the sole truth of the matter"');
id. at 20 (arguing that the "most striking feature" of the law merchant was "its
strongly marked international character"). It is worth noting that the fourth
principle is entirely circular; the "uniformity in its essential features" is what is to
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to the proceedings at St. Ives;3 76 yet even had this phenomenon
occurred simultaneously in all Christendom, it still would not
provide a single substantive principle that could be considered part of
the "law merchant."
Mitchell's chapter on sale and contract reinforces this view. On
nearly every substantive question he examined-whether the
principle of market overt protects good-faith buyers of stolen
goods;3 77 whether unwritten contracts are binding;378 whether written
contracts must include consideration;379 whether debts contracted at a
fair must be documented by a sealed bond;380 whether the lands of a
debtor could be seized to pay a debt;"' whether merchants can be
held liable for a fellow townsman's debts;382 whether partnership
must be registered with the civil authorities;3 83 whether individual
partners can enter into contracts binding on the firm;384 etc.-
substantial and perhaps complete disorder reigned among, various
European jurisdictions.3 85 This disagreement may explain why none
of Mitchell's broad principles are substantive in nature: there were
be proved, and one cannot use as proof an unsupported assertion that its "main
lines of development were everywhere the same." Id.
376. As Mitchell admitted,
The records of the Fair Court of St. Ives show that formalism and
technicalities still held their ground. Verbal accuracy was required of the
defendant and it was possible for a debtor to defraud his creditor and prevent
attachment of his goods by going through the farce of a mock sale.
Id. at 17-18; see also supra text accompanying note 189 (describing technicalities
at St. Ives).
377. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 93-102; see also supra text accompanying note
335 (discussing market overt).
378. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 102-05.
379. Id. at 105-07.
380. Id. at 110-11.
381. Id. at 118-19.
382. Id. at 122-24.
383. Id. at 130-32.
384. Id. at 132-36.
385. Consider various other passages from a single page: "The Great Fairs of
Champagne had their own style, usage, and customs"; "The Merchants of Antwerp
refused to submit to the law of London"; "In Italy the special codes of commerce
that almost every great city possessed, show greater or smaller discrepancies in
almost every section .... Id. at 2.
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exceedingly few such principles that were actually shared across all
of commercial Western Europe, let alone the entire world. If the law
merchant is only what is held in common, then it will certainly be
universal, but it may also be substantively empty. Though he insisted
that the law merchant was "in its broadest sense the body of
commercial rules observed throughout Western Christendom,"
Mitchell had to concede that "each country developed to a certain
extent upon its own lines," and he even admitted a sense in which
"an 'English Law Merchant' may be said to have existed"--which is
exactly what the foreign merchant in 1473 denied before the
Chancery."'6
It may seem unnecessary to quibble with arguments presented
more than a century ago, but the conclusions of historians such as
Mitchell and Holdsworth have flowed unfiltered into much recent
scholarship. Recent historians have also accepted the theoretical
approach of older scholars, conceding wide gaps in actual practice in
order to preserve the integrity of the law merchant in theory. In 1901,
Albert Thomas Carter described the law merchant as "slightly
affected, perhaps by local variations," but maintained that it was still
"really Law, and it was really International. 387 Similarly, Trakman
wrote in 2003 that "[1]ocal lords certainly had a significant impact on
both the inception and application of the medieval Law Merchant,"
but continued to describe it as a single phenomenon even as it
"acquired a distinctly local flavour. 38 8 How various must legal
practices be-and how distant from the contemporary sources must
be the notion of a universal body of substantive law-before one
abandons the terminology of a unitary law? Why not settle for
studying the common elements in customs, while accepting that
different substantive law may have been applied in different
jurisdictions? 389
386. Id. at 115. To be fair, one should note that Mitchell had a far better
command of the primary sources than many other historians who have written on
the law merchant. This may be the source of the logical tensions underlying his
argument. Mitchell wrote as if he were aware of the cracks in the dike, but was
unwilling to reject the historiographical tradition and to revise the prevailing
interpretation.
387. Carter, supra note 18, at 232.
388. Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 276, 290.
389. This was the very sensible approach of Kadens, supra note 20, at 63-64,
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Indeed, even Holdsworth was compelled to this conclusion after
his examination of the English sources. The law merchant must have
been "essentially cosmopolitan" in character, he argued, for only a
law "from which national technicalities were as far as possible
eliminated . . . would suffice for [merchants'] needs."3 90
Unfortunately, Holdsworth was unable to find among English
merchants, with their "peculiar customs" and "peculiar privileges,"
evidence in accord with this description.3 9' After recommending that
one look to the fair courts, rather than those of the boroughs, to
"trace the development of commercial law, ' 392 he found that the
English fairs "made no permanent contribution to the growth of
special commercial courts. '393 One passage on the subject is worth
reproducing at length:
The impression which the published records of our fair courts
leaves upon me is that they were courts which dealt for the
most part with petty transactions, and that consequently, the
law there administered had not much chance to develop. The
forms of action, the procedure, and the rules of law possess
with regard to Continental sources.
390. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 543; 5 id. at 109. Others might think that
historians ought not to assume such "legislative functions." BERTRAND RUSSELL,
On the Notion of Cause, in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC AND OTHER ESSAYS 180, 180
(1918) (making the same point for philosophers). Before concluding that
mercantile law "necessarily differed at many points from the ordinary law," 1
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 543 (emphasis added), one should perhaps start
by determining what the differences were, and then for explanation look to the
needs that they might have satisfied. Carter similarly fell into the trap of inferring
from present requirements to historical events: "[It is incredible that [the
merchants] would have administered a system where their rights varied with the
locality, they themselves being both litigants and judges. Owing to the exigencies
of trade, merchants, of all men, require that the law should be known with
precision." Carter, supra note 18, at 236. However, Carter himself provided no
evidence-and little can be found elsewhere-as to the precise identities of those
who served as suitors of the fair courts, and it is entirely plausible that the
composition of a fair court might have varied dramatically from place to place. (As
Carter himself admitted, the merchant courts were no different from other English
local courts in their "popular" aspect. See supra *note 99.) Given the myriad
examples of variation in legal practices, one should not ignore the documentary
evidence we possess in favor of an anachronistic reading of the needs of
merchants.
391. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 66.
392. 5 id. at 106; see also supra text accompanying note 342.
393. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 113.
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the same primitive characteristics as marked the business in
other local courts. Compurgation meets us at every turn.
There is no clear line between tort and contract .... Neither
in our fair nor our borough records do we read much of the
beginnings of those legal doctrines of our modem
commercial law which were beginning to spread from Italy
and south-western Europe to the great fairs of France and the
trading cities of the Netherlands.394
One might infer from this evidence that such commercial doctrines
simply were not supposed to be there, that England possessed
various mercantile customs but no cosmopolitan law merchant. Yet
Holdsworth and his followers could not accept this view, for two
reasons. The first reason is that the universal law merchant is thought
to arise naturally from the practice of commerce and exchange, in
England as elsewhere.395 If the principles of the law merchant need
not be approved by any sovereign legislator, the usages of trade
must, in Harold Berman's phrase, be "inherently binding," and no
less so in England.396 The second and more problematic reason is that
the evidence these authors cited to distinguish the law merchant from
the ordinary law of the land is in large part derived from English
sources.3 97 Carta Mercatoria and the Statute of the Staple are part of
the English legal tradition, not any continent-wide heritage. Even the
terms used to state the thesis of a distinct law merchant suggest an
English origin-especially the references to a "common law" that is
not the ius commune of Continental merchant towns. If there is no
394. 5 id. at 113-14 (emphasis added).
395. An example of this argument can be seen in Holdsworth's statements on
the role of the notary. Even though the notary never held a significant position in
English commerce, it is considered natural that he should have:
I cannot but think that if Englishmen had had much need to use the
commercial instruments which these notaries drew, if these instruments had
come with any frequency before the courts, we should have seen a similar
class arising in England. That no such class arose in the Middle Ages points, I
think, to the fact that the larger commerce was mainly in foreign hands, and
that the litigation arising from it did not trouble the English courts.
5 id. at 115.
396. Harold J. Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The "New" Law Merchant and the
"Old": Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION,
supra note 9, at 21, 32.
397. See, e.g., 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 543.
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universal law merchant in the court of an English fair, then where did
it appear, and how is it known to be cosmopolitan rather than simply
the expression of certain Continental customs?
The evidence from St. Ives and elsewhere encourages a different
approach. Commercial regulations may simply have been part of
domestic law-influenced by mercantile custom, perhaps, for
reasons of efficiency, but claiming no universal authority derived
from the law of Nature. Indeed, it should be difficult to convince
anyone that crying "Halves!" to intervene in sales of meat and fish-
however common a practice-could have long been considered "law
universal throughout the world." How this interpretation could have
survived over the centuries, and why it has enjoyed such popularity
among modem historians, is the story of Part III.
III. MERCHANT LAW AND POLITICS
As Parts I and II have established, the regulation of commerce at
St. Ives was not exclusively dependent on the will of the merchant
community or on a set of principles known as "the law merchant."
Furthermore, no universal body of substantive law was recognized to
govern trade, replacing or superseding local law that conflicted with
its tenets. Why, then, do historians still invest the medieval law
merchant with such authority, and still consider the merchants to
have ruled their own affairs?
The answer appears to lie in the political realm. Since the early
modem period, the history of commercial law in England has been
invoked to justify a variety of political programs. The interpretation
of that history has thus been subject to intense political influence.
The historical tradition in this field emerged in a seventeenth-century
battle between English civilians and common lawyers for jurisdiction
in commercial cases. It was revived under the influence of a second
set of political concems-those of German Romantics, who saw the
law merchant as the fulfillment of their vision of communal and
customary law. Anglophone scholars quickly adopted their ideas,
identifying in the law merchant a vindication of the mercantile spirit
of the age.
In the twentieth century, as the primary documents received closer
scrutiny, historians' understanding of medieval commercial law
underwent substantial revision. In the last generation, however, the
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universalist claims have again returned in the context of
globalization. As international trade has grown more pervasive and
complex, legal scholars have sought a uniform replacement for the
crazy-quilt of local regulations that multinational corporations might
face. Like the civil lawyers and the German Romantics, they have
seen in the medieval law merchant what they wanted to see-in this
case, a model of legal uniformity outside the framework of national
governments and existing authorities. The potential implications of
such a lex mercatoria for modern politics have clouded historians'
vision of commercial law as it was practiced in the Middle Ages.398
A. THE CIVILIANS AND THE MERCHANT COURTS
Tendentious descriptions of mercantile law did not begin with the
modern era. The 1473 Chancery decision described in Part II, which
declares the law merchant "law universal throughout the world," was
ultimately rooted in jurisdictional concerns. 399 The central question
of the case is whether a carrier of goods had committed a felony by
converting the goods to his own use; if so, the king could claim the
goods as waif. The law merchant is mentioned only in discussing
whether "this matter ought to be determined at common law [i.e., in
the common-law courts] and not here," before the Council. The
references to the "law of nature" thus served merely to establish the
personal prerogative of the King (and his Council) to dispose of the
case. 400 The case was then discussed in the Exchequer Chamber,
which considered the conversion to be felonious under English law.
Yet the owner was allowed to keep the goods, because the King had
granted him "safe and secure conduct, both for his goods and his
person." The result was dictated by domestic law and by a royal
398. This Article cannot provide the complete historiography of the law
merchant. The discussion below is limited to those authors who have exercised the
greatest influence on later scholars. For a more general survey, see Isaacs, supra
note 366, at 536; LMLP, supra note 20, at 123-88.
399. See Anon. v. Sheriff of London, Y.B. 13 Edw. 2, fol. 9, Pasch, pl. 5 (Ch.
1473), excerpted in 2 SCLM, supra note 38, at lxxxv, lxxxvi; see also supra text
accompanying note 234.
400. EXCHEQUER CHAMBER, supra note 234, at 32. The owner of the goods was
an alien who traded "by reason of the King's seal," giving "the King . . .
jurisdiction over [him]." Id.
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grant of safe conduct; the universal law merchant played no role
except as a pretext for preserving the Chancellor's jurisdiction.40 1
As a rhetorical tool for asserting jurisdiction, the law merchant
continued to be employed in the battle between civil-law and
common-law traditions. By the early sixteenth century, the civil law
had come to dominate the High Court of Admiralty, and the civilians
had significant institutional influence in the Chancery and in the
Court of Requests.4"2 The civilians soon found themselves fighting
the common lawyers for jurisdiction, as the common-law writ of
prohibition was used to block Admiralty proceedings and to force
commercial cases into the common-law courts.40 3 Much of the battle
between civilians and common lawyers was waged in the political
realm; yet it also provoked fierce ideological disputes, in which the
partisans of each side tried to demonstrate why theirs was the proper
law to govern commerce. 4° The law merchant, which had never been
discussed formally in England by any major treatise since Lex
401. Id. at 33-34. Contra 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 405 (asserting
without further argument that the case "depended on the law of nature and not
upon municipal law").
402. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE CIVILIAN WRITERS OF DOCTORS'
COMMONS, LONDON 29-30 (Comparative Studies in Continental and Anglo-
American Legal , History [Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur
kontinentaleuropaischen und anglo-amerikanischen Rechtsgeschichte] 3, 1988).
403. Id. at 31.
404. By this period, the regulation of commerce on the Continent had been
strongly influenced by the civil law. The followers of the great fourteenth-century
scholar Bartolo di Sassoferrato had long attempted to create a modem system of
law based primarily on the Corpus Juris Civilis. The political and social chasm
between Italian principalities and Justinian's Empire led to intractable theoretical
conflicts and "considerable intellectual agony," in Daniel Coquillette's phrase; the
tensions were resolved only through the acceptance of contemporary custom as law
where it did not conflict with the Roman tradition. Id. at 42-43. Thus, the civil
tradition has been described as. more flexible and providing more substantive
commercial content than the English common law. Id.; see also id. at 94.
Additionally, international trade brought into English courts a number of foreign
traders who were familiar with the civil law's terms but who knew nothing of the
common-law tradition. In 1607, the civilian Sir Thomas Ridley relied on this point
to argue for civilian jurisdiction over commercial cases, writing that "[b]usiness
many times concerns not only our own countrymen, but also strangers, who ...
live in countries ordered by the Civil Law." Id. at 120. (Spelling has been
modernized in this and all quotations below.)
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Mercatoria, suddenly became the focus of a great deal of legal
attention. 05
The question of which courts should hear mercantile cases turned
in part on whether mercantile law was distinct from the law of the
land. A number of early civilian treatises attempt to unify the civil
and common law, and they portray mercantile law as merely one
more aspect of this single legal framework. In the early sixteenth
century, Christopher St. German separated the "law of reason" and
the "law of man" into two camps, and in the latter he included both
the "general customs" of the realm and those of the courts
"Pypowdres. '40 6 Yet the attempt at unity was short-lived-for if
mercantile law were simply part of human law, then commercial
cases might belong in the common-law courts, which were
competent to interpret and apply the "general customs" of the realm.
Only if mercantile law were separate from the common law, and
instead part of a transnational tradition, could it be retained in
separate courts staffed by the civil lawyers.4"7
This position was argued ably in the early seventeenth century by
Sir John Davies, attorney general for Ireland under James I. In his
Question Concerning Impositions, Davies claimed that the king had
power to impose taxes on foreign trade without an act of
Parliament.4 8 He justified this claim by arguing that international
trade was governed not by the common law, but by the civil law,
which on his understanding granted far more authority to the
sovereign. Davies began his case for mercantile exceptionalism by
noting that the community of merchants "hath always had a peculiar
and proper law to rule and govern it," namely the Law Merchant,
"whereof the laws of all nations do take special knowledge. 40 9 Cases
concerning merchants were therefore not to be decided by "the
peculiar and ordinary Laws of every Country, but by the general Law
405. Plucknett noted that there is no systematic treatment of the law merchant in
a formal textbook in England until after the end of the Middle Ages. T.F.T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 659 (5th ed. 1956).
406. COQUILLETTE, supra note 402, at 52.
407. Id. at 35.
408. DAVIES, supra note 236, at 18.
409. Id. at 12.
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of Nature and Nations, ' 41° of which the Law Merchant was "a
branch. '41' As this Law of Nations "is nothing else but that which
common reason hath established among all men," the Law Merchant
was therefore "universal and one in the same in all Countries in the
World .... [T]here is not one Law in England, another in France...
but the same rules of reason, and the like proceedings of the Law
Merchant are observed in every nation. 4 2
Once he had established that the laws of commerce were not local
to England, Davies could then argue that the question of impositions
was best addressed within an external legal tradition. The civil law
had not been adopted in England as it had on the Continent, but it
still prevailed within the Admiralty. The common law, Davies
claimed, therefore governed "causes arising within the land only";
for cases "concerning merchants ... crossing the seas," civil law was
more appropriate, and indeed "our Kings have ever used the Roman
Civil Law for the deciding . . . thereof. ' 413 The civil law accepted
impositions, as did the Law of Nations as Davies understood it, and
thus the king could claim more authority in this sphere than the
common law of England would allow.
This expansive view of the Law Merchant was not limited to
apologists for the Crown. The trader Gerard Malynes wrote his
Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria for the use of the practicing
merchant, and much of the book discusses various types of traded
goods or foreign weights and measures. 4  Yet Malynes was
unabashed in his description of the law merchant as superior to local
law. "Every man knoweth," he wrote, of the "great diversity amongst
all nations" in their "manners and prescriptions" for administering
justice; yet since Biblical times, the law merchant "hath always been
found . . constant and permanent without abrogation, according to
410. Id. at 18.
411. Id. at 17.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 20.
414. MALYNES, supra note 204. Malynes explicitly drew on the civilian
tradition, naming as sources Bartolus, Benvenuto Stracca and Rodericus Suarez,
among others. However, his was not the civilian's approach; the books of those
learned authors were "full of quillets and distinctions over-curious and precise." Id.
at 5.
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her most ancient customs, concurring With the law of nations in all
countries." '415 As a result, the "customary law of merchants" fulfilled
the definition of Cicero-"vera lex est recta ratio, naturae
congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans sempiterna"-and enjoyed "a
peculiar prerogative above all other customs. 4
16
Under the influence of the scholars of civil law, the law merchant
had been characterized as both independent from and superior to
local law. Yet placing the law merchant within the "general Law of
Nature and Nations" was not necessarily in the civilians' best
interest. A law "observed alike in all Nations," to use the phrase of
Sir Thomas Ridley, might be considered part of the domestic law of
those nations, and thus might be enforced along with other laws of
England in the common-law courts.1 7
Indeed, that is in large part what happened. The common lawyers
effectively destroyed the Admiralty monopoly on commercial cases
and created a new monopoly of their own. In 1622, the same year
that Malynes wrote his Consuetudo, Chief Justice Hobart ruled that
"the custom of merchants is part of the common law of this
kingdom, '41 s and under Chief Justices Holt and Mansfield, the
common-law courts took ever greater control of mercantile cases-a
process that has often been interpreted as "incorporating" the law
merchant into the English common law.4 19 In the 1759 case of Luke
v. Lyde, Lord Mansfield concluded that "the Maritime Law is not the
Law of a particular Country, but the general Law of Nations," and at
415. Id. at ii.
416. Id. at v-vi, 4.
417. COQUILLETTE, supra note 402, at 129. Writing in the early seventeenth
century, Ridley explicitly stated that the law merchant was not part of the ius
gentium, the law of nations "which common reason hath established among men,
and [which] is observed alike in all Nations." Instead, he described it as part of the
ius civile, the law "which the old Romans used" and which is, "for the great
wisdom and equity thereof ... the common law of all well governed Nations, a
very few [only] excepted." Id. Ridley knew full well that England was one of these
exceptions, and identified the law merchant with a foreign legal tradition that was
not officially recognized by-and thus still independent from-the common law.
418. Vanheath v. Turner, Winch 24, 25, 120 Eng. Rep. 20, 21 (C.P. 1621),
quoted in BEWES, supra note 5, at 1.
419. For detailed criticism of this "incorporation" theory, see ROGERS, supra
note 20.
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the same time assured its mercantile counterpart of a permanent
place in the common-law courts.4 20 The civilians' campaign for
exclusive jurisdiction had failed, and commercial cases became
entirely subject to English common-law courts.
B. THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT
The triumph of the common lawyers in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries brought about what Berthold Goldman
considered the first disappearance of the English law merchant-the
jurisdiction of common-law courts over commercial cases.4 21 Yet the
concept of a transnational, customary law merchant was revived in
the mid-nineteenth century for reasons that would have been
anathema to the civil lawyers. While the civilians had sought to
portray the law merchant as part of the universal Roman heritage, the
law merchant's greatest champions of the nineteenth century saw it
as an escape from foreign Roman influences.
The Romantic movement in nineteenth-century Europe placed
strong emphasis on national and ethnic identity over the claims of
universal or multinational empires. In disunited Germany, the
Romantics advanced the claim that proper law was not imposed from
above, but rather grew out of the customs of the Volk.422 A case
should not be decided on the basis of Romanist principles, but on the
"Natur der Sache-the nature of the matter. ' '423 Already in the
eighteenth century, J.G. Busch had called on judges to "distance
themselves from all juristic notions and simply use their common
sense ... to grasp and master the nature of the transaction die Natur
420. Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882, 887, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (1759), quoted in
COQUILLETTE, supra note 402, at 289. It was in this form that the doctrines entered
American jurisprudence. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (stating that the true
interpretation of commercial law was "to be sought, not in the decisions of the
local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial
jurisprudence"). Justice Story, writing for the court, cited Mansfield to argue that
the law of negotiable instruments was "not the law of a single country only, but of
the commercial world." Id. But see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938) (overruling Swift, and holding that "[t]here is no federal general, common
law").
421. Goldman, supra note 9, at 3.
422. Whitman, supra note 8, at 159.
423. Id. at 160.
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des Geschaftes.'4 24 After the Revolution of 1848, serious efforts
began to expel Roman jurisprudence from German systems of
commercial law, under the leadership of a young lawyer named
Levin Goldschmidt.
Goldschmidt, who may have done more than anyone to revive
scholarly interest in the medieval law merchant, felt a profound
aversion to the claim of the civilians and Cicero to derive true law
from right reason. Instead, Goldschmidt argued that "[e]very fact-
pattern of common life . . . carries within itself its appropriate,
natural rules, its right law." This law "is not a creature of mere
reason," nor is it "eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same";
rather, it is "in-dwelling in the very circumstances of life." The task
of the law-giver consists in "uncovering and implementing this
immanent law. 4 25 Goldschmidt decried the "orgy of statute-making"
he saw around him, for immanent law was best revealed in the
flexible "will of the Volkc" rather than in "the inflexible will of the
legislator. 426 Because they incorporated commercial custom, he saw
the medieval merchant courts as the "judicial organs of merchant
legal consciousness," giving expression to the true will of the
international merchant community.427
Goldschmidt's proposed commercial code was profoundly
influential; many of its principles were enacted into law after
Germany's unification in 1871, and the American legal scholar Karl
Llewellyn brought them into the Uniform Commercial Code in the
1940s.428 Yet Goldschmidt's assessment of the medieval law
merchant also found a willing audience. His ideas were introduced
into English and American historiography largely through the work
of William Mitchell, who portrayed the law merchant as a
transnational law, separate from the control of existing authorities
424. Id. at 162 (quoting 2 J.G. BUSCH, THEORETISCH-PRAKTiSCHE DARSTELLUNG
DER HANDLUNG IN DEREN MANNIGFALTIGEN GESCHAFTEN 366 (Hamburg, B.G.
Hoffmann 1792)).
425. Id. at 158 (quoting 1 LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES
HANDELSRECHTS 302 (Stuttgart, F. Enke 3d ed. 1875)).
426. Id. at 165.
427. Id. (quoting 2 LEViN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 242-
43 (Erlangen, F. Enke 2d ed. 1864)).
428. Id. at 157-58.
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and founded on the custom of the merchant community. Mitchell
quoted with approval Goldschmidt's pronouncement on "the
grandeur and significance of the medieval merchant," creating "his
own laws out of his own needs and his own views. "429 Perhaps
because of his focus on the English law merchant, Mitchell also
managed to incorporate the universalist claims of the English
civilians that Goldschmidt would have abhorred-repeating Davies'
claim that the law merchant is part of "the law of nature and
nations," derivable from the "rules of reason" and "the same in all
countries of the world. '430 Although he did note that Davies'
description may be "too sweeping," Mitchell retained the
fundamental claim that the law merchant "was a body of rules and
principles . . . distinct from the ordinary law of the land" and
"possessed of a certain uniformity in its essential features. 43'
Mitchell's work was cited widely among Anglophone historians,
including Holdsworth,432 and their work was well received in an era
in which business claimed increasing prestige. Wyndham Bewes'
Romance of the Law Merchant, published in 1923, ranges easily
from the days of the Phoenicians to the seventeenth century,
429. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 10.
430. Id. at 1.
431. Id. at 1, 10.
432. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 89, at 538, 570. The influence of Mitchell and
Goldschmidt, as well as the documentary work of F.W. Maitland, led Charles
Gross in The Court of Piepowder to note the increased "attention [that] has been
devoted to the history of the law merchant." Gross, supra note 60, at 231. Gross
relied on those authors extensively, arguing that "the procedure of the court of
piepowder resembles the procedure of the international law merchant as it was
administered in all European tribunals." Id. at 245. As a result of the preliminary
study, Gross urged that "the local archives should be exploited for more data
concerning this interesting branch of the judicature," id. at 247, and two years later
he published the first volume of Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant. 1
SCLM, supra note 1. In fact, Gross read Mitchell's work and met with him while
working on the St. Ives records. For more details on the history of the volume's
publication, see LMLP, supra note 20, at 168.
The earlier English authors had influenced Maitland as well; he considered
the law merchant as "a ius gentium known to merchants throughout Christendom."
At the same time, however, Maitland insisted that the law merchant primarily
consisted of "rules of evidence" and was "not so much the law for a class of men
as the law for a class of transactions." 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 37, at
467.
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chronicling the deeds of merchants.433 The foreword describes the
tales of "perils by sea, endurance, sacrifice, courage" to be found in
the annals of commerce,"' and Bewes' description of the medieval
law merchant is just as breathless: "There was no substantial
difference in the customary law in the various trading nations .... It
appears all at once, like Minerva sprung fully armed from the brain
of Jove." '435 Although Mitchell and Holdsworth were far more careful
in their work, their influence on Bewes is clear from his citations.
Goldschmidt's Romanticism continued to find new expression
among those who sought to romanticize the law merchant.
C. REINTERPRETATION AND RENEWAL
Together, the works of Goldschmidt, Mitchell, and Holdsworth
cast a very long shadow. Into the mid-1950s, one finds editions of
T.F.T. Plucknett's Concise History of the Common Law repeatedly
citing Holdsworth and arguing for "a movement from local law
towards a cosmopolitan law" promoted by the "international
character of commerce. 436 Even in 1991, John H. Munro described
Malynes' tendentious work as "the best and most famous
compilation" on the law merchant, "by a merchant with wide
commercial and legal experience in both the Low Countries and
England." '37
This shadow has unfortunately obscured the efforts of a new,
skeptical school of authors to return to the original sources.438 As
433. BEWES, supra note 5.
434. Richard Atkin, Foreword to BEWES, supra note 5, at iii.
435. BEWES, supra note 5, at 8.
436. PLUCKNETT, supra note 405, at 659.
437. Munro, supra note 343, at 53 n. 11.
438. The skeptical view was enunciated as early as 1903, when John S. Ewart
described medieval mercantile law as "nothing but a heterogeneous lot of loose
undigested customs, which it is impossible to dignify with the name of a body of
law." John S. Ewart, What is the Law Merchant?, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 135, 138
(1903) (responding to Frances M. Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM.
L. REv. 470 (1902)). To Ewart, the attempt to decide cases according to a universal
law was "nothing but a particularly happy method by which the law [could be]
brought into harmony with current notions of justice." Id. at 145. This description
seems to coincide with that of Lord John Campbell, who wrote that before Lord
Mansfield fixed the customs of contemporary merchants into the common law, "no
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early as the 1930s, L. Stuart Sutherland chided her contemporaries
for ignoring the primary documents, calling it "useless" to rely on
seventeenth-century writers in describing thirteenth-century courts.
439
From his studies of royal courts, J.H. Baker argued that lex
mercatoria was not considered to be "a distinct body of substantive
law," but rather "an expeditious procedure especially adapted for the
needs of men who could not tarry for the common law," which
generally "followed the ordinary medieval principles of English law
relating to customs."" 0 In examining the history of bills and notes,
James Steven Rogers found that merchants had hardly avoided the
central royal courts in England-their cases had merely been
recorded in ways that disguised their commercial nature." And the
translators of the treatise Lex Mercatoria discovered "little
transnational substantive content" in the mercantile law of thirteenth-
century England." However, in general, similar attention has not
been paid in a systematic way to the records of the merchant courts
themselves-nor have the skeptics yet succeeded in overcoming the
'critical mass' of authorities created by the previous historiographical
tradition.
Since World War II, moreover, political changes have again made
fashionable the vision of a universal law merchant.443 The significant
increase in the pace, volume, and complexity of international trade
one knew" how mercantile cases were to be determined; a jury in a mercantile case
would decide "according to their notions of what was fair, and no general rule was
laid down." Id. at 151.
439. L. Stuart Sutherland, The Law Merchant in England in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries, 17 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y 151, 151-52 (4th ser.
1934). Sutherland even lent a sympathetic ear to the "heretics" who claimed that
"the merchant customs in the Middle Ages were too indefinite to be called by the
name of Law Merchant at all." Id. at 152-53.
440. BAKER, supra note 20, at 345, 347, 366.
441. ROGERS, supra note 20, at 18. Baker also discussed this possibility: even
though the common-law courts would not have necessarily recognized a bill of
exchange as conclusive evidence in a plea of debt, the plaintiff could still sue on
the underlying obligation. Although the bill might be shown to the jury, it would
not be mentioned in their decision, nor would it enter into the record if the
defendant waged his law. BAKER, supra note 20, at 350.
442. LMLP, supra note 20, at 179.
443. Cf Cremades & Plehn, supra note 5, at 320 (attributing the movement for a
new lex mercatoria to conflicting legal regimes following post-war
decolonization).
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has brought with it a desire for legal predictability and for uniformity
across the globe, as multinational actors seek to reconcile the various
demands of local laws.444 Berman, for example, saw in today's
patterns of global trade an echo of medieval universality; the "high
degree of uniformity" observed in modem contract practices is not
due only to "common commercial needs," but also to the fact that
merchants constitute a "transnational community which has had a
more or less continuous history . . . for some nine centuries." 445
Influenced by Malynes, Goldschmidt, and Mitchell, he concluded
that "the universal character of the law merchant, both in its
formative period and thereafter, has been stressed by all who have
written about it.""11 6 Drawing on the same sources, Trakman similarly
claimed that the medieval law merchant "reflected the ultimate move
away from local law towards a universal system of law, based upon
mercantile interests," 447 for the only law that could "effectively
enhance the activities of merchants" would be a law that "recognized
the capacity of merchants to regulate their own affairs through their
customs."448 These interpretations were then carried forward by
Bruce Benson, who employed the example of the medieval law
merchant to argue that modem governments could relinquish to
private-sector institutions the various tasks of law enforcement. 449
444. As illustrations, consider such harmonizing institutions as the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT"), or the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
445. Berman, supra note 196, at 1-2.
446. BERMAN, supra note 5, at 342.
447. TRAKMAN, supra note 4, at 8.
448. Id. at 9. As noted, Trakman later modified, but did not abandon, this
position. See supra note 27; supra text accompanying note 239.
449. To Benson, the development of the law merchant "effectively shatters the
myth that government must define and enforce 'the rules of the game."' Because
the law merchant "developed outside the constraints of political boundaries" and
because it "escaped the influence of political rulers," it provides "the best example
of what a system of customary law can achieve." BENSON, ENTERPRISE OF LAW,
supra note 5, at 30; see also Benson, Justice Without Government, supra note 5, at
127 (claiming that the "historical experience" disproves the political claim that "an
effective legal system and coercive state power must inevitably go hand in hand").
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D. CONCLUSIONS
The persistent survival of the private, cosmopolitan law merchant,
despite the best efforts of some historians to eliminate it, would be
bad enough. Even worse, however, it is this flawed interpretation that
has been most influential to those outside the field, and much new
research still relies on an erroneous historical account. Economists
have analyzed the game-theoretic consequences of merchant courts
on medieval trade, while assuming that they were voluntary
institutions powerless to enforce their decisions.450 Political scientists
have considered the law merchant a uniquely stateless system of
justice, an instructive example for an era when the nation-state is in
decline.451
Such characterizations effectively demonstrate how the
historiography of mercantile law has turned into a game. of
"Telephone," with one generation interpreting the works of previous
authors and the next interpreting the interpretations. Unfortunately,
those scholars seeking to revise our understanding of the law
merchant based on the original sources and the primary documents
have not yet caught the public eye. The thesis of a universal,
substantive law merchant is politically suggestive; the, thesis of a
truly medieval mercantile law, bereft of immediate political
implications, far less so. One can only hope that scholarship rather
than politics will soon take the upper hand.
450. See generally Milgrom et al., supra note 33 (emphasizing the courts' role
as disseminators of information on the credit-worthiness of indebted merchants,
and asserting that such institutions helped make possible the revival of European
trade); North, supra note 33; SCHWARTZ, supra note 34.
451. Joseph Nye compared medieval merchants, who developed the lex
mercatoria as a "private set of rules for conducting business," to software
programmers and technology companies "developing the code and norms of the
Internet partly outside the control of formal political institutions," which "add a
layer of relations that sovereign states do not effectively control." JOSEPH S. NYE,
JR., UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 218-19 (4th ed. 2003). Nye's
description of "a new cyber-feudalism, with overlapping communities and
jurisdictions laying claims to multiple layers of citizens' identities and loyalties,"
invokes Hedley Bull's conception of a "new medievalism," a "system of
overlapping authority and multiple loyalty" that serves as "a modem and secular
equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western
Christendom in the Middle Ages." Id. at 218; HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL
SOCIETY 245 (2d ed. 1995); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING
SOVEREIGNTY 20 (1999).
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IV. EPILOGUE: LEXMERCATORIA AND LEX
CYBERSPACE
This Article is concerned only with the character of commercial
law in medieval England; a debate on the proper means of regulating
contemporary commerce goes far beyond its scope. But it is
important to note that the current political debates are founded on a
certain interpretation of the medieval law merchant, an interpretation
that may be profoundly flawed. As Trakman wrote, "[h]istory does
provide lessons for the future. The Medieval Law Merchant does
reveal the ability of merchants to regulate their business affairs
within the broad framework of a suppletive legal order." '452 Justice
will not prevail "when judges are unduly preoccupied with applying
local public policies and indigenous legal rules to transregional
business"; the medieval law merchant "is a light whose vision cannot
be ignored if we are to promote productive trade across national
boundaries in modem times." '453
These claims, though presented as inferences from the historical
example of the medieval law merchant, are clearly political in nature.
The decision of a private arbitrator to ignore municipal laws, enacted
by an elected legislature, is one with significant implications for the
distribution of power in commercial disputes. Indeed, to Berman, the
customs of the international trading community form "an
autonomous body of law, binding on national courts";454 he praised
452. TRAKMAN, supra note 4, at 17.
453. Id. at 4, 21. Again, Trakman did not entirely abandon this view. See
Trakman, E-Merchant Law, supra note 5, at 303 ("The twenty-first century
cyberspace Law Merchant heralds a pragmatic vision of merchant regulation."); cf
Cremades & Plehn, supra note 5, at 320 (analogizing multinational enterprises "to
the medieval merchants whose activities were superimposed on a patchwork of
local sovereignties"); id. at 320, 324 (arguing that nation-states, "like the feudal
lords of the medieval period," should recognize that "piecemeal regulation"
through national laws "impedes the growth of global trade" and instead "permit[s]
businessmen to avoid the application of national law"); Juenger, supra note 9, at
497 (noting the "qualitative superiority" of the "new law merchant" over state
regulation).
454. Berman, supra note 196, at 49 (emphasis added); see also id. at 49-50
(arguing that "the law of the international mercantile community" the law
merchant--"antedates the emergence of a system of nation-states by some
centuries," and thus "should be recognized as legally binding by national courts as
well as by commercial arbitrators, independent of its incorporation into national
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arbitrators for deciding cases "according to international commercial
custom" or "according to the law of international trade," and one
hears in his words the faint echo of secundum legem mercatoriam.45
In the past twenty years, the medieval experience has become the
foundation for a new political movement, aimed at replacing the
national regulation of foreign trade with a transnational, customary
law. To supporters of such a view, international commerce has a "sui
generis character that warrants a special, separate regime of
governance .... Domestic requirements simply are too ensconced in
national habits and culture to serve as the governing predicate for
non-national relationships. 456 Partisans of this "new" lex mercatoria
look forward to a day when arbitrators will be free to decide cases
according to the custom of merchants, relaxing a national regulation
when it is "not fit for international trade." '457 Such a vision has not
been without its critics;458 yet the scholars who oppose it on public
legal systems"). Baker objected strenuously to such an approach, claiming that it
would allow the merchant community "to devise new forms of transaction which
defy existing law, and [entitle them] to have force breathed into them without the
sanction of legislation." BAKER, supra note 20, at 344-45. See generally Clayton P.
Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional Design and
International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 157 (2004).
455. Berman, supra note 196, at 55; see also Berman & Dasser, supra note 396,
at 34 (describing a provision in French law allowing a private arbitrator, under
certain circumstances, to decide disputes "according to the rules of law he deems
appropriate").
456. Carbonneau, supra note 9, at 14.
457. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 51. Goldman, to whom colleagues attribute "a
prominent role in defining [the law merchant's] sources and character," e.g.,
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Preface to LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra
note 9, at xi, has celebrated instances where "a principle or a rule, not taken from a
national law or even from international law . . . has been applied by arbitral
tribunals or even by state courts." Berthold Goldman, Introduction I, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at xv, xvi.
458. See, e.g., F.A. Mann, Introduction II, in LEX MERCATORA AND
ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at xix, xx (describing a procedure such as
Lowenfeld's as "nothing but palm-tree justice"); William W. Park, Control
Mechanisms in the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEx MERCA TORIA
AND ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 109 (asking if lex mercatoria were "a fig leaf
to hide an unauthorized substitution of [arbitrators'] private normative preferences
in place of the parties' shared expectations under the properly applicable law");
OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 130 (1994) (noting that such a theory "would grant arbitrators the
power to dictate which rules of national laws would be applied in the national
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policy grounds still generally accept the same distorted account of
history.459
As scholarship on the law merchant spins further and further away
from its documentary base, it has begun to breathe even the rarified
air of cyberspace. Building on the doctrine that international activity
is of a "sui generis character" and "warrants a special, separate
regime of governance, "460 lawyers facing new questions of
jurisdiction and conflict of laws on the Internet have turned to the
Romantic vision of the law merchant as a model for creating a new
legal order-a "Law Cyberspace"-without the involvement of
sovereign nation-states, implemented through private "cyberspace
arbitration. '461 David R. Johnson and David Post described a
medieval world in which merchants could not resolve their disputes
in feudal courts, "nor could the local lord easily establish meaningful
rules for a sphere of activity that he barely understood and that was
executed in locations beyond his control. 462 Instead, those who
"cared most about and best understood their new creation" formed
and championed the new law-and those who care most about and
arena, a rather strange prospect"); Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex
Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613, 628 (1989) (arguing for the use of the term
"principia mercatoria" rather than lex-signifying general principles and common
sense, but not a body of autonomous law); see also Lisa L. Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex
Mercatoria-Hoist With Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 67 (2004).
459. Cutler criticized the "Modem Law Merchant" for its role in expanding the
"global legal hegemony and imperialism" of a Western "mercatocracy." Cutler,
supra note 82, at 490. Yet she did so by contrasting it with an age when "medieval
merchants, their law, and their institutions" legitimately and truly "operated
outside the political economy of the time" Id. at 486, 490; see also A. Claire
Cutler, Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths, 24 MILLENNIUM 377 (1995); A.
CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY 10 (2003)
(emphasizing the "autonomous nature of the [medieval] merchant class and the
merchant courts"); cf CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 458, at 110 ("[I]n the Middle
Ages, international merchants ... developed customs and usages to regulate their
trade. These customs and usages... were handed down orally by merchants and
their binding effect was presumed by these merchants.").
460. Carbonneau, supra note 9, at 14.
461. Hardy, supra note 9, at 1037.
462. Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1389. The abbot of Ramsey might have
disagreed.
2006] 809
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
best understand their new creation, the Internet, should play a similar
role.463
Again, though they find their inspiration and examples in history,
such proposals are in fact concerned with the proper distribution of
power in contemporary society. For online activities that only
"minimally affect the vital interests of sovereigns," Johnson and Post
argued, the self-regulation of system administrators is "better suited
to dealing with the Net's legal issues."'464 Joel Reidenberg suggested
that a "Lex Informatica" empower "technologists" instead of public
actors, setting policy on topics such as data privacy through software
rather than legislatures.4 65 And Matthew Burnstein called for "the
medieval lex mercatoria" to serve as a "conceptual framework for a
new body of cyber-law" that would not be "subject to any state's
exclusive jurisdiction. '466
It is not for this Article to decide whether such a transnational,
customary body of law would be desirable for governing today's
commerce, let alone tomorrow's Internet. What seems more certain
is that there is little evidence such a law was in effect at the medieval
fair court of St. Ives.
The twentieth-century revival of the law merchant conceives of
this law as a solution to the legal problems created by cross-border
trade-as a substantive replacement for complicated doctrines of
conflict of laws. Thus Maitland's tentative description of the law
merchant as the "private international law" of the Middle Ages;4 67
thus Goldman's conception of "the law proper to international
economic relations";4 68 thus also its proposed use in cyberspace,
463. Id. at 1389-90.
464. Id. at 1390-91.
465. Reidenberg, supra note 9, at 587.
466. Burnstein, supra note 9, at 103, 108. He considered the use of admiralty
law as a model, but rejected its use of "the law of the flag as a choice of law
device." Id. To judge from their citations, these scholars generally obtained their
understanding of the law merchant from the works of Berman, Trakman, Bewes,
and Mitchell.
467. 1 SELECT PLEAS, supra note 14, at 133.
468. Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law-The
Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
113 (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1986), quoted in Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex
[21:685
FROM ST. IVES TO CYBERSPACE
where cross-border transactions are routine, and the application of
choice-of-law principles unclear. Within a single jurisdiction, it is
assumed, municipal regulation can be uncontroversially applied; but
when legal authorities begin to overlap, some new substantive
arrangements are required that only a separate law merchant can
provide.469
This was not the understanding at St. Ives. Nowhere in the fair
court's records do we read a concern for anything that might be
described as conflict of laws in the modern sense-whether, for
instance, to apply the laws of Leicester or Rouen to a given dispute,
or whether to enforce another set of substantive rules in the absence
of agreement.470 The St. Ives rolls-again, the best records available
for fair courts of the period-do not indicate that the court treated
international merchants as possessing any unique status or legal
autonomy, especially as compared to other manorial and seignorial
courts of the period. Furthermore, while English mercantile courts
may have occasionally given effect to the customs of merchants, they
were often commercial customs of a local nature, rather than the
universally shared customs of an international merchant class.
Perhaps the best description of what medieval merchants meant
when they invoked principles secundum legem mercatoriam was
unwittingly offered by Goldman, when he defined lex mercatoria as
"the law proper to international economic relations. 47' When used to
argue for the application of custom to modern commercial disputes,
this definition is, as Highet noted, "completely circular." '472 However,
when considered in the context of medieval demands that courts do
Mercatoria, in LEXMERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 102 (emphasis
added).
469. Cf Kadens, supra note 20, at 46 (distinguishing those medieval "traders
and artisans engaged in purely local commerce," who could be governed by local
laws, from those engaged in interjurisdictional activities: "the critical characteristic
of merchant law arguably lay in the fact that merchants either did business outside
the jurisdiction of their native law or did business with other merchants who lived
under different laws"). In order to "get around" the various legal and practical
disadvantages of alien traders, a solution was found in "[t]he creation of special
laws that merchants could apply amongst themselves." Id. at 47.
470. See, e.g., Curteis v. St. Romain (St. Ives Fair Ct. 1287), in 1 SCLM, supra
note 1, at 26.
471. Goldman, supra note 468, at 113, quoted in Highet, supra note 468, at 102.
472. Highet, supra note 468, at 102.
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'right' and 'justice' to the parties before them, an understanding of
lex mercatoria as 'mercantile law,' as 'the law appropriate to govern
trade,' makes perfect sense. It best explains the strange mixture of
equity and custom applied at the fair court of St. Ives-as well as the
manner in which merchants could seek the protection of a general
'law' without necessarily asking for specific and uniform rules of
substance and procedure. The suitors of the St. Ives court could all
agree that cases ought to be decided by principles of lex mercatoria,
even if the content of those principles were a matter of dispute.
Though modem-day authors may envision a single, cosmopolitan
body of law to govern international commerce, the same cannot
necessarily be said of the medieval traders whose examples they
invoke.
The story of the wine merchant Gerard of Cologne is not over;
cross-border wine sales occupy the attention of the Supreme Court
much as they did the fair court of St. Ives.473 But whatever Gerard's
experience may reveal of thirteenth-century Huntingdonshire, it has
little to offer the architects of a new legal order. The proceedings at
St. Ives must be understood in contemporary terms, and not as
medieval prototypes of the laws we would seek today.
473. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
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